An overwhelming body of scientific evidence now clearly indicates that climate change is a serious and urgent issue. The Earth's climate is rapidly changing, mainly as a result of increases in greenhouse gases caused by human activities.\n\nMost climate models show that a doubling of pre-industrial levels of greenhouse gases is very likely to commit the Earth to a rise of between 2 - 5°C in global mean temperatures. This level of greenhouse gases will probably be reached between 2030 and 2060. A warming of 5°C on a global scale would be far outside the experience of human civilisation and comparable to the difference between temperatures during the last ice age and today. Several new studies suggest up to a 20% chance that warming could be greater than 5°C.\n\nIf annual greenhouse gas emissions remained at the current level, concentrations would be more than treble pre-industrial levels by 2100, committing the world to 3 - 10°C warming, based on the latest climate projections.\n\nSome impacts of climate change itself may amplify warming further by triggering the release of additional greenhouse gases. This creates a real risk of even higher temperature changes.\n* Higher temperatures cause plants and soils to soak up less carbon from the atmosphere and cause permafrost to thaw, potentially releasing large quantities of methane.\n* Analysis of warming events in the distant past indicates that such feedbacks could amplify warming by an additional 1 - 2°C by the end of the century.\nWarming is very likely to intensify the water cycle, reinforcing existing patterns of water scarcity and abundance and increasing the risk of droughts and floods.\nRainfall is likely to increase at high latitudes, while regions with Mediterranean-like climates in both hemispheres will experience significant reductions in rainfall. Preliminary estimates suggest that the fraction of land area in extreme drought at any one time will increase from 1% to 30% by the end of this century. In other regions, warmer air and warmer oceans are likely to drive more intense storms, particularly hurricanes and typhoons.\n\nAs the world warms, the risk of abrupt and large-scale changes in the climate system will rise.\n* Changes in the distribution of heat around the world are likely to disrupt ocean and atmospheric circulations, leading to large and possibly abrupt shifts in regional weather patterns.\n* If the Greenland or West Antarctic Ice Sheets began to melt irreversibly, the rate of sea level rise could more than double, committing the world to an eventual sea level rise of 5 - 12 m over several centuries.\nThe body of evidence and the growing quantitative assessment of risks are now sufficient to give clear and strong guidance to economists and policy-makers in shaping a response.

Understanding the scientific evidence for the human influence on climate is an essential starting point for the economics, both for establishing that there is indeed a problem to be tackled and for comprehending its risk and scale. It is the science that dictates the type of economics and where the analyses should focus, for example, on the economics of risk, the nature of public goods or how to deal with externalities, growth and development and intra- and inter-generational equity. The relevance of these concepts, and others, is discussed in Chapter 2.\n\nThis chapter begins by describing the changes observed in the Earth's system, examining briefly the debate over the attribution of these changes to human activities. It is a debate that, after more than a decade of research and discussion, has reached the conclusion there is no other plausible explanation for the observed warming for at least the past 50 years. The question of precisely how much the world will warm in the future is still an area of active research. The Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)1 in 2001 was the last comprehensive assessment of the state of the science. This chapter uses the 2001 report as a base and builds on it with more recent studies that embody a more explicit treatment of risk. These studies support the broad conclusions of that report, but demonstrate a sizeable probability that the sensitivity of the climate to greenhouse gases is greater than previously thought. Scientists have also begun to quantify the effects of feedbacks with the natural carbon cycle, for example, exploring how warming may affect the rate of absorption of carbon dioxide by forests and soils. These types of feedbacks are predicted to further amplify warming, but are not typically included in climate models to date. The final section of this chapter provides a starting point for Part II, by exploring what basic science reveals about how warming will affect people around the world.

An overwhelming body of scientific evidence indicates that the Earth's climate is rapidly changing, predominantly as a result of increases in greenhouse gases caused by human activities.\n\nHuman activities are changing the composition of the atmosphere and its properties. Since pre-industrial times (around 1750), carbon dioxide concentrations have increased by just over one third from 280 parts per million (ppm) to 380 ppm today (Figure 1.1), predominantly as a result of burning fossil fuels, deforestation, and other changes in land-use.2 This has been accompanied by rising concentrations of other greenhouse gases, particularly methane and nitrous oxide.\n\nThere is compelling evidence that the rising levels of greenhouse gases will have a warming effect on the climate through increasing the amount of infrared radiation (heat energy) trapped by the atmosphere: "the greenhouse effect" (Figure 1.2). In total, the warming effect due to all (Kyoto) greenhouse gases emitted by human activities is now equivalent to around 430 ppm of carbon dioxide (hereafter, CO~~2~~ equivalent or CO~~2~~e)3 (Figure 1.1) and rising at around 2.3 ppm per year4. Current levels of greenhouse gases are higher now than at any time in at least the past 650,000 years.5\n\n<<tiddler "Figure 1.1">>\n\n<<tiddler "Figure 1.2">>\nThe Earth has warmed by 0.7°C since around 1900 (Figure 1.3). Global mean temperature is referred to throughout the Review and is used as a rough index of the scale of climate change. This measure is an average over both space (globally across the land-surface air, up to about 1.5 m above the ground, and sea-surface temperature to around 1 m depth) and time (an annual mean over a defined time period). All temperatures are given relative to pre-industrial, unless otherwise stated. As discussed later in this chapter, this warming does not occur evenly across the planet.\n\nOver the past 30 years, global temperatures have risen rapidly and continuously at around 0.2°C per decade, bringing the global mean temperature to what is probably at or near the warmest level reached in the current interglacial period, which began around 12,000 years ago8. All of the ten warmest years on record have occurred since 1990. The first signs of changes can be seen in many physical and biological systems, for example many species have been moving poleward by 6 km on average each decade for the past 30 - 40 years. Another sign is changing seasonal events, such as flowering and egg laying, which have been occurring 2 - 3 days earlier each decade in many Northern Hemisphere temperate regions.9\n\n<<tiddler "Figure 1.3">>\nThe IPCC concluded in 2001 that there is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over at least the past 50 years is attributable to human activities.10 Their confidence is based on several decades of active debate and effort to scrutinise the detail of the evidence and to investigate a broad range of hypotheses.\n\nOver the past few decades, there has been considerable debate over whether the trend in global mean temperatures can be attributed to human activities. Attributing trends to a single influence is difficult to establish unequivocally because the climate system can often respond in unexpected ways to external influences and has a strong natural variability. For example, Box 1.1 briefly describes the debate over whether the observed increase in temperatures over the last century is beyond that expected from natural variability alone throughout the last Millennium.\n\n<<tiddler "Box 1.1">>\nMuch of the debate over the attribution of climate change has now been settled as new evidence has emerged to reconcile outstanding issues. It is now clear that, while natural factors, such as changes in solar intensity and volcanic eruptions, can explain much of the trend in global temperatures in the early nineteenth century, the rising levels of greenhouse gases provide the only plausible explanation for the observed trend for at least the past 50 years. Over this period, the sustained globally averaged warming contrasts strongly with the slight cooling expected from natural factors alone. Recent modelling by the Hadley Centre and other research institutes supports this. These models show that the observed trends in temperatures at the surface and in the oceans12, as well as the spatial distribution of warming13, cannot be replicated without the inclusion of both human and natural effects.\n\nTaking into account the rising levels of aerosols, which cool the atmosphere,14 and the observed heat uptake by the oceans, the calculated warming effect of greenhouse gases is more than enough to explain the observed temperature rise.

The causal link between greenhouse gases concentrations and global temperatures is well established, founded on principles established by scientists in the nineteenth century.\n\nThe greenhouse effect is a natural process that keeps the Earth's surface around 30°C warmer than it would be otherwise. Without this effect, the Earth would be too cold to support life. Current understanding of the greenhouse effect has its roots in the simple calculations laid out in the nineteenth century by scientists such as Fourier, Tyndall and Arrhenius15. Fourier realised in the 1820s that the atmosphere was more permeable to incoming solar radiation than outgoing infrared radiation and therefore trapped heat. Thirty years later, Tyndall identified the types of molecules (known as greenhouse gases), chiefly carbon dioxide and water vapour, which create the heat-trapping effect. Arrhenius took this a step further showing that doubling the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would lead to significant changes in surface temperatures.\n\nSince Fourier, Tyndall and Arrhenius made their first estimates, scientists have improved their understanding of how greenhouse gases absorb radiation, allowing them to make more accurate calculations of the links between greenhouse gas concentrations and temperatures. For example, it is now well established that the warming effect of carbon dioxide rises approximately logarithmically with its concentration in the atmosphere16. From simple energy-balance calculations, the direct warming effect of a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations would lead to an average surface warming of around 1°C.\n\nBut the atmosphere is much more complicated than these simple models suggest. The resulting warming will in fact be much greater than 1°C because of the interaction between feedbacks in the atmosphere that act to amplify or dampen the direct warming (Figure 1.4). The main positive feedback comes from water vapour, a very powerful greenhouse gas itself. Evidence shows that, as expected from basic physics, a warmer atmosphere holds more water vapour and traps more heat, amplifying the initial warming.17\n\nUsing climate models that follow basic physical laws, scientists can now assess the likely range ofwarming for a given level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.\n\nIt is currently impossible to pinpoint the exact change in temperature that will be associated with a level of greenhouse gases. Nevertheless, increasingly sophisticated climate models are able to capture some of the chaotic nature of the climate, allowing scientists to develop a greater understanding of the many complex interactions within the system and estimate how changing greenhouse gas levels will affect the climate. Climate models use the laws of nature to simulate the radiative balance and flows of energy and materials. These models are vastly different from those generally used in economic analyses, which rely predominantly on curve fitting. Climate models cover multiple dimensions, from temperature at different heights in the atmosphere, to wind speeds and snow cover. Also, climate models are tested for their ability to reproduce past climate variations across several dimensions, and to simulate aspects of present climate that they have not been specifically tuned to fit.\n\n<<tiddler "Figure 1.4">>\nFeedbacks including a possible reduction in the efficiency of the land and oceans to absorb carbon dioxide emissions and increased natural releases of methane\n\nLocal and global feedbacks, for example: changes in the clouds, the water content of the atmosphere and the amount of sunlight reflected by sea ice (albedo)\n\nThe accuracy of climate predictions is limited by computing power. This, for example, restricts the scale of detail of models, meaning that small-scale processes must be included through highly simplified calculations. It is important to continue the active research and development of more powerful climate models to reduce the remaining uncertainties in climate projections.\n\nThe sensitivity of mean surface temperatures to greenhouse gas levels is benchmarked against the warming expected for a doubling of carbon dioxide levels from pre-industrial (roughly equivalent to 550 ppm CO~~2~~e). This is called the "climate sensitivity" and is an important quantity in accessing the economics of climate change. By comparing predictions of different state-of-the-art climate models, the IPCC TAR concluded that the likely range of climate sensitivity is 1.5° - 4.5°C. This range is much larger than the 1°C direct warming effect expected from a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations, thus emphasising the importance of feedbacks within the atmosphere. For illustration, using this range of sensitivities, if greenhouse gas levels could be stabilised at today's levels (430 ppm CO~~2~~e), global mean temperatures would eventually rise to around 1° - 3°C above pre-industrial (up to 2°C more than today)18. This is not the same as the "warming commitment" today from past emissions, which includes the current levels of aerosols in the atmosphere (discussed later in this chapter).\n\nResults from new risk based assessments suggest there is a significant chance that the climate system is more sensitive than was originally thought.\n\nSince 2001, a number of studies have used both observations and modelling to explore the full range of climate sensitivities that appear realistic given current knowledge (Box 1.2). This new evidence is important in two ways: firstly, the conclusions are broadly consistent with the IPCC TAR, but indicate that higher climate sensitivities cannot be excluded; and secondly, it allows a more explicit treatment of risk.\n\nFor example, eleven recent studies suggest only between a 0% and 2% chance that the climate sensitivity is less than 1°C, but between a 2% and 20% chance that climate sensitivity is greater than 5°C19. These sensitivities imply that there is up to a one-in-five chance that the world would experience a warming in excess of 3°C above pre-industrial even if greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilised at today's level of 430 ppm CO~~2~~e.\n\n<<tiddler "Box 1.2">>\nIn the future, climate change itself could trigger additional increases in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, further amplifying warming. These potentially powerful feedbacks are less well understood and only beginning to be quantified.\n\nClimate change projections must also take into account the strong possibility that climate change itself may accelerate future warming by reducing natural absorption and releasing stores of carbon dioxide and methane. These feedbacks are not incorporated into most climate models to date because their effects are only just beginning to be understood and quantified.\n\nRising temperatures and changes in rainfall patterns are expected to weaken the ability of the Earth's natural sinks to absorb carbon dioxide (Box 1.3), causing a larger fraction of human emissions to accumulate in the atmosphere. While this finding is not new, until recently the effect was not quantified.\n\nNew models, which explicitly include interactions between carbon sinks and climate, suggest that by 2100, greenhouse gas concentrations will be 20 - 200 ppm higher than they would have otherwise been, amplifying warming by 0.1 - 1.5°C.21 Some models predict future reductions in tropical rainforests, particularly the Amazon, also releasing more carbon into the atmosphere22. Chapter 8 discusses the implications of weakened carbon sinks for stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations.\n\nWidespread thawing of permafrost regions is likely to add to the extra warming caused by weakening of carbon sinks. Large quantities of methane (and carbon dioxide) could be released from the thawing of permafrost and frozen peat bogs. One estimate, for example, suggests that if all the carbon accumulated in peat alone since the last ice age were released into the atmosphere, this would raise greenhouse gas levels by 200 ppm CO~~2~~e.23 Additional emissions may be seen from warming tropical wetlands, but this is more uncertain. Together, wetlands and frozen lands store more carbon than has been released already by human activities since industrialisation began. Substantial thawing of permafrost has already begun in some areas; methane emissions have increased by 60% in northern Siberia since the mid-1970s24.\n\nStudies of the overall scale and timing of future releases are scarce, but initial estimates suggest that methane emissions (currently 15% of all emissions in terms of CO~~2~~ equivalent25) may increase by around 50% by 2100 (Box 1.3).\n\nPreliminary estimates suggest that these "positive feedbacks" could lead to an addition rise intemperatures of 1 - 2°C by 2100.\n\nRecent studies have used information from past ice ages to estimate how much extra warming would be produced by such feedbacks. Warming following previous ice ages triggered the release of carbon dioxide and methane from the land and oceans, raising temperatures by more than that expected from solar effects alone. If present day climate change triggered feedbacks of a similar size, temperatures in 2100 would be 1 - 2°C higher than expected from the direct warming caused by greenhouse gases.26\n\nThere are still many unanswered questions about these positive feedbacks between the atmosphere, land and ocean. The combined effect of high climate sensitivity and carbon cycle feedbacks is only beginning to be explored, but first indications are that this could lead to far higher temperature increases than are currently anticipated (discussed in chapter 6). It remains unclear whether warming could initiate a self-perpetuating effect that would lead to a much larger temperature rise or even runaway warming, or if some unknown feedback could reduce the sensitivity substantially27. Further research is urgently required to quantify the combined effects of these types of feedbacks.\n\n<<tiddler "Box 1.3">>\n

Additional warming is already in the pipeline due to past and present emissions.\n\nThe full warming effect of past emissions is yet to be realised. Observations show that the oceans have taken up around 84% of the total heating of the Earth's system over the last 40 years36. If global emissions were stopped today, some of this heat would be exchanged with the atmosphere as the system came back into equilibrium, causing an additional warming. Climate models project that the world is committed to a further warming of 0.5° - 1°C over several decades due to past emissions37. This warming is smaller than the warming expected if concentrations were stabilised at 430 ppm CO~~2~~e, because atmospheric aerosols mask a proportion of the current warming effect of greenhouse gases. Aerosols remain in the atmosphere for only a few weeks and are not expected to be present in significant levels at stabilisation38.\n\nIf annual emissions continued at today's levels, greenhouse gas levels would be close to double pre-industrial levels by the middle of the century. If this concentration were sustained, temperatures are projected to eventually rise by 2 - 5�C or even higher.\n\nProjections of future warming depend on projections of global emissions (discussed in chapter 7). If annual emissions were to remain at today's levels, greenhouse gas levels would reach close to 550 ppm CO~~2~~e by 205039. Using the lower and upper 90% confidence bounds based on the IPCC TAR range and recent research from the Hadley Centre, this would commit the world to a warming of around 2 - 5°C (Table 1.1). As demonstrated in Box 1.2, these two climate sensitivity distributions lie close to the centre of recent projections and are used throughout this Review to give illustrative temperature projections. Positive feedbacks, such as methane emissions from permafrost, could drive temperatures even higher.\n\nNear the middle of this range of warming (around 2 - 3°C above today), the Earth would reach a temperature not seen since the middle Pliocene around 3 million years ago40. This level of warming on a global scale is far outside the experience of human civilisation.\n\nTable 1.1 Temperature projections at stabilisation\n\nMeinshausen (2006) used climate sensitivity estimates from eleven recent studies to estimate the range of equilibrium temperature changes expected at stabilisation. The table below gives the equilibrium temperature projections using the 5 - 95% climate sensitivity ranges based on the IPCC TAR (Wigley and Raper (2001)), Hadley Centre (Murphy et al. 2004) and the range over all eleven studies. Note that the temperature changes expected prior to equilibrium, for example in 2100, would be lower.\n\nTemperature increase at equilibrium relative to pre-industrial (°C) Stabilisation level\n(ppm CO~~2~~ equivalent) IPCC TAR 2001\n(Wigley and Raper)\nHadley Centre\nEnsemble\nEleven Studies\n400 0.8 - 2.4 1.3 - 2.8 0.6 - 4.9\n450 1.0 - 3.1 1.7 - 3.7 0.8 - 6.4\n500 1.3 - 3.8 2.0 - 4.5 1.0 - 7.9\n550 1.5 - 4.4 2.4 - 5.3 1.2 - 9.1\n650 1.8 - 5.5 2.9 - 6.6 1.5 - 11.4\n750 2.2 - 6.4 3.4 - 7.7 1.7 - 13.3\n1000 2.8 - 8.3 4.4 - 9.9 2.2 - 17.1\n\nHowever, these are conservative estimates of the expected warming, because in the absence of an effective climate policy, changes in land use and the growth in population and energy consumption around the world will drive greenhouse gas emissions far higher than today. This would lead greenhouse gas levels to attain higher levels than suggested above. The IPCC projects that without intervention greenhouse gas levels will rise to 550 - 700 ppm CO~~2~~e by 2050 and 650 - 1200 ppm CO~~2~~e by 210041. These projections and others are discussed in Chapter 7, which concludes that, without mitigation, greenhouse gas levels are likely to be towards the upper end of these ranges. If greenhouse gas levels were to reach 1000 ppm, more than treble pre-industrial levels, the Earth would be committed to around a 3 - 10°C of warming or more, even without considering the risk of positive feedbacks (Table 1.1).

This chapter has so far considered only the expected changes in global average surface temperatures. However, this can often mask both the variability in temperature changes across the earth's surface and changes in extremes. In addition, the impacts on people will be felt mainly through water, driven by shifts in regional weather patterns, particularly rainfall and extreme events (more detail in Part II).\n\nIn general, higher latitudes and continental regions will experience temperature increases significantly greater than the global average.\n\nFuture warming will occur unevenly and will be superimposed on existing temperature patterns. Today, the tropics are around 15°C warmer than the mid-latitudes and more than 25°C warmer than the high latitudes. In future, the smallest temperature increases will generally occur over the oceans and some tropical coastal regions. The largest temperature increases are expected in the high latitudes (particularly around the poles), where melting snow and sea ice will reduce the reflectivity of the surface, leading to a greater than average warming. For a global average warming of around 4°C, the oceans and coasts generally warm by around 3°C, the mid-latitudes warm by more than 5°C and the poles by around 8°C.\n\nThe risk of heat waves is expected to increase (Figure 1.5). For example, new modelling work by the Hadley Centre shows that the summer of 2003 was Europe's hottest for 500 years and that human-induced climate change has already more than doubled the chance of a summer as hot as 2003 in Europe occurring.42 By 2050, under a relatively high emissions scenario, the temperatures experienced during the heatwave of 2003 could be an average summer. The rise in heatwave frequency will be felt most severely in cities, where temperatures are further amplified by the urban heat island effect.\n\nChanges in rainfall patterns and extreme weather events will lead to more severe impacts on people than that caused by warming alone.\n\nWarming will change rainfall patterns, partly because warmer air holds more moisture, and also because the uneven distribution of warming around the world will lead to shifts in large-scale weather regimes. Most climate models predict increases in rainfall at high latitudes, while changes in circulation patterns are expected to cause a drying of the subtropics, with northern Africa and the Mediterranean experiencing significant reductions in rainfall. There is more uncertainty about changes in rainfall in the tropics (Figure 1.6), mainly because of complicated interactions between climate change and natural cycles like the El Ni�o, which dominate climate in the tropics.43 For example, an El Ni�o event with strong warming in the central Pacific can cause the Indian monsoon to switch into a "dry mode", characterised by significant reductions in rainfall leading to severe droughts. These delicate interactions could cause abrupt shifts in rainfall patterns. This is an area that urgently needs more research because of the potential effect on billions of people, especially in South and East Asia (more detail in Part II).\n\n<<tiddler "Figure 1.5">>\n\n<<tiddler "Figure 1.6">>\nGreater evaporation and more intense rainfall will increase the risk of droughts and flooding in areas already at risk.45 It could also increase the size of areas at risk; one recent study, the first of its kind, estimates that the fraction of land area in moderate drought at any one time will increase from 25% at present to 50% by the 2090s, and the fraction in extreme drought from 3% to 30%46.\n\nHurricanes and other storms are likely to become more intense in a warmer, more energised world, as the water cycle intensifies, but changes to their location and overall numbers47 remain less certain. There is growing evidence the expected increases in hurricane severity are already occurring, above and beyond any natural decadal cycles. Recent work suggests that the frequency of very intense hurricanes and typhoons (Category 4 and 5) in the Atlantic Basin has doubled since the 1970s as a result of rising sea-surface temperatures.48 This remains an active area of scientific debate49. In higher latitudes, some models show a general shift in winter storm tracks towards the poles.50 In Australia, this could lead to water scarcity as the country relies on winter storms to supply water51.\n\nClimate change could weaken the Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation, partially offsetting warming in both Europe and eastern North America, or in an extreme case causing a significant cooling.\n\nThe warming effect of greenhouse gases has the potential to trigger abrupt, large-scale and irreversible changes in the climate system. One example is a possible collapse of the North Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation (THC). In the North Atlantic, the Gulf Stream and North Atlantic drift (important currents of the North Atlantic THC) have a significant warming effect on the climates of Europe and parts of North America. The THC may be weakened, as the upper ocean warms and/or if more fresh water (from melting glaciers and increased rainfall) is laid over the salty seawater.52 No complex climate models currently predict a complete collapse. Instead, these models point towards a weakening of up to half by the end of the century53. Any sustained weakening of the THC is likely to have a cooling effect on the climates of Europe and eastern North America, but this would only offset a portion of the regional warming due to greenhouse gases. A recent study using direct ocean measurements (the first of its kind) suggests that part of the THC may already have weakened by up to 30% in the past few decades, but the significance of this is not yet known.54 The potential for abrupt, large-scale changes in climate requires further research.\n\nSea levels will continue to rise, with very large increases if the Greenland Ice Sheet starts to melt irreversibly or the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) collapses.\n\nSea levels will respond more slowly than temperatures to changing greenhouse gas concentrations. Sea levels are currently rising globally at around 3 mm per year and the rise has been accelerating55. According to the IPCC TAR, sea levels are projected to rise by 9 - 88 cm by 2100, mainly due to expansion of the warmer oceans and melting glaciers on land.56 However, because warming only penetrates the oceans very slowly, sea levels will continue to rise substantially more over several centuries. On past emissions alone, the world has built up a substantial commitment to sea level rise. One study estimates an existing commitment of between 0.1 and 1.1 metres over 400 years.57\n\n<<tiddler "Box 1.4">>\nAs global temperatures continue to rise, so do the risks of additional sea level contributions from large-scale melting or collapse of ice sheets. If the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets began to melt irreversibly, the world would be committed to substantial increases in sea level in the range 5 - 12 m over a timescale of centuries to millennia.65 The immediate effect would be a potential doubling of the rate of sea level rise: 1 - 3 mm per year from Greenland and as high as 5 mm per year from the WAIS.66 For illustration, if these higher rates were reached by the end of this century, the upper range of global sea level rise projections would exceed 1m by 2100. Both of these ice sheets are already showing signs of vulnerability, with ice discharge accelerating over large areas, but the thresholds at which large-scale changes are triggered remain uncertain (Box 1.4).

Climate change is a serious and urgent issue. While climate change and climate modelling are subject to inherent uncertainties, it is clear that human activities have a powerful role in influencing the climate and the risks and scale of impacts in the future. All the science implies a strong likelihood that, if emissions continue unabated, the world will experience a radical transformation of its climate. Part II goes on to discuss the profound implications that this will have for our way of life.\n\nThe science provides clear guidance for the analysis of the economics and policy. The following chapter examines the implications of the science for the structuring of the economics.

The Third Assessment Report of the IPCC gives the most comprehensive assessment of the science of climate change up to 2001 (IPCC 2001a,b). The summary for policymakers gives a good introduction to the more in-depth analyses of the three working groups. Maslin (2004) provides a more narrative description of climate change, including an overview of the history. Schellnhuber (2006) gives a good summary of the evolution of the science from early 2001 to 2005, including articles describing temperature projections based on new estimates of climate sensitivity (e.g. Meinshausen (2006)), positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle (e.g. Cox et al. (2006)) and several articles on the impacts of climate change.\n\nAnnan, J.D. and J.C. Hargreaves (2006): 'Using multiple observationally-based constraints to estimate climate sensitivity', Geophysical Research Letters 33: L06704\n\nArcher, D. (2005): 'Methane hydrates and anthropogenic climate change', Reviews of Geophysics, submitted, available from http://geosci.uchicago.edu/~archer/reprints/archer.ms.clathrates.pdf\n\nBarnett T.P., D.W. Pierce, K.M. AchutaRao et al. (2005): 'Penetration of human-induced warming into the world's oceans', Science 309: 284 - 287\n\nBengtsson, L., K. Hodges and E. Roeckner (2006): 'Storm tracks and climate change', Journal of Climate, in press.\n\nBrohan. P., J.J. Kennedy, I. Harris, et al. (2006): 'Uncertainty estimates in regional and global observed temperature changes: a new dataset from 1850'. Journal of Geophysical Research, 111, D12106, doi: 10.1029/2005JD006548\n\nBurke, E.J., S.J. Brown and N. Christidis (2006): 'Modelling the Recent Evolution of Global Drought and Projections for the Twenty-First Century with the Hadley Centre Climate Model', Journal of Hydrometeorology, 7(5):1113 - 1125\n\nBryden, H.L., H.R. Longworth and S.A. Cunningham (2005): 'Slowing of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation at 25°N', Nature 438: 655-657\n\nChurch, J.A., and N.J. White (2006): 'A 20th century acceleration in global sea-level rise', Geophysical Research Letters, 33, L01602, doi: 10.1029/2005GL024826.\n\nCollins, M. and the CMIP Modelling Group (2005): 'El Nino - or La Nina-like climate change? Climate Dynamics' 24: 89-104\n\nCox, P.M., R.A. Betts, C.D. Jones, et al. (2000): 'Acceleration of global warming due to carbon-cycle feedbacks in a coupled climate model', Nature 408: 184-187\n\nCox P.M., C. Huntingford and C.D. Jones (2006): 'Conditions for Sink-to-Source Transitions and Runaway Feedbacks from the Land Carbon Cycle', in Avoiding dangerous climate change, H.J. Schellnhuber et al. (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.155 - 163.\n\nDavidson and Janssens (2006): 'Temperature sensitivity of soil carbon decomposition and feedbacks to climate change', Nature 440: 165-173\n\nDEFRA (2005): 'Climate change and the greenhouse effect: a briefing from the Hadley Centre', available from http://www.metoffice.com/research/hadleycentre/pubs/brochures/2005/climate_greenhouse.pdf\n\nEmanuel, K. (2005): 'Increased destructiveness of tropical cyclones over the past 30 years', Nature 436: 686-688\n\nForest, C.E., P.H. Stone and A.P. Sokolov (2006): 'Estimates PDFs of climate system properties including natural and anthropogenic forcings', Geophysical Research Letters 33: L01705, doi: 10.1029/2005GL023977\n\nFriedlingstein, P., P. Cox, R. Betts et al. (2006): 'Climate-carbon cycle feedback analysis: results from C4MIP model intercomparison', Journal of Climate, 19: 3337-3353\n\nFyfe, J.C. (2003): 'Extratropical southern hemisphere cyclones: Harbingers of climate change?' Journal of Climate 16, 2802-2805\n\nGedney, N., P.M. Cox and C. Huntingford (2004): 'Climate feedback from wetland methane emissions', Geophysical Research Letters 31 (20): L20503\n\nGeng, Q.Z. and M. Sugi (2003): 'Possible changes in extratropical cyclone activity due to enhanced greenhouse gases and aerosols - Study with a high resolution AGCM'. Journal of Climate 16: 2262-2274.\n\nGorham, E. (1991): 'Northern Peatlands: Role in the Carbon Cycle and Probable Responses to Climatic Warming', Ecological Applications 1: 182-195, doi: 10.2307/1941811\n\nGregory, J. and P. Huybrechts (2006): 'Ice sheet contributions to future sea level change', Phil Trans Royal Soc A 364: 1709 - 1731, doi: 10.1098/rsta.2006.1796\n\nHadley Centre (2005): 'Stabilising climate to avoid dangerous climate change - a summary of relevant research at the Hadley Centre', available from http://www.metoffice.com/research/hadleycentre/pubs/brochures\n\nHanna, E., P. Huybrechts, and I. Janssens, et al. (2005): 'Runoff and mass balance of the Greenland ice sheet: 1958-2003'. Journal of Geophysical Research 110, D13108, doi: 10.1029/2004JD005641\n\nHansen, J., M. Sato, R. Ruedy, et al. (2006): 'Global temperature change, Proceedings of the National Academy', 103: 14288-14293\n\nHope, P.K. (2006): 'Projected future changes in synoptic systems influencing southwest Western Australia. Climate Dynamics' 26: 765-780, doi: 10.1007/s00382-006-0116-x\n\nHuntington, T.G. (2006): 'Evidence for intensification of the global water cycle: review and synthesis', Journal of Hydrology 319: 1 - 13\n\nHuybrechts, P. and J. de Wolde (1999): 'The dynamic response of the Greenland Ice Sheet and Antarctic ice sheets to a multiple century climatic-warming', Journal of Climate 12: 2169-2188\n\nInternational ad hoc detection group (2005): 'Detecting and attributing external influences on the climate system: a review of recent advances', Journal of Climate 18: 1291-1314\n\nIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001a): 'Climate change 2001: summary for policymakers, A contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change' [Watson RT, and the Core Writing Team (eds.)], Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\n\nIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001b): 'Climate change 2001: the scientific basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change' [Houghton JT, Ding Y, Griggs DJ, et al. (eds.)], Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\n\nJohannessen, O.M., K. Khvorostovsky, M.W. Miles et al. (2005): 'Recent ice-sheet growth in the interior of Greenland'. Science 310: 1013-1016\n\nKnutti, R., T.F. Stocker, F. Joos and G-K Plattner (2002): 'Constraints on radiative forcing and future climate change from observations and climate model ensembles', Nature 416: 719 - 723\n\nLawrence D.M. and A.G. Slater (2005): 'A projection of severe near-surface permafrost degradation during the 21st century', Geophysical Research Letters 32: L24401\n\nLambert S.J. and J.C. Fyfe (2006): 'Changes in winter cyclone frequencies and strengths simulated in enhanced greenhouse warming experiments: results from models participating in the IPCC diagnostic exercise', Climate Dynamics 1432, 0894\n\nLandsea, C. (2005): 'Atlantic hurricanes and global warming', Nature 438, E11-E12\n\nLevitus, S.J., J. Antonov and T. Boyer (2005): 'Warming of the world ocean 1955 - 2003', Geophysical Research Letters 32: L02604, doi:10.1029/2004GL021592\n\nLindzen, R.S., M-D Chou and A.Y. Hou (2001): 'Does the earth have an adaptive infrared iris?' Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 82: 417-432\n\nMann, M.E., R.S. Bradley and M.K. Hughes (1999): 'Northern hemisphere temperatures during the past millennium: inferences, uncertainties, and limitations', Geophysical Research Letters, 26, 759-762.\n\nMaslin, M. (2004): 'Global warming: a very short introduction', New York: Oxford University Press.\n\nMeehl, G.A., W.M. Washington, W.D. Collins et al. (2005): 'How much more global warming and sea level rise?' Science 307:1769 - 1772\n\nMeinshausen, M. (2006): 'What does a 2°C target mean for greenhouse gas concentrations? A brief analysis based on multi-gas emission pathways and several climate sensitivity uncertainty estimates', Avoiding dangerous climate change, in H.J. Schellnhuber et al. (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.265 - 280.\n\nMurphy, J.M., D.M.H. Sexton D.N. Barnett et al. (2004): 'Quantification of modelling uncertainties in a large ensemble of climate change simulations', Nature 430: 768 - 772\n\nNational Research Council (2006): 'Surface temperature reconstructions for the past 2,000 years', available from http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11676.html\n\nNorth Greenland Ice Core Project (2004): 'High-resolution record of Northern Hemisphere climate extending into the last interglacial maximum', Nature 431: 147-151\n\nOrr, J.C., V.J. Fabry, O. Aumont et al. (2005): 'Anthropogenic ocean acidification over the twenty-first century and its impact on calcifying organisms', Nature 437: 681-686\n\nParmesan, C. and G. Yohe (2003): 'A globally coherent fingerprint of climate change impacts across natural systems', Nature 421: 37 - 42\n\nPearce, F. (2003): 'Land of the midnight sums', New Scientist 177: 2379\n\nPierrehumbert, R.T. (2004): 'Warming the world', Nature 432: 677, doi: 10.1038/432677a\n\nPielke, R. (2005): 'Meteorology: Are there trends in hurricane destruction?' Nature 438: E11\n\nRapley, C. (2006): 'The Antarctic ice sheet and sea level rise', in Avoiding dangerous climate change, Schellnhuber HJ (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25 - 28.\n\nRignot, E. and P. Kanagaratnam (2006): 'Changes in the velocity structure of the Greenland ice sheet. Science' 311: 986-990\n\nRoot, T.L., D.P. MacMynowski, M.D. Mastrandrea and S.H. Schneider (2005): 'Human-modified temperatures induce species changes: combined attribution', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102: 7465 - 7469\n\nSch�r, C., P.L. Vidale, D. L�thi, et al. (2004): 'The role of increasing temperature variability in European summer heatwaves', Nature 427: 332-336, doi: 10.1038/nature02300\n\nScheffer, M., V. Brovkin and P. Cox (2006): 'Positive feedback between global warming and the atmospheric CO~~2~~ concentration inferred from past climate change'. Geophysical Research Letters 33, L10702\n\nSchellnhuber, H.J., W. Cramer, N. Nakicenovic et al. (eds.) (2006): 'Avoiding dangerous climate change', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\n\nSchlesinger, M.E., J. Yin, G. Yohe, et al. (2006): 'Assessing the risk of a collapse of the Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation', in Avoiding dangerous climate change, H.J. Schellnhuber et al. (eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37 - 47.\n\nScholze, M., K. Wolfgang, N. Arnell and C. Prentice (2006): 'A climate-change risk analysis for world ecosystems', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103: 13116 - 13120\n\nSiegenthaler U, Stocker T.F., Monnin E, et al. 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1 The fourth assessment is due in 2007. The scientific advances since the TAR are discussed in Schellnhuber et al. (2006)\n\n2 The human origin of the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is demonstrated through, for example, the isotope composition and hemispheric gradient of atmospheric carbon dioxide (IPCC 2001a).\n\n3 In this Review, the total radiative effect of greenhouse gases is quoted in terms of the equivalent concentration (in ppm) of carbon dioxide and will include the six Kyoto greenhouse gases. It will not include other human influences on the radiation budget of the atmosphere, such as ozone, land properties (i.e. albedo), aerosols or the non-greenhouse gas effects of aircraft unless otherwise stated, because the radiative forcing of these substances is less certain, their effects have a shorter timescale and they are unlikely to form a substantial component of the radiative forcing at equilibrium (they will be substantially decreasing over the timescale of stabilisation). The definition excludes greenhouse gases controlled under the Montreal Protocol (e.g. CFCs). Note however, that such effects are included in future temperature projections. The CO~~2~~ equivalence here measures only the instantaneous radiative effect of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and ignores the lifetimes of the gases in the atmosphere (i.e. their future effect).\n\n4 The 1980-2004 average, based on data provided by Prof K Shine and Dr L Gohar, Dept. of Meteorology, University of Reading.\n\n5 Siegenthaler et al. (2005) using data from ice cores. The same research groups recently presented analyses at the 2006 conference of the European Geosciences Union, which suggest that carbon dioxide levels are unprecedented for 800,000 years.\n\n6 Kyoto greenhouse gases are the six main greenhouse gases covered by the targets set out in the Kyoto Protocol.\n\n7 Based on the error on the radiative forcing (in CO~~2~~ equivalent) of all long-lived greenhouse gases from Figure 6.6, IPCC (2001b)\n\n8 Hansen et al. (2006)\n\n9 Parmesan and Yohe (2003) and Root et al. (2005) have correlated a shift in timing and distribution of 130 different plant and animal species with observed climate change.\n\n10 IPCC (2001a) - this key conclusion has been supported in the Joint Statement of Science Academies in 2005 and a report from the US Climate Change Science Programme (2006).\n\n11 National Research Council (2006) - a report requested by the US Congress\n\n12 Barnett et al. (2005a)\n\n13 For example, Ad hoc detection and attribution group (2005)\n\n14 Aerosols are tiny particles in the atmosphere also created by human activities (e.g. sulphate aerosol emitted by many industrial processes). They have several effects on the atmosphere, one of which is to reflect solar radiation and therefore, cool the surface. This effect is thought to have offset some of the warming effect of greenhouse gases, but the exact amount is uncertain.\n\n15 For example, Pearce (2003), Pierrehumbert (2004)\n\n16 i.e. the incremental increase in radiative forcing due to an increase in concentration (from pre-industrial) will fall to around half of the initial increase when concentrations reach around 600ppm, a quarter at 1200ppm and an eighth at 2400ppm. Note that other greenhouse gases, such as methane and nitrous oxide, have a linear relationship.\n\n17 It has been suggested that water vapour could act as a negative feedback on warming, on the basis that the upper atmosphere would dry out as it warms (Lindzen 2005). Re-analysis of satellite measurements published last year indicated that in fact the opposite is happening (Soden et al. 2005). Over the past two decades, the air in the upper troposphere has become wetter, not drier, countering Lindzen's theory and confirming that water vapour is having a positive feedback effect on global warming. This positive feedback is a major driver of the indirect warming effects from greenhouse gases.\n\n18 Calculated using method shown in Meinshausen (2006).\n\n19 Meinshausen (2006)\n\n20 An increase in low clouds would have a negative feedback effect, as they have little effect on infrared radiation but block sunlight, causing a local cooling. Conversely, an increase in high clouds would trap more infrared radiation, amplifying warming.\n\n21 Friedlingstein et al. (2006)\n\n22 Cox et al. (2000) with the Hadley Centre model and Scholze et al (2006) with several models.\n\n23 Gorham et al. (1991)\n\n24 Walter et al. (2006)\n\n25 Emissions measured in CO~~2~~ equivalent are weighted by their global warming potential (see chapter 8).\n\n26 These estimates come from recent papers by Torn and Harte (2006) and Scheffer et al. (2006), which estimate the scale of positive feedbacks from release of carbon dioxide and methane from past natural climate change episodes, e.g. Little Ice Age and previous inter-glacial period, into current climate models.\n\n27 One study to date has examined this question and suggested that a run away effect is unlikely, at least for the land-carbon sink (Cox et al. 2006). It remains unclear how the risk of run-away climate change would change with the inclusion of other feedbacks.\n\n28 Friedlingstein et al. (2006) found that all eleven climate models that explicitly include carbon cycle feedbacks showed a weakening of carbon sinks.\n\n29 Orr et al. (2005)\n\n30 Friedlingstein et al. (2006)\n\n31 Lawrence and Slater (2005), based on IPCC A2 Scenario\n\n32 Summarised in Davidson and Janssens (2006) (wetlands) and Archer (2005) (permafrost) - CO~~2~~ equivalent emissions (chapter 7).\n\n33 Walter et al. (2006) and Smith et al. (2005)\n\n34 Estimates of potential methane emissions from thawing permafrost range around 2 - 4GtCO~~2~~/yr. Wetlands emit equivalent to 2 - 6 GtCO~~2~~/yr and studies project that this may rise by up to 80%. Davidson & Janssens (2006), Gedney et al. (2004) and Archer (2005).\n\n35 Hadley Centre (2005)\n\n36 Barnett et al. (2005a) and Levitus et al. (2005)\n\n37 Wigley (2005) and Meehl et al. (2005) look at the amount of warming "in the pipeline" using different techniques.\n\n38 In many countries, aerosol levels have already been reduced by regulation because of their negative health effects.\n\n39 For example, 45 years at 2.5 ppm/yr gives 112.5ppm. Added to the current level, this gives 542.5ppm in 2050.\n\n40 Hansen et al. (2006)\n\n41 Based on the IPCC TAR central radiative forcing projections for the six illustrative SRES scenarios (IPCC 2001b).\n\n42 According to Stott et al. (2004), climate change has increased the chance of the 2003 European heatwave occurring by between 2 and 8 times. In 2003, temperatures were 2.3°C warmer than the long-term average.\n\n43 In an El Ni�o year (around once every 3-7 years), the pattern of tropical sea surface temperatures changes, with the eastern Pacific warming significantly. This radically alters large-scale atmospheric circulations across the globe, and causes rainfall patterns to shift, with some regions experiencing flooding and others severe droughts. As the world warms, many models suggest that the East Pacific may warm more intensely than the West Pacific, mimicking the pattern of an El Ni�o, although significant uncertainties remain. Models do not yet agree on the nature of changes in the frequency or intensity of the El Ni�o (Collins and the CMIP Modelling Groups 2005).\n\n44 Sch�r C et al. (2004)\n\n45 Huntington (2006) reviewed more than 50 peer-reviewed studies and found that many aspects of the global water cycle have intensified in the past 50 years, including rainfall and evaporation. Modelling work by Wetherald & Manabe (2002) confirms that warming will increase rates of both precipitation and evaporation.\n\n46 Burke, Brown and Christidis (2006) using one model under a high emissions scenario. Other climate models are needed to verify these results. The study uses one commonly used drought index: The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI). This uses temperature and rainfall data to formulate a measure of 'dryness'. Other drought indices do not show such large changes.\n\n47 For example, Lambert and Fyfe (2006) and Fyfe (2003)\n\n48 Emanuel (2005); Webster et al. (2005)\n\n49 Pielke (2005); Landsea (2005)\n\n50 For example, Geng and Sugi (2003); Bengtsson, Hodges and Roeckner (2006)\n\n51 Hope (2006)\n\n52 Summarised in Schlesinger et al. (2006)\n\n53 Wood et al. (2006). Complex climate models project a weakening of between 0% and 50% by the end of the century.\n\n54 Bryden et al. (2005). It is unclear whether the weakening is part of a natural cycle or the start of a downward trend.\n\n55 Church and White (2006)\n\n56 IPCC (2001b). This range covers several sources of uncertainty, including emissions, climate sensitivity and ocean responses\n\n57 Wigley (2005). The uncertainty reflects a range of climate sensitivities, aerosol forcings and melt-rates.\n\n58 For example, Zwally et al. 2006 and Johannessen et al. 2005\n\n59 For example, Hanna et al. 2005 and Rignot and Kanagaratnam 2006\n\n60 Lower and higher estimates based on Huybrechts and de Wolde (1999) and Gregory and Huybrechts (2006), respectively.\n\n61 North Greenland Ice Core Project (2004). The warm temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere during the previous interglacial reflected a maximum in the cycle of warming from the Sun due to the orbital position of the Earth. In the future, Greenland is expected to experience some of the largest temperature changes. A 4-5°C greenhouse warming of Greenland would correspond to a global mean temperature rise of around 3°C (Gregory and Huybrechts (2006)).\n\n62 Rapley (2006)\n\n63 Shepherd et al. 2003. The collapse of Larsen B followed the collapse in 1995 of the smaller Larsen A ice shelf.\n\n64 Zwally et al. (2006)\n\n65 Based on 7m and 5m from the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets, respectively. Rapley (2006) and Wood et al. (2006)\n\n66 Huybrechts and DeWolde (1999) simulated the melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet for a local temperature rise of 3°C and 5.5°C. These scenarios led to a contribution to sea level rise of 1m and 3m over 1000 years (1mm/yr and 3mm/yr), respectively. Possible contributions from the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) remain highly uncertain. In an expert survey reported by Vaughan and Spouge (2002), most glaciologists agree that collapse might be possible on a thousand-year timescale (5mm/yr), but that this contribution is unlikely to be seen in this century. Few scientists considered that collapse might occur on a century timescale.

The ''60th Annual DPI/NGO Conference'' Ro be held at ''United Nations Headquarters'' from September 5-7, 2007.

This web site is based on a TiddlyWiki platform - a unique and brilliant design for a self-contained, [[Creative Commons]] "Wiki". Wiki is a Hawaiian word meaning //swift// or //swiftly//, and TiddlyWiki is the wikiest wiki to date., Unlike most web sites that consist of multiple, linked web pages, all of the content in a TiddlyWiki is contained in a single web page, that contains numerous sub-pages, known as "tiddlers".\n\nA TiddlyWiki page uses simple formatting codes for its tiddlers - similar, but not identical to the codes used in <<wikipedia Wikipedia>> and each tiddler can have one or more "tags" or "key words" that are displayed adjacent to the tiddler. This makes TiddlyWiki the easiest and quickest platform for creating and maintaining a web site.\n\nFrom a design standpoint, what makes TiddlyWiki unique is that not only can tiddlers contain and siplay text, images, links, etc, but the appearance and format of a TiddlyWiki is defined by "style sheets and "styles" that are themselves contained in tiddlers. In addition, a tiddler can include Javascript - the language that powers TiddlyWiki - that can add very useful features over and above those in the standard TiddlyWiki.\n\n

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The team was led by Siobhan Peters. Team members included Vicki Bakhshi, Alex Bowen, Catherine Cameron, Sebastian Catovsky, Di Crane, Sophie Cruickshank, Simon Dietz, Nicola Edmondson, Su-Lin Garbett, Lorraine Hamid, Gideon Hoffman, Daniel Ingram, Ben Jones, Nicola Patmore, Helene Radcliffe, Raj Sathiyarajah, Michelle Stock, Chris Taylor, Tamsin Vernon, Hannah Wanjie, and Dimitri Zenghelis.\n\nWe are very grateful to the following organisations for their invaluable contributions throughout the course of the Review: Vicky Pope and all those who have helped us at the Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction; Claude Mandil, Fatih Birol and their team at the International Energy Agency; Francois Bourguignon, Katherine Sierra, Ken Chomitz, Maureen Cropper, Ian Noble and all those who have lent their support at the World Bank; the OECD, EBRD, IADB, and UNEP; Rajendra Pachauri, Bert Metz, Martin Parry and others at the IPCC; Chatham House; as well as Martin Rees and the Royal Society.\n\nMany government departments and public bodies have supported our work, with resources, ideas and expertise. We are indebted to them. They include: HM Treasury, Cabinet Office, Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, Department of Trade and Industry, Department for International Development, Department for Transport, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Office of Science and Innovation. We are also grateful for support and assistance from the Bank of England and the Economic and Social Research Council, and for advice from the Environment Agency and Carbon Trust.\n\nWe owe thanks to the academics and researchers with whom we have worked closely throughout the Review. A special mention goes to Dennis Anderson who contributed greatly to our understanding of the costs of energy technologies and of technology policy, and has provided invaluable support and advice to the team. Special thanks too to Halsey Rogers and to Tony Robinson who worked with us to edit drafts of the Review. And we are very grateful to: Neil Adger, Sudhir Anand, Nigel Arnell, Terry Barker, John Broome, Andy Challinor, Paul Collier, Sam Fankhauser, Michael Grubb, Roger Guesnerie, Cameron Hepburn, Dieter Helm, Claude Henry, Chris Hope, Paul Johnson, Paul Klemperer, Robert May, David Newbery, Robert Nicholls, Peter Sinclair, Julia Slingo, Max Tse, Rachel Warren and Adrian Wood.\n\nThroughout our work we have learned greatly from academics and researchers who have advised us, including: Philippe Aghion, Shardul Agrawala, Edward Anderson, Tony Atkinson, Paul Baer, Philip Bagnoli, Hewson Baltzell, Scott Barrett, Marcel Berk, Richard Betts, Ken Binmore, Victor Blinov, Christopher Bliss, Katharine Blundell, Severin Borenstein, Jean-Paul Bouttes, Alan Budd, Frances Cairncross, Daniel Cullenward, Larry Dale, Victor Danilov-Daniliyan, Amy Davidsen, Angus Deaton, Richard Eckaus, Jae Edmonds, Jorgen Elmeskov, Paul Epstein, Gunnar Eskeland, Alexander Farrell, Brian Fender, Anthony Fisher, Meredith Fowley, Jeffrey Frankel, Jose Garibaldi, Maryanne Grieg-Gran, Bronwyn Hall, Jim Hall, Stephane Hallegate, Kate Hampton, Michael Hanemann, Geoffrey Heal, Merylyn Hedger, Molly Hellmuth, David Henderson, David Hendry, Marc Henry, Margaret Hiller, Niklas Hoehne, Bjart Holtsmark, Jean- Charles Hourcade, Jo Hossell, Alistair Hunt, Saleem Huq, Mark Jaccard, Sarah Joy, Jiang Kejun, Ian Johnson, Tom Jones, Dale Jorgenson, Paul Joskow, Kassim Kulindwa, Daniel Kammen, Jonathan K�hler, Paul Krugman, Sari Kovats, Klaus Lackner, John Lawton, Li Junfeng, Lin Erda, Richard Lindzen, Bj�rn Lomborg, Gordon MacKerron, Joaquim Oliveira Martins, Warwick McKibbin, Robert Mendelsohn, Evan Mills, Vladimir Milov, James Mirrlees, Richard Morgenstern, Robert Muir-Wood, Justin Mundy, Gustavo Nagy, Neboj�a Nakicenovic, Karsten Neuhoff, Greg Nimmet, J.C Nkomo, William Nordhaus, David Norse, Anthony Nyong, Pan Jiahua, John Parsons, Cedric Philibert, Robert Pindyck, William Pizer, Oleg Pluzhnikov, Jonathon Porritt, Lant Pritchett, John Reilly, Richard Richels, David Roland-Holst, Cynthia Rosenzweig, Joyashree Roy, Jeffrey Sachs, Mark Salmon, Alan Sanstad, Mark Schankerman, John Schellnhueber, Michael Schlesinger, Ken Schomitz, Amartya Sen, Robert Sherman, P. R. Shukla, Brian Smith, Leonard Smith, Robert Socolow, David Stainforth, Robert Stavins, Joe Stiglitz, Peter Stone, Roger Street, Josu� Tanaka, Evgeniy Sokolov, Robert Solow, James Sweeney, Richard Tol, Asbjorn Torvanger, Laurence Tubiana, Steven Ward, Paul Watkiss, Jim Watson, Martin Weitzman, Hege Westskog, John Weyant, Tony White, Gary Yohe, Ernesto Zedillo and Zou Ji.\n\nWe are grateful to the leaders, officials, academics, NGO staff and business people who assisted us during our visits to: Brazil, Canada, China, the European Commission, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Russia, South Africa and the USA.\n\nAnd thanks to the numerous business leaders and representatives who have advised us, including, in particular, John Browne, Paul Golby, Jane Milne, Vincent de Rivaz, James Smith, Adair Turner, and the Corporate Leaders Group.\n\nAlso to the NGOs that have offered advice and help including: Christian Aid, The Climate Group, Friends of the Earth, Global Cool, Green Alliance, Greenpeace, IIED, IPPR, New Economics Foundation, Oxfam, Practical Action, RSPB, Stop Climate Chaos, Tearfund, Women's Institute, and WWF UK.\n\nFinally, thanks also go to Australian Antarctic Division for permission to use the picture for the logo and to David Barnett, for designing the logo.

|>|''A'' |\n|~AAs |Assigned Amounts |\n|ACT MAP |MAP Accelerated Technology Scenario (IEA - Energy Technology Perspectives publication 2006) |\n|ADB |Asian Development Bank |\n|AOSIS |Alliance Of Small Island States |\n|AR (~I-IV) |Assessment Report (first-fourth) |\n|>|''B'' |\n|BAU |Business As Usual |\n|bcm |Billion cubic meters (unit of volume, e.g. for gas) |\n|BGE |Balanced Growth Equivalent |\n|Bl |Barrel of oil |\n|Boe |Barrels of oil equivalent |\n|>|''C'' |\n|C |Carbon (to convert 1 tonne of C into CO~~2~~, multiply by 12/44). |\n|CBA |Cost Benefit Analysis |\n|CCGT |Combined Cycle Gas Turbine |\n|CCS |Carbon Capture and Storage |\n|CDM |Clean Development Mechanism |\n|CER |Certified Emission Reduction |\n|~CFCs |Chloro Fluoro Carbons |\n|CFL |Compact Fluorescent Lamp |\n|~CH4 |Methane (greenhouse gas) |\n|CGE |Computable General Equilibrium |\n|CHP |Combined Heat and Power |\n|CO~~2~~ |Carbon dioxide |\n|CO~~2~~e |CO~~2~~ equivalent |\n|CSD |Commission for Sustainable Development |\n|>|''D'' |\n|dCHP |Decentralised Combined Heat and Power |\n|DEFRA |UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs |\n|DFID |UK Department for International Development |\n|DFT |UK Department for Transport |\n|DTI |UK Department for Trade and Industry |\n|>|''E'' |\n|E |Exa: 10 to the power of 18 |\n|EBRD |European Bank for Reconstruction and Development |\n|EC |European Commission |\n|EIF |Energy Investment Framework |\n|EIT |Economy In Transition |\n|EMAS |Environmental Management Assistance System |\n|EMF |Energy Modelling Forum (Stanford University) |\n|EPA |Environmental Protection Agency |\n|ESCO |Energy Service Company |\n|ETS |Emission Trading System (EU) |\n|EU |European Union |\n|>|''F'' |\n|FCCC |Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN) |\n|FDI |Foreign Direct Investment |\n|FOB |Free on Board |\n|>|''G'' |\n|G |Giga: 10 to the power of 9 |\n|GATT |General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs |\n|GCM |Global Climate Model |\n|GDP |Gross Domestic Product |\n|GEF |Global Environment Facility |\n|GHG |Greenhouse Gas |\n|GMT |Global Mean Temperature |\n|GNP |Gross National Product |\n|GPG |Global Public Goods |\n|GPP |Gross Primary Production |\n|~GtC |Gigatonne of Carbon |\n|~GtCO~~2~~e |Gigatonne of Carbon Dioxide equivalent |\n|GWP |Global Warming Potential or Gross World Product |\n|>|''H'' |\n|HDI |Human Development Index |\n|HFC |Hydro Fluoro Carbon |\n|HMT |UK Her Majesty's Treasury |\n|HVAC |Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning |\n|>|''I'' |\n|~I-O |~Input-Output |\n|IA(M) |Integrated Assessment (Model) |\n|IAEA |International Atomic Energy Agency |\n|IEA |International Energy Agency |\n|IET |International Emission Trading |\n|IIASA |International Institute for Applied System Analysis |\n|IMCP |Innovation Modelling Comparison Project |\n|IMF |International Monetary Fund |\n|IPCC |Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change |\n|IPR |Intellectual property rights |\n|ISIC |International Standard Industrial Classification |\n|ISO |International Standardisation Organization |\n|IT |Information Technology |\n|ITC |Induced Technical Change |\n|>|''J'' |\n|J |Joule = Newton x meter (International Standard unit of energy) |\n|JI |Joint Implementation |\n|JRC |Joint Research Centre (EU) |\n|>|''K'' |\n|K |Kilo: 10 to the power of 3 |\n|~KWh |Kilowatt hour |\n|>|''L'' |\n|Lbs |Pounds (unit of weight. 1 lbs = 0.454 kg) |\n|LDC |Least Developed Country |\n|LIC |Low Income Country |\n|LNG |Liquid Natural Gas |\n|LPG |Liquid Petroleum Gas |\n|>|''M'' |\n|M |Mega: 10 to the power of 6 |\n|MAC |Marginal Abatement Cost |\n|~MERs |Market Exchange Rates |\n|~MDGs |Millennium Development Goals |\n|MEA |Multilateral Environmental Agreements |\n|MIC |Middle Income Country |\n|MIT |Massachusetts Institute of Technology |\n|Mtoe |Mega tonnes oil equivalent |\n|>|''N'' |\n|~N2O |Nitrous oxide (greenhouse gas) |\n|NACE |Nomenclature des Activit�s dans la Communaut� Europ�enne (index of business activities in the EU) |\n|NAFTA |North American Free Trade Agreement |\n|NAP |National allocation plan |\n|~NCGGs |~Non-Carbon Greenhouse Gases |\n|NGO |~Non-Governmental Organization |\n|NIC |Newly Industrialized Country |\n|NMHC |~Non-Methane Hydro Carbon |\n|~NOx |Nitrogen oxides (local air pollutants) |\n|>|''O'' |\n|ODA |Official Development Assistance |\n|ODS |Ozone Depleting Substances |\n|OECD |Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development |\n|OPEC |Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries |\n|>|''P'' |\n|P |Peta: 10 to the power of 15 |\n|PFC |Per Fluoro Carbon |\n|ppm [ v / w ] |parts per million [by volume / weight] |\n|PPP |Purchasing Power Parity |\n|>|''Q'' |\n|~QELRCs |Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction Commitments |\n|>|''R'' |\n|R&D |Research and Development |\n|RD&D |Research, Development and Demonstration |\n|RFF |Resources for the Future |\n|>|''S'' |\n|SAR |Second Assessment Report (by IPCC) |\n|SBSTA |Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice |\n|SCC |Social Cost of Carbon |\n|SD |Sustainable Development |\n|~SOx |Sulphur dioxide |\n|~SMEs |Small and Medium Enterprises |\n|SRES |Special Report on Emissions Scenarios |\n|SRLULUCF |Special Report on ~Land-Use, ~Land-Use Change and Forestry |\n|>|''T'' |\n|T |Tera: 10 to the power of 12 |\n|TAR |Third Assessment Report (by IPCC) |\n|tce |Tonnes of coal equivalent |\n|THC |Thermohaline Circulation |\n|Toe |Tonnes of oil equivalent. (Mtoe - mega tonnes of oil equivalent). |\n|TPES |Total Primary Energy Supply |\n|TWA |Tolerable Windows Approach |\n|>|''U'' |\n|UK |United Kingdom |\n|UN |United Nations |\n|UNCED |UN Conference on Environment and Development |\n|UNDP |UN Development Programme |\n|UNEP |UN Environment Programme |\n|UNFCCC |UN Framework Convention on Climate Change |\n|US/USA |United States (of America) |\n|US CCSP |United States Climate Change Science Programme |\n|US EIA |United States Energy Information Administration |\n|>|''V'' |\n|VAT |Value Added Tax |\n|VOC |Volatile organic compound |\n|>|''W'' |\n|W |Watt = Joule/second (International Standard unit of power) |\n|WBCSD |World Business Council for Sustainable Development |\n|WCED |World Commission on Environment and Development |\n|WEC |World Energy Council |\n|WEO |World Economic Outlook |\n|WG (I - III) |Working Group (One to Three) of the IPCC |\n|Wh |Watt hour |\n|WHO |World Health Organization (UN) |\n|WRI |World Resources Institute |\n|WTA |Willingness To Accept compensation |\n|WTO |World Trade Organization |\n|WTP |Willingness To Pay |\n|WWF |World Wildlife Fund |

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[[Administrative Menu]] - attached to base of the [[Main Menu|MainMenu]]\n<<tiddler "Administrative Menu">>

<<option chkGenerateAnRssFeed>> GenerateAnRssFeed\n<<option chkOpenInNewWindow>> OpenLinksInNewWindow\n<<option chkSaveEmptyTemplate>> SaveEmptyTemplate\n<<option chkToggleLinks>> Clicking on links to tiddlers that are already open causes them to close\n^^(override with Control or other modifier key)^^\n<<option chkHttpReadOnly>> HideEditingFeatures when viewed over HTTP\n<<option chkForceMinorUpdate>> Treat edits as MinorChanges by preserving date and time\n^^(override with Shift key when clicking 'done' or by pressing Ctrl-Shift-Enter^^\n<<option chkConfirmDelete>> ConfirmBeforeDeleting\nMaximum number of lines in a tiddler edit box: <<option txtMaxEditRows>>\nFolder name for backup files: <<option txtBackupFolder>>\n<<option chkInsertTabs>> Use tab key to insert tab characters instead of jumping to next field\n<<option chkUseInclude>> Include ~TiddlyWikis (IncludeList | IncludeState | [[help|http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/#%5B%5BIncludePlugin%20Documentation%5D%5D]])\n^^(Reload this ~TiddlyWiki to make changes become effective)^^\n<<option chkSearchTitles>> Search in tiddler titles\n<<option chkSearchText>> Search in tiddler text\n<<option chkSearchTags>> Search in tiddler tags\n<<option chkSearchTitlesFirst>> Search results show title matches first\n<<option chkSearchList>> Search results show list of matching tiddlers\n<<option chkSearchIncremental>> Incremental searching\n<<option chkSearchTitles>> Search in tiddler titles\n<<option chkSearchText>> Search in tiddler text\n<<option chkSearchTags>> Search in tiddler tags\n<<option chkSearchTitlesFirst>> Search results show title matches first\n<<option chkSearchList>> Search results show list of matching tiddlers\n<<option chkSearchIncremental>> Incremental searching\n''Private Settings: ''<<option chkUsePrivateSettings>> Use private settings. <<option chkMakeSettingPrivateWhenChanged>> Make setting private when changed.&#160;&#160;&#160;[[Show Settings]].\n^^(Private settings are stored in this ~TiddlyWiki, shared settings are stored as cookies. For more information see the [[Settings documentation|SettingsPlugin Documentation]].)^^\n<<option chkUseYourSearch>> Use 'Your Search' //([[more options|YourSearch Options]])//

<<list all>>

|[[Table of Contents]] |h\n|[[Executive Summary]] |\n|[[Preface]] |\n|[[Introduction]] |\n|[[Summary of Conclusions]] |\n|[[Part I]] |h\n|[[Chapter 1]] |\n|[[Chapter 2]] |\n|[[Part II]] |h\n|[[Chapter 3]] |\n|[[Chapter 4]] |\n|[[Chapter 5]] |\n|[[Chapter 6]] |\n|[[Part III]] |h\n|[[Chapter 7]] |\n|[[Chapter 8]] |\n|[[Chapter 9]] |\n|[[Chapter 10]] |\n|[[Chapter 11]] |\n|[[Chapter 12]] |\n|[[Chapter 13]] |\n|[[Part IV]] |h\n|[[Chapter 14]] |\n|[[Chapter 15]] |\n|[[Chapter 16]] |\n|[[Chapter 17]] |\n|[[Part V]] |h\n|[[Chapter 18]] |\n|[[Chapter 19]] |\n|[[Chapter 20]] |\n|[[Part VI]] |h\n|[[Chapter 21]] |\n|[[Chapter 22]] |\n|[[Chapter 23]] |\n|[[Chapter 24]] |\n|[[Chapter 25]] |\n|[[Chapter 26]] |\n|[[Chapter 27]] |\n|[[Acronyms]] |\n|[[Postscript]] |\n<<redirect "Executive Summary" "Executive Summary">>\n<<redirect "Preface" "Preface">>\n<<redirect "Acknowledgements" "Acknowledgements">>\n<<redirect "Introduction" "Introduction">>\n<<redirect "Summary of Conclusions" "Summary of Conclusions">>\n<<redirect "Part I" "Part I">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 1" "Chapter 1">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 2" "Chapter 2">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 2: Annex A" "Chapter 2: Annex A">>\n<<redirect "Part II" "Part II">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 3" "Chapter 3">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 4" "Chapter 4">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 5" "Chapter 5">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 6" "Chapter 6">>\n<<redirect "Part III" "Part III">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 7" "Chapter 7">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 7: Annex A" "Chapter 7: Annex A">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 7: Annex B" "Chapter 7: Annex B">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 7: Annex C" "Chapter 7: Annex C">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 7: Annex D" "Chapter 7: Annex D">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 8" "Chapter 8">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 9" "Chapter 9">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 10" "Chapter 10">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 11" "Chapter 11">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 12" "Chapter 12">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 13" "Chapter 13">>\n<<redirect "Part IV" "Part IV">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 14" "Chapter 14">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 15" "Chapter 15">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 16" "Chapter 16">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 17" "Chapter 17">>\n<<redirect "Part V" "Part V">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 18" "Chapter 18">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 19" "Chapter 19">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 20" "Chapter 20">>\n<<redirect "Part VI" "Part VI">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 21" "Chapter 21">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 22" "Chapter 22">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 23" "Chapter 23">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 24" "Chapter 24">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 25" "Chapter 25">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 26" "Chapter 26">>\n<<redirect "Chapter 27" "Chapter 27">>\n<<redirect "Acryonyms & Abbreviations" "Acryonyms & Abbreviations">>\n<<redirect "Postscript" "Postscript">>\n<<redirect "Postscript Technical Annex" "Postscript Technical Annex">>

The //Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change// book, commissioned by ''Defra'' - the British Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs - consolidates the scientific findings of a major conference held in Exeter, and gives an account of the most recent developments on critical thresholds and key vulnerabilities of the climate system, impacts on human and natural systems, emission pathways and technological options of meeting different stabilisation levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.\n!!!The book focuses on three crucial questions:\n# ''For different levels of climate change what are the key impacts, for different regions and sectors, and for the world as a whole?''\n# ''What would such levels of climate change imply in terms of greenhouse gas stabilisation concentrations and emission pathways required to achieve such levels?''\n#'' What technological options are there for achieving stabilisation of greenhouse gases at different stabilisation concentrations in the atmosphere, taking into account costs and uncertainties?''\n!!! Read more:\n* [[Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change - executive summary|http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/research/dangerous-cc/pdf/avoid-dangercc-execsumm.pdf]], pdf (168 KB)\n* [[Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change - full text of book|http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/research/dangerous-cc/pdf/avoid-dangercc.pdf]], pdf (16.3 MB - note very large file size)\n* [[News release|http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2006/060130c.htm]] - 30 January 2006\n* The book can be ordered online via the [[Cambridge University Press website|http://www.cambridge.org/0521864712]].\n\n* More on [[Climate Change @ Defra|http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange]]

<<tabs txtMainTab Timeline Timeline TabTimeline Alphabetical 'All tiddlers' TabAll Tags 'All tags' TabTags Missing 'Missing tiddlers' TabMoreMissing Orphans 'Orphaned tiddlers' TabMoreOrphans Shadowed 'Shadowed tiddlers' TabMoreShadowed>>

/***\n|Name|Better Timeline plugin macro|h\n|Created by|[[Saq Imtiaz]]|\n|Location|http://lewcid.googlepages.com/lewcid.html#BetterTimelineMacro|\n|Version|0.5 beta|\n|Requires|~TW2.x|\n!!!Description:\nA replacement for the core timeline macro that offers more features:\n*list tiddlers with only specfic tag\n*exclude tiddlers with a particular tag\n*limit entries to any number of days, for example one week\n*specify a start date for the timeline, only tiddlers after that date will be listed.\n\n!!!Installation:\nCopy the contents of this tiddler to your TW, tag with systemConfig, save and reload your TW.\n\n!!!Syntax:\n{{{<<timeline better:true>>}}}\n''the param better:true enables the advanced features, without it you will get the old timeline behaviour.''\n\nadditonal params:\n(use only the ones you want)\n{{{<<timeline better:true onlyTag:Tag1 excludeTag:Tag2 sortBy:modified/created firstDay:YYYYMMDD maxDays:7 maxEntries:30>>}}}\n\n''explanation of syntax:''\nonlyTag: only tiddlers with this tag will be listed. Default is to list all tiddlers.\nexcludeTag: tiddlers with this tag will not be listed.\nsortBy: sort tiddlers by date modified or date created. Possible values are modified or created.\nfirstDay: useful for starting timeline from a specific date. Example: 20060701 for 1st of July, 2006\nmaxDays: limits timeline to include only tiddlers from the specified number of days. If you use a value of 7 for example, only tiddlers from the last 7 days will be listed.\nmaxEntries: limit the total number of entries in the timeline.\n\n\n!!!History:\n*28-07-06: ver 0.5 beta, first release\n\n!!!Code\n***/\n//{{{\n// Return the tiddlers as a sorted array\nTiddlyWiki.prototype.getTiddlers = function(field,excludeTag,includeTag)\n{\n var results = [];\n this.forEachTiddler(function(title,tiddler)\n {\n if(excludeTag == undefined || tiddler.tags.find(excludeTag) == null)\n if(includeTag == undefined || tiddler.tags.find(includeTag)!=null)\n results.push(tiddler);\n });\n if(field)\n results.sort(function (a,b) {if(a[field] == b[field]) return(0); else return (a[field] < b[field]) ? -1 : +1; });\n return results;\n}\n\n\n\n//this function by Udo\nfunction getParam(params, name, defaultValue)\n{\n if (!params)\n return defaultValue;\n var p = params[0][name];\n return p ? p[0] : defaultValue;\n}\n\nwindow.old_timeline_handler= config.macros.timeline.handler;\nconfig.macros.timeline.handler = function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler)\n{\n var args = paramString.parseParams("list",null,true);\n var betterMode = getParam(args, "better", "false");\n if (betterMode == 'true')\n {\n var sortBy = getParam(args,"sortBy","modified");\n var excludeTag = getParam(args,"excludeTag",undefined);\n var includeTag = getParam(args,"onlyTag",undefined);\n var tiddlers = store.getTiddlers(sortBy,excludeTag,includeTag);\n var firstDayParam = getParam(args,"firstDay",undefined);\n var firstDay = (firstDayParam!=undefined)? firstDayParam: "00010101";\n var lastDay = "";\n var field= sortBy;\n var maxDaysParam = getParam(args,"maxDays",undefined);\n var maxDays = (maxDaysParam!=undefined)? maxDaysParam*24*60*60*1000: (new Date()).getTime() ;\n var maxEntries = getParam(args,"maxEntries",undefined);\n var last = (maxEntries!=undefined) ? tiddlers.length-Math.min(tiddlers.length,parseInt(maxEntries)) : 0;\n for(var t=tiddlers.length-1; t>=last; t--)\n {\n var tiddler = tiddlers[t];\n var theDay = tiddler[field].convertToLocalYYYYMMDDHHMM().substr(0,8);\n if ((theDay>=firstDay)&& (tiddler[field].getTime()> (new Date()).getTime() - maxDays))\n {\n if(theDay != lastDay)\n {\n var theDateList = document.createElement("ul");\n place.appendChild(theDateList);\n createTiddlyElement(theDateList,"li",null,"listTitle",tiddler[field].formatString(this.dateFormat));\n lastDay = theDay;\n }\n var theDateListItem = createTiddlyElement(theDateList,"li",null,"listLink",null);\n theDateListItem.appendChild(createTiddlyLink(place,tiddler.title,true));\n }\n }\n }\n\n else\n {\n window.old_timeline_handler.apply(this,arguments);\n }\n}\n//}}}

/***\n|Name|BigThemePack|\n|Created by|SimonBaird & SaqImtiaz|\n|Location|http://simonbaird.com/mptw/#BigThemePack|\n|Version|0.1.1|\n|Requires|SelectThemePlugin|\n!Uninstallation Notes:\n*Make sure that you set your theme as default or none, before deleting the theme pack.\n\n!Usage:\n<<themeSelect style 'Select Theme'>>\n\n***/\n//{{{\nif (!config.themes) config.themes = [];\n//}}}\n/***\n!!~MonkyMind themes\nThe following themes were created by Robert Lindsay from http://www.monkymind.org/\n***/\n//{{{\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.Berry2StyleSheet = "<!--- [[Berry 2|StyleSheet]] with ideas shamesslessly taken from (and suggested by) Simon Baird, Clint Checketts and Christine Hodges --->\sn\sn/*{{{*/\sn.headerForeground { display: none;}\sn#sidebar {width: 170px; background: #efefef;border-left: solid 2px #b8b9c7;border-top: solid 2px #d7d8e8;}\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents {width: 158px; background: #eae9ee;font-weight: bold; color: #333 ;}\sn#sidebarOptions input { border: solid 2px #b8b9c7; }\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel { background: #eee;}\sn#sidebarOptions a {;border: none;}\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a {border: none;color: #5c4894;}\sn#displayArea {background: #fff;margin: 1em 15.7em 0em 1em;border-left: solid 2px #b8b9c7;}\sn.viewer {line-height: 1.4em;padding-bottom: 1em;border-bottom:solid 1px #b8b9c7;}\sn.viewer th, thead td {background: #5d4b97;border: 1px solid #666;color: #fff;}\sn.title {color: #000}\snh1,h2,h3,h4,h5 {color: #fff;background: #6b69ad;}\sna{ color: #700126;}\sna:hover{ background: #6b69ad; color: #fff;font-weight: bold;}\sn.externalLink { text-decoration: underline; color: #000083;}\snbody { background: #d7d8e8;}\sn.popup { background: #6b69ad; border: 1px solid #04b;}\sn.popup li a:hover {background: #d7d8e8;color: #000;border: none;}\sn.popup li.disabled {color: #000;}\sn.button:hover {color: #fff;background: #6b69ad;\sn border: 1px solid #d7d8e8;}\sn#topMenu { background: transparent; padding: 6px;margin-left: -5px;border-bottom: solid 3px #5c4894;}\sn#topMenu .button, #topMenu .tiddlyLink, tiddlyLinkExisting, #topMenu .externalLink\sn{\sn color: #fff;\sn text-align: center;\sn font-weight: bold;\sn font-size: 1.1em;\sn text-decoration: none;\sn letter-spacing: 1.5px;\sn background: transparent;\sn border-right: solid 1px #fff;\sn padding: 5px 15px 8px 15px;\sn}\sn#topMenu a:hover {\sn color: #700126;\sn background: #d7d8e8;\sn}\sn#topMenu br {display: none; padding-right: 1em;}\sn\sn\sn/*}}}*/";\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.Berry2PageTemplate = "<!--- More ideas shamesslessly begged, borrowed or stolen from..... Simon Baird, Clint Checketts and Christine Hodges :)) --->\sn<!--{{{-->\sn<div class='header' macro=\s"gradient vert #5c4894 #6b69ad\s">\sn <div id='topMenu'>\sn <span refresh='content' tiddler='SiteTitle'></span><span refresh='content' tiddler='MainMenu'></span></div>\sn </div>\sn</div> \sn<div id='sidebar'>\sn <div id='sidebarOptions' refresh='content' tiddler='SideBarOptions'></div>\sn <div id='sidebarTabs' refresh='content' force='true' tiddler='SideBarTabs'></div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='displayArea'>\sn <div id='messageArea'></div>\sn <div id='tiddlerDisplay'></div>\sn</div>\sn<!--}}}-->\sn";\n\nconfig.themes.push("Berry2");\n\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.Blueberry2StyleSheet = "<!--- [[Blueberry 2|StyleSheet]] with ideas shamesslessly taken from (and suggested by) Simon Baird, Clint Checketts and Christine Hodges --->\sn\sn/*{{{*/\sn.headerForeground { display: none;}\sn#sidebar {width: 171px; background: #e7ecee;border-left: solid 2px #8895bb;border-top: solid 2px #97a8d2;}\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents {width: 158px; background: #dce1e3;font-weight: bold; color: #333 ;}\sn#sidebarOptions input { border: solid 2px #8895bb; }\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel { background: #eee;}\sn#sidebarOptions a {;border: none;}\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a {border: none;color: #00005a;}\sn#displayArea {background: #fff;margin: 1em 15.7em 0em 1em;border-left: solid 2px #8895bb;}\sn.viewer {line-height: 1.4em;padding-bottom: 1em;border-bottom:solid 1px #dedede;}\sn.viewer th, thead td {background: #00009d;border: 1px solid #666;color: #fff;}\sn.title {color: #000}\snh1,h2,h3,h4,h5 {color: #fff;background: #00009d;}\sna{ color: #00005a;}\sna:hover{ background: #00009d; color: #fff;font-weight: bold;}\sn.externalLink { text-decoration: underline; color: #000083;}\snbody { background: #97a8d2;}\sn.popup { background: #04b; border: 1px solid #04b;}\sn.popup li a:hover {background: #dedede;color: #000083;border: none;}\sn.popup li.disabled {color: #000;}\sn.button:hover {color: #fff;background: #00009d;\sn border: 1px solid #dedede;}\sn#topMenu { background: transparent; padding: 6px;margin-left: -5px;border-bottom: solid 3px #00005a}\sn#topMenu .button, #topMenu .tiddlyLink, tiddlyLinkExisting, #topMenu .externalLink\sn{\sn color: #fff;\sn text-align: center;\sn font-weight: bold;\sn font-size: 1.1em;\sn text-decoration: none;\sn letter-spacing: 1.5px;\sn background: transparent;\sn border-right: solid 1px #fff;\sn padding: 5px 15px 6px 15px;\sn}\sn#topMenu a:hover {\sn color: #fff;\sn background: #00009d;\sn border: solid 1px #db4;\sn}\sn#topMenu br {display: none; padding-right: 1em;}\sn\sn\sn/*}}}*/";\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.Blueberry2PageTemplate = "<!--- More ideas shamesslessly begged, borrowed or stolen from..... Simon Baird, Clint Checketts and Christine Hodges :)) --->\sn<!--{{{-->\sn<div class='header' macro=\s"gradient vert #00005a #0000ad\s">\sn <div id='topMenu'>\sn <span refresh='content' tiddler='SiteTitle'></span><span refresh='content' tiddler='MainMenu'></span></div>\sn </div>\sn</div> \sn<div id='sidebar'>\sn <div id='sidebarOptions' refresh='content' tiddler='SideBarOptions'></div>\sn <div id='sidebarTabs' refresh='content' force='true' tiddler='SideBarTabs'></div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='displayArea'>\sn <div id='messageArea'></div>\sn <div id='tiddlerDisplay'></div>\sn</div>\sn<!--}}}-->\sn";\n\nconfig.themes.push("Blueberry2");\n\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.iJobsStyleSheet = "<!--- [[iJobs 2|StyleSheet]] with ideas shamesslessly taken from (and suggested by) Simon Baird, Clint Checketts and Christine Hodges. Colours inspired by http://www.solucija.com/templates/demo/Internet_Jobs/ --->\sn/*{{{*/\sn.headerForeground { display: none;}\sn#sidebar {width: 171px; background: #808080;border-bottom: solid 1.5em #3c6491;border-top: solid 2px #fff;}\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents {width: 158px; background: #eee;font-weight: bold; color: #333 ;}\sn.tabSelected{color: #fff;background: #963112; border: solid 1px #fff;}\sn.tabUnselected {color: #fff;background: #999;}\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel { background: #eee;}\sn#sidebarOptions a {;border: none;}\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a {border: none;color: #333;background: #eee;}\sn#displayArea {background: #fff;margin: 1em 15.7em 0em 1em;border-top: solid 3px #ddd;border-bottom: solid 1.5em #3c6491;}\sn.viewer {line-height: 1.4em;padding-bottom: 1em;border-bottom:solid 1px #dedede;}\sn.viewer th, thead td {background: #963112;border: 1px solid #666;color: #fff;}\sn.title {color: #000}\snh1,h2,h3,h4,h5 {color: #fff;background: #963112;}\sna{ color:#c01903 ;}\sna:hover{ background: #c01903; color: #fff;font-weight: bold;}\sn.externalLink { text-decoration: underline; color: #c01903;}\snbody { background: #fff;}\sn.popup { background: #3c6491; border: 1px solid #3c6491;}\sn.popup li a:hover {background: #dedede;color: #963112;border: none;}\sn.popup li.disabled {color: #000;}\sn.button {color: #fff;background: #808080;border: 1px solid #fff;}\sn.button:hover {color: #fff;background: #c01903;\sn border: 1px solid #dedede;}\sn#topMenu { background: transparent;border-bottom: solid 3px #bcbcbc; padding: 5px;margin-left: -5px;}\sn#topMenu .button, #topMenu .tiddlyLink, tiddlyLinkExisting, #topMenu .externalLink\sn{\sn color: #333;\sn text-align: center;\sn font-weight: bold;\sn font-size: 1em;\sn text-decoration: none;\sn letter-spacing: 1.5px;\sn background: transparent;\sn border-right: solid 1px #fff;\sn padding: 5px 15px 8px 15px;\sn}\sn#topMenu a:hover {\sn color: #fff;\sn background: #3c6491;\sn}\sn#topMenu br {display: none; padding-right: 1em;}\sn\sn\sn/*}}}*/\sn";\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.iJobsPageTemplate = "<!--- More ideas shamesslessly begged, borrowed or stolen from..... Simon Baird, Clint Checketts and Christine Hodges :)) --->\sn<!--{{{-->\sn<div class='header' macro=\s"gradient vert #aaa #ccc\s">\sn <div id='topMenu'>\sn <span refresh='content' tiddler='SiteTitle'></span><span refresh='content' tiddler='MainMenu'></span></div>\sn </div>\sn</div> \sn<div id='sidebar'>\sn <div id='sidebarOptions' refresh='content' tiddler='SideBarOptions'></div>\sn <div id='sidebarTabs' refresh='content' force='true' tiddler='SideBarTabs'></div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='displayArea'>\sn <div id='messageArea'></div>\sn<div class='viewer' macro=\s"gradient vert #f5f5f5 #fff\s">\sn <div id='tiddlerDisplay'></div>\sn</div>\sn<!--}}}-->\sn";\n\nconfig.themes.push("iJobs");\n\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.NoBerry2StyleSheet = "<!--- The default TW colours with modified layout. Ideas shamesslessly taken from (and suggested by) Simon Baird, Clint Checketts and Christine Hodges --->\sn\sn/*{{{*/\sn.headerForeground { display: none;}\sn#sidebar {width: 170px; }\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents {width: 158px; }\sn#displayArea {background: #fff;margin: 1em 15.7em 0em 1em;}\sn#topMenu { background: transparent; padding: 6px;margin-left: -5px; border-bottom: solid 3px #0457ce;}\sn#topMenu .button, #topMenu .tiddlyLink, tiddlyLinkExisting, #topMenu .externalLink\sn{\sn color: #fff;\sn text-align: center;\sn font-weight: bold;\sn font-size: 1.1em;\sn text-decoration: none;\sn letter-spacing: 1.5px;\sn background: transparent;\sn border-right: solid 1px #fff;\sn padding: 5px 15px 8px 15px;\sn}\sn#topMenu a:hover {\sn color: #fff;\sn background: #18f;\sn}\sn#topMenu br {display: none; padding-right: 1em;}\sn\sn\sn/*}}}*/";\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.NoBerry2PageTemplate = "<!--- More ideas shamesslessly begged, borrowed or stolen from..... Simon Baird, Clint Checketts and Christine Hodges :)) --->\sn<!--{{{-->\sn<div class='header' macro=\s"gradient vert #04b #18f\s">\sn <div id='topMenu'>\sn <span refresh='content' tiddler='SiteTitle'></span><span refresh='content' tiddler='MainMenu'></span></div>\sn </div>\sn</div> \sn<div id='sidebar'>\sn <div id='sidebarOptions' refresh='content' tiddler='SideBarOptions'></div>\sn <div id='sidebarTabs' refresh='content' force='true' tiddler='SideBarTabs'></div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='displayArea'>\sn <div id='messageArea'></div>\sn <div id='tiddlerDisplay'></div>\sn</div>\sn<!--}}}-->\sn";\n\nconfig.themes.push("NoBerry2");\n\n//}}}\n/***\n!!Clint's Themes\nThe themes were created by Clint Checketts from http://www.checkettsweb.com/\nThe original GTD theme was created by Nathan Bowers from http://snapgrid.com/\n***/\n//{{{\n\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.GTDStyleSheet = "/***\sn!Calendar CSS\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.calendar{\sn border-bottom: 1px solid #550000;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer .calendar{\sn width: 220px;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendar{\sn font-size: 8px;\sn cursor: pointer;\sn width: 100%;\sn border: 0;\sn border-collapse: collapse;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendar .button{\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendar td{\sn font-size: 8pt;\sn padding: 0;\sn background: #fff;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendar a{\sn margin: 0;\sn color: #000;\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendar a:hover{\sn color: #000;\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendarMonthname,\sn#mainMenu .calendar .calendarMonthTitle td a{\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendarDaysOfWeek td{\sn background: #500;\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn/*}}}*/\sn\sn/***\sn!GTD Style\sn\sn!Generic rules /%==================================================================== %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\snbody {\sn background: #464646 url('http://shared.snapgrid.com/images/tiddlywiki/bodygradient.png') repeat-x top fixed;\sn color: #000;\sn font: .82em/1.25em 'Bitstream Vera Sans', Verdana, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;\sn/*'Lucida Sans Unicode', 'Lucida Grande','Trebuchet MS', */\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Header rules /%====================================================================== %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#contentWrapper\sn{\sn margin: 0 auto;\snwidth: 59em;\snposition: relative;\sn}\sn\sn#header\sn{\sn color: #fff;\sn padding: 1.5em 1em .6em 0;\sn}\sn\sn#siteTitle {\sn\sn font-size: 2.3em;\sn margin: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#siteSubtitle {\sn font-size: 1em;\sn padding-left: .8em;;\sn}\sn\sn#titleLine{\sn background: transparent;\sn padding: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#titleLine a {\sn color: #cf6;\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn\sn\sn\sn\sn\sn\sn\sn\sn\sn/***\sn!Sidebar rules /%====================================================================== %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#sidebar{\sn left: 0;\snwidth: 18em;\sn margin: .9em .9em 0 0;\sn color: #000;\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Main menu rules /%=================================================================== %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#mainMenu{\sn position: static;\sn width: auto;\sn\sn background: #600;\sn border-right: 3px solid #500;\snpadding: 0;\sn text-align: left;\sn font-size: 1em;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu h1{\sn padding: 0;\sn margin: 0;\sn font-size: 1em;\sn font-weight: normal;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu ul{\sn padding: 0;\sn margin: 0;\sn list-style: none;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu h1 a,\sn#mainMenu li a,\sn#mainMenu li a.button{\sn display: block;\sn padding: 0 5px 0 10px;\snborder: 0;\sn border-bottom: 1px solid #500;\sn border-top: 1px solid #900;\snmargin: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu a,\sn#mainMenu a.button{\sn height: 22px;\snheight: 1.83em;\sn line-height: 22px;\sn color: #fff;\sn background: #700;\snmargin-left: 1em;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu a:hover,\sn#mainMenu a.button:hover {\sn background: #b00;\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Sidebar options rules /%============================================================ %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#sidebarOptions {\sn background: #eeb;\sn border-right: 3px solid #bb8;\sn color: #B4C675;\sn padding: .5em 0;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions a {\sn color: #700;\sn margin: .2em .8em;\sn padding: 0;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions a:hover, #sidebarOptions a:active {\sn color: #fff;\sn background: #700;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions input{\sn margin: 2px 10px;\sn border: 1px inset #333;\snpadding: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel {\sn background: #fff;\sn color: #000;\sn padding: 5px 10px;\sn font-size: .9em;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a{\sn font-weight: normal;\sn margin: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a:link,#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a:visited {\sn color: #700;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a:hover,#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a:active {\sn color: #fff;\sn background: #700;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Sidebar tabs rules /%===================================================================== %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#sidebarTabs {\sn background: transparent;\sn border-right: 3px solid #740;\sn border-bottom: 3px solid #520;\sn border: 0;\sn padding: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper #sidebarTabs a,\sn#contentWrapper #displayArea .tabContents a{\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper #sidebarTabs a:hover,\sn#contentWrapper #displayArea .tabContents a:hover {\sn background: #000;\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper #sidebarTabs a:active,\sn#contentWrapper #displayArea .tabContents a:active{\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sn\sn\sn#contentWrapper .tabSelected {\sn background: #960;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper .tabUnselected{\sn background: #660;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper #sidebar .tabset{\sn background: #eeb;\sn border-right: 3px solid #bb8;\sn padding: 0 0 0 .75em;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper .tabContents{\snfont-size: .95em;\snbackground: #960;\snborder:0;\sn border-right: 3px solid #740;\sn border-bottom: 3px solid #520;\sn padding: .75em;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper .tabContents{\sn width: auto;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper #sidebarTabs .tabContents .tabset,\sn#contentWrapper .tabContents .tabset{\sn border: 0;\sn padding: 0;\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper .tabContents .tabSelected,\sn#contentWrapper .tabContents .tabContents {\sn background: #700;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper .tabContents .tabUnselected {\sn background: #440;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper .tabset a {\sn color: #fff;\sn padding: .2em .7em;\sn margin: 0 .17em 0 0;\sn height: 2em;\snposition: static;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper .tabset a:hover {\sn background: #000;\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper .tabset a:active {\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper .tabContents ul{\sn margin: 0;\sn padding: 0;\sn list-style: none;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper .tabContents .tabContents ul{\sn color: #eeb;\sn}\sn\sn.tabContents ul a,\sn.tabContents ul .button{\sn color: #fff;\sn display: block;\sn padding: .1em 0 .1em .7em;\sn background: transparent;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn.tabContents ul a:hover {\sn color: #fff;\sn background: #000;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!License panel rules /%==================================================================== %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#licensePanel {\sn padding: 0px 1em;\sn font-size: .9em;\sn}\sn\sn#licensePanel a {\sn color: #960;\sn display: block;\sn margin-top: .9em;\sn}\sn\sn#licensePanel a:hover {\sn color: #fff;\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Popup rules /%================================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.popup {\sn font-size: .8em;\sn padding: 0em;\sn background: #333;\sn border: 1px solid #000;\sn}\sn\sn.popup hr {\sn margin: 1px 0 0 0;\sn visibility: hidden;\sn}\sn\sn.popup li.disabled {\sn color: #666;\sn}\sn\sn.popup li a,\sn.popup li a:visited{\sn color: #000;\sn border: .1em outset #cf6;\sn background: #cf6;\sn}\sn\sn.popup li a:hover {\snborder: .1em outset #cf6;\sn background: #ef9;\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Message area rules /%================================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#messageArea{\sn font-size: .9em;\sn padding: .4em;\sn background: #FFE72F;\sn border-right: .25em solid #da1;\sn border-bottom: .25em solid #a80;\sn\snposition: fixed;\sn top: 10px;\sn right: 10px;\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper #messageArea a{\sn color: #00e;\sn text-decoration: none;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper #messageArea a:hover{\sn color: #00e;\sn text-decoration: underline;\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper #messageArea .messageToolbar a.button{\sn border: 1px solid #da1;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper #messageArea .messageToolbar a.button:hover{\sn color: #00e;\sn text-decoration: none;\sn border: 1px solid #000;\sn background: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn\sn\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Tiddler display rules /%================================================================== %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#displayArea {\sn width: 39.75em;\sn margin: 0 0 0 17em;\sn}\sn\sn.tiddler {\sn margin: 0 0 .9em 0;\sn padding: 0 1em;\sn border-right: .25em solid #aaa;\sn border-bottom: .25em solid #555;\sn background: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn.title {\sn font-size: 1.5em;\sn font-weight: bold;\sn color: #900;\sn}\sn\sn.toolbar {\sn font-size: .8em;\sn padding: .5em 0;\sn}\sn\sn.toolbar .button{\sn padding: .1em .3em;\sn color: #000;\sn\sn border: .1em outset #cf6;\sn background: #cf6;\snmargin: .1em;\sn}\sn\sn.toolbar .button:hover {\sn background: #ef9;\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sn.toolbar .button:active {\sn background: #ff0;\sn}\sn\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Viewer rules /% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.viewer {\sn line-height: 1.4em;\sn font-size: 1em;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer a:link, .viewer a:visited {\sn color: #15b;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer a:hover {\sn color: #fff;\sn background: #000;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer .button{\sn background: transparent;\sn border-top: 1px solid #eee;\sn border-left: 1px solid #eee;\sn border-bottom: 1px solid #000;\sn border-right: 1px solid #000;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer .button:hover{\sn background: #eee;\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer .button:active{\sn background: #ccc;\sn border-bottom: 1px solid #eee;\sn border-right: 1px solid #eee;\sn border-top: 1px solid #111;\sn border-left: 1px solid #111;\sn}\sn\sn\sn.viewer blockquote {\sn border-left: 3px solid #777;\sn margin: .3em;\sn padding: .3em;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer pre{\sn background: #fefefe;\sn border: 1px solid #f1f1f1;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer pre, .viewer code{\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer ul {\sn padding-left: 30px;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer ol {\sn padding-left: 30px;\sn}\snul{\snlist-style-type: asquare;\sn}\snol{ \sn list-style-type: decimal;\sn}\sn\snol ol{ \sn list-style-type: lower-alpha;\sn}\sn\snol ol ol{ \sn list-style-type: lower-roman;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer ul, .viewer ol, .viewer p {\sn margin: .0;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer li {\sn margin: .2em 0;\sn}\sn\snh1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 {\sn color: #000;\sn font-weight: bold;\sn background: #eee;\sn padding: 2px 10px;\sn margin: 5px 0;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer h1 {font-size: 1.3em;}\sn.viewer h2 {font-size: 1.2em;}\sn.viewer h3 {font-size: 1.1em;}\sn.viewer h4 {font-size: 1em;}\sn.viewer h5 { font-size: .9em;}\sn.viewer h6 { font-size: .8em;}\sn\sn.viewer table {\sn border: 2px solid #303030;\sn font-size: 11px;\sn margin: 10px 0;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer th, .viewer thead td{\sn color: #000;\sn background: #eee;\sn border: 1px solid #aaa;\sn padding: 0 3px;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer td {\sn border: 1px solid #aaa;\sn padding: 0 3px;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer caption {\sn padding: 3px;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer hr {\sn border: none;\sn border-top: dotted 1px #777;\sn height: 1px;\sn color: #777;\sn margin: 7px 0;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer\sn{\sn margin: .5em 0 0 0;\sn padding: .5em 0;\sn border-top: 1px solid #ccc;\sn}\sn\sn.highlight {\sn color: #000;\sn background: #ffe72f;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Editor rules /% ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.editor {\sn font-size: .8em;\sn color: #402C74;\sn padding: .3em 0;\sn}\sn\sn.editor input, .editor textarea {\sn font: 1.1em/130% 'Andale Mono', 'Monaco', 'Lucida Console', 'Courier New', monospace;\sn margin: 0;\sn border: 1px inset #333;\sn padding: 2px 0;\sn}\sn\sn.editor textarea {\sn height: 42em;\sn width: 100%;\sn}\sn\sninput:focus, textarea:focus\sn{\sn background: #ffe;\sn border: 1px solid #000;\sn}\sn.footer\sn{\sn padding: .5em 0;\sn margin: .5em 0;\sn border-top: 1px solid #ddd;\sn color: #555;\sn text-align: center; \sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!IE Display hacks /% ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\snbody{\sn _text-align: center;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper\sn{\sn/* _width: 770px; CSS UNDERSCORE HACK FOR PROPER WIN/IE DISPLAY */\sn _text-align: left; /* CSS UNDERSCORE HACK FOR PROPER WIN/IE DISPLAY */ \sn}\sn\sn#messageArea{\sn _position: absolute;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/";\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.GTDPageTemplate = "<!---\sn| Name:|GTDTWPlusPageTemplate|\sn| Source:|http://www.checkettsweb.com/tw/gtd_tiddlywiki.htm#StyleSheet|\sn| Author:|ClintChecketts|\sn--->\sn<!--{{{-->\sn<div id='header'>\sn<div id='titleLine'>\sn<span id='siteTitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteTitle'></span>\sn<span id='siteSubtitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteSubtitle'></span>\sn</div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='sidebar'>\sn<div id='mainMenu' refresh='content' tiddler='MainMenu'></div>\sn<div id='sidebarOptions' refresh='content' tiddler='SideBarOptions'></div>\sn<div id='sidebarTabs' refresh='content' force='true' tiddler='SideBarTabs'></div><div id=\s"licensePanel\s">\sn<a rel=\s"license\s" href=\s"http://shared.snapgrid.com/gtd_tiddlywiki.html#RevisionHistory\s" target=\s"_new\s">GTDTW Version <span macro=\s"version\s"></span></a>\sn<a rel=\s"license\s" href=\s"http://www.tiddlywiki.com\s" target=\s"_new\s">\snTiddlyWiki is published by Jeremy Ruston at Osmosoft under a BSD open source license</a>\sn<a rel=\s"license\s" href=\s"http://snapgrid.com\s" target=\s"_new\s">GTD TiddlyWiki is a modification by Nathan Bowers at Snapgrid under the same license terms.</a>\sn<a rel=\s"license\s" href=\s"http://davidco.com\s" target=\s"_new\s">\s"Getting Things Done\s" is &#169; David Allen at Davidco. Davidco has no affiliation with TiddlyWiki or GTD TiddlyWiki.</a></div></div>\sn<div id='displayArea'>\sn<div id='messageArea'></div>\sn<div id='tiddlerDisplay'></div>\sn<!--}}}-->";\n\nconfig.themes.push("GTD");\n\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.DevFireStyleSheet = "/***\sn!Devfire\snStyle by Clint Checketts (http://www.checkettsweb.com) for TiddlyWiki 2.0\snInspired by the GLP'd Darkfire Wordpress skin.\sn\sn!Sections in this Tiddler:\sn*Generic rules\sn*Links styles\sn*Header\sn*Main menu\sn*Sidebar\sn**Sidebar options\sn**Sidebar tabs\sn*Message area\sn*Popup\sn*Tabs\sn*Tiddler display\sn**Viewer\sn**Editor\sn*Misc. rules\sn!Generic rules /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\snbody {\snbackground-color: #000;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Link styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sna,\sna.button,\sn#mainMenu a.button,\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a{\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sna:hover,\sna.button:hover,\sn#mainMenu a.button:hover,\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a:hover\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a:active{\sn color: #ff7f00;\sn border: 0;\sn border-bottom: #ff7f00 1px dashed;\sn background: transparent;\sn text-decoration: none;\sn}\sn\sn#displayArea .button.highlight{\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn background: #4c4c4c;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Header styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.header{\sn border-bottom: 2px solid #ffbf00;\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn.headerForeground a {\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn.header a:hover {\sn border-bottom: 1px dashed #fff;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Main menu styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#mainMenu {color: #fff;}\sn#mainMenu h1{\sn font-size: 1.1em;\sn}\sn#mainMenu li,#mainMenu ul{\sn list-style: none;\sn margin: 0;\sn padding: 0;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Sidebar styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#sidebar {\sn right: 0;\sn color: #fff;\sn border: 2px solid #ffbf00;\sn border-width: 0 0 2px 2px;\sn}\sn#sidebarOptions {\sn background-color: #4c4c4c;\sn padding: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions a{\sn margin: 0;\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn#sidebarOptions a:hover {\sn color: #4c4c4c;\sn background-color: #ffbf00;\sn\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions a:active {\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn background-color: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel {\sn background-color: #333;\sn margin: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs {background-color: #4c4c4c;}\sn#sidebarTabs .tabSelected {\sn padding: 3px 3px;\sn cursor: default;\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn background-color: #666;\sn}\sn#sidebarTabs .tabUnselected {\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn background-color: #5f5f5f;\sn padding: 0 4px;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabUnselected:hover,\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents {\sn background-color: #666;\sn}\sn\sn.listTitle{color: #FFF;}\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents a{\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents a:hover{\sn color: #ff7f00;\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabSelected,\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tab:hover,\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabContents{\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn background: #4c4c4c;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabUnselected {\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn background: #5f5f5f;\sn}\sn\sn.tab.tabSelected, .tab.tabSelected:hover{color: #ffbf00; border: 0; background-color: #4c4c4c;cursor:default;}\sn.tab.tabUnselected {background-color: #666;}\sn.tab.tabUnselected:hover{color:#ffbf00; border: 0;background-color: #4c4c4c;}\sn.tabContents {\sn background-color: #4c4c4c;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn.tabContents .tabContents{background: #666;}\sn.tabContents .tabSelected{background: #666;}\sn.tabContents .tabUnselected{background: #5f5f5f;}\sn.tabContents .tab:hover{background: #666;}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Message area styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#messageArea {background-color: #666; color: #fff; border: 2px solid #ffbf00;}\sn#messageArea a:link, #messageArea a:visited {color: #ffbf00; text-decoration:none;}\sn#messageArea a:hover {color: #ff7f00;}\sn#messageArea a:active {color: #ff7f00;}\sn#messageArea .messageToolbar a{\sn border: 1px solid #ffbf00;\sn background: #4c4c4c;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Popup styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#popup {color: #fff; background-color: #4c4c4c; border: 1px solid #ffbf00;}\sn#popup a {color: #ffbf00; }\sn#popup a:hover { background: transparent; color: #ff7f00; border: 0;}\sn#popup hr {color: #ffbf00; background: #ffbf00;}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Tiddler Display styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.title{color: #fff;}\snh1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {\sn color: #fff;\sn background-color: transparent;\sn border-bottom: 1px solid #333;\sn}\sn\sn.subtitle{\sn color: #666;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer {color: #fff; }\sn\sn.viewer table{background: #666; color: #fff;}\sn\sn.viewer th {background-color: #996; color: #fff;}\sn\sn.viewer pre, .viewer code {color: #ddd; background-color: #4c4c4c; border: 1px solid #ffbf00;}\sn\sn.viewer hr {color: #666;}\sn\sn.tiddler .button {color: #4c4c4c;}\sn.tiddler .button:hover { color: #ffbf00; background-color: #4c4c4c;}\sn.tiddler .button:active {color: #ffbf00; background-color: #4c4c4c;}\sn\sn.toolbar {\sn color: #4c4c4c;\sn}\sn\sn.toolbar a.button,\sn.editorFooter a{\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn.footer {\sn color: #ddd;\sn}\sn\sn.selectedTiddler .footer {\sn color: #888;\sn}\sn\sn.highlight, .marked {\sn color: #000;\sn background-color: #ffe72f;\sn}\sn.editorFooter {\sn color: #aaa;\sn}\sn\sn.tab{\sn-moz-border-radius-topleft: 3px;\sn-moz-border-radius-topright: 3px;\sn}\sn\sn.tagging,\sn.tagged{\sn background: #4c4c4c;\sn border: 1px solid #4c4c4c; \sn}\sn\sn.selected .tagging,\sn.selected .tagged{\sn background: #000;\sn border: 1px solid #ffbf00;\sn}\sn\sn.tagging .listTitle,\sn.tagged .listTitle{\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn.tagging .button,\sn.tagged .button{\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn border: 0;\sn padding: 0;\sn}\sn\sn.tagging .button:hover,\sn.tagged .button:hover{\snbackground: transparent;\sn}\sn/*}}}*//***\sn!Devfire\snStyle by Clint Checketts (http://www.checkettsweb.com) for TiddlyWiki 2.0\snInspired by the GLP'd Darkfire Wordpress skin.\sn\sn!Sections in this Tiddler:\sn*Generic rules\sn*Links styles\sn*Header\sn*Main menu\sn*Sidebar\sn**Sidebar options\sn**Sidebar tabs\sn*Message area\sn*Popup\sn*Tabs\sn*Tiddler display\sn**Viewer\sn**Editor\sn*Misc. rules\sn!Generic rules /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\snbody {\snbackground-color: #000;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Link styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sna,\sna.button,\sn#mainMenu a.button,\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a{\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sna:hover,\sna.button:hover,\sn#mainMenu a.button:hover,\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a:hover\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a:active{\sn color: #ff7f00;\sn border: 0;\sn border-bottom: #ff7f00 1px dashed;\sn background: transparent;\sn text-decoration: none;\sn}\sn\sn#displayArea .button.highlight{\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn background: #4c4c4c;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Header styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.header{\sn border-bottom: 2px solid #ffbf00;\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn.headerForeground a {\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn.header a:hover {\sn border-bottom: 1px dashed #fff;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Main menu styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#mainMenu {color: #fff;}\sn#mainMenu h1{\sn font-size: 1.1em;\sn}\sn#mainMenu li,#mainMenu ul{\sn list-style: none;\sn margin: 0;\sn padding: 0;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Sidebar styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#sidebar {\sn right: 0;\sn color: #fff;\sn border: 2px solid #ffbf00;\sn border-width: 0 0 2px 2px;\sn}\sn#sidebarOptions {\sn background-color: #4c4c4c;\sn padding: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions a{\sn margin: 0;\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn#sidebarOptions a:hover {\sn color: #4c4c4c;\sn background-color: #ffbf00;\sn\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions a:active {\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn background-color: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel {\sn background-color: #333;\sn margin: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs {background-color: #4c4c4c;}\sn#sidebarTabs .tabSelected {\sn padding: 3px 3px;\sn cursor: default;\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn background-color: #666;\sn}\sn#sidebarTabs .tabUnselected {\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn background-color: #5f5f5f;\sn padding: 0 4px;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabUnselected:hover,\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents {\sn background-color: #666;\sn}\sn\sn.listTitle{color: #FFF;}\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents a{\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents a:hover{\sn color: #ff7f00;\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabSelected,\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tab:hover,\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabContents{\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn background: #4c4c4c;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabUnselected {\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn background: #5f5f5f;\sn}\sn\sn.tab.tabSelected, .tab.tabSelected:hover{color: #ffbf00; border: 0; background-color: #4c4c4c;cursor:default;}\sn.tab.tabUnselected {background-color: #666;}\sn.tab.tabUnselected:hover{color:#ffbf00; border: 0;background-color: #4c4c4c;}\sn.tabContents {\sn background-color: #4c4c4c;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn.tabContents .tabContents{background: #666;}\sn.tabContents .tabSelected{background: #666;}\sn.tabContents .tabUnselected{background: #5f5f5f;}\sn.tabContents .tab:hover{background: #666;}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Message area styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#messageArea {background-color: #666; color: #fff; border: 2px solid #ffbf00;}\sn#messageArea a:link, #messageArea a:visited {color: #ffbf00; text-decoration:none;}\sn#messageArea a:hover {color: #ff7f00;}\sn#messageArea a:active {color: #ff7f00;}\sn#messageArea .messageToolbar a{\sn border: 1px solid #ffbf00;\sn background: #4c4c4c;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Popup styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#popup {color: #fff; background-color: #4c4c4c; border: 1px solid #ffbf00;}\sn#popup li.disabled{color: #ffbf00;}\sn\sn#popup a {color: #ffbf00; }\sn#popup a:hover { background: transparent; color: #ff7f00; border: 0;}\sn#popup hr {color: #ffbf00; background: #ffbf00;}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Tiddler Display styles /% ============================================================= %/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.title{color: #fff;}\snh1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {\sn color: #fff;\sn background-color: transparent;\sn border-bottom: 1px solid #333;\sn}\sn\sn.subtitle{\sn color: #666;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer {color: #fff; }\sn\sn.viewer table{background: #666; color: #fff;}\sn\sn.viewer th {background-color: #996; color: #fff;}\sn\sn.viewer pre, .viewer code {color: #ddd; background-color: #4c4c4c; border: 1px solid #ffbf00}\sn\sn.viewer hr {color: #666;}\sn\sn.tiddler .button {color: #4c4c4c;}\sn.tiddler .button:hover { color: #ffbf00; background-color: #4c4c4c;}\sn.tiddler .button:active {color: #ffbf00; background-color: #4c4c4c;}\sn\sn.toolbar {\sn color: #4c4c4c;\sn}\sn\sn.toolbar a.button,\sn.editorFooter a{\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn.footer {\sn color: #ddd;\sn}\sn\sn.selectedTiddler .footer {\sn color: #888;\sn}\sn\sn.highlight, .marked {\sn color: #000;\sn background-color: #ffe72f;\sn}\sn.editorFooter {\sn color: #aaa;\sn}\sn\sn.tab{\sn-moz-border-radius-topleft: 3px;\sn-moz-border-radius-topright: 3px;\sn}\sn\sn.tagging,\sn.tagged{\sn background: #4c4c4c;\sn border: 1px solid #4c4c4c; \sn}\sn\sn.selected .tagging,\sn.selected .tagged{\sn background: #000;\sn border: 1px solid #ffbf00;\sn}\sn\sn.tagging .listTitle,\sn.tagged .listTitle{\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn.tagging .button,\sn.tagged .button{\sn color: #ffbf00;\sn border: 0;\sn padding: 0;\sn}\sn\sn.tagging .button:hover,\sn.tagged .button:hover{\snbackground: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn.cascade {\sn background: #4c4c4c;\sn color: #ddd;\sn border: 1px solid #ffbf00;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/";\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.DevFirePageTemplate = "<div class='header' macro='gradient vert #390108 #900'>\sn<div class='headerShadow'>\sn<span class='siteTitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteTitle'></span>&nbsp;\sn<span class='siteSubtitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteSubtitle'></span>\sn</div>\sn<div class='headerForeground'>\sn<span class='siteTitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteTitle'></span>&nbsp;\sn<span class='siteSubtitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteSubtitle'></span>\sn</div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='mainMenu' refresh='content' tiddler='MainMenu'></div>\sn<div id='sidebar'>\sn<div id='sidebarOptions' refresh='content' tiddler='SideBarOptions'></div>\sn<div id='sidebarTabs' refresh='content' force='true' tiddler='SideBarTabs'></div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='displayArea'>\sn<div id='messageArea'></div>\sn<div id='tiddlerDisplay'></div>\sn</div>";\n\nconfig.themes.push("DevFire");\n\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.ClassicBrownStyleSheet = "[[TagglyTaggingStyles]]\sn\sn/***\sn!TiddlyWiki Classic Color Scheme\snDesigned by Jeremy Ruston\sn\snTo use this color scheme copy the [[ClassicTiddlyWiki]] contents into a tiddler and name it 'StyleSheet' also grab the [[ClassicTemplate]] and copy its contents into a tiddler named 'PageTemplate'.\sn\sn!Colors Used\sn*@@bgcolor(#630):color(#fff): #630@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#930): #930@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#996633): #963@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#c90): #c90@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#cf6): #cf6@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#cc9): #cc9@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#ba9): #ba9@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#996): #996@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#300):color(#fff): #300@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#000000):color(#fff): #000@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#666): #666@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#888): #888@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#aaa): #aaa@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#ddd): #ddd@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#eee): #eee@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#ffffff): #fff@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#f00): #f00@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#ff3): #ff3@@\sn!Generic Rules /%==============================================%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\snbody {\sn background: #fff;\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sna{\sn color: #963;\sn}\sn\sna:hover{\sn background: #963;\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sna img{\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\snh1,h2,h3,h4,h5 {\sn background: #cc9;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Header /%==================================================%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.header{\sn background: #300;\sn}\sn\sn.titleLine {\sn color: #fff;\sn padding: 5em 0em 1em .5em;\sn}\sn\sn.titleLine a {\sn color: #cf6;\sn}\sn\sn.titleLine a:hover {\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Main Menu /%=================================================%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#mainMenu .button {\sn color: #930;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .button:hover {\sn color: #cf6;\sn background: #930;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu li{\sn list-style: none;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Sidebar options /%=================================================%/\sn~TiddlyLinks and buttons are treated identically in the sidebar and slider panel\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#sidebar {\sn background: #c90;\sn right: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions a{\sn color: #930;\sn border: 0;\sn margin: 0;\sn padding: .25em .5em;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions a:hover {\sn color: #cf6;\sn background: #930;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions a:active {\sn color: #930;\sn background: #cf6;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel {\sn background: #eea;\sn margin: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a {\sn color: #930;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a:hover {\sn color: #cf6;\sn background: #930;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a:active {\sn color: #930;\sn background: #cf6;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Sidebar tabs /%=================================================%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.tabSelected,.tabContents {\sn background: #eea;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn.tabUnselected {\sn background: #c90;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs {\sn background: #c90;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabSelected{\sn color: #cf6;\sn background: #963;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabUnselected {\sn color: #cf6;\sn background: #930;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents{\sn background: #963;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabSelected,\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabSelected:hover{\sn background: #930;\sn color: #cf6;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabUnselected,\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabUnselected:hover{\sn background: #300;\sn color: #cf6;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabContents {\sn background: #930;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents a {\sn color: #cf6;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .button.highlight,\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents a:hover {\sn background: #cf6;\sn color: #300;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Message Area /%=================================================%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn#messageArea {\sn background: #930;\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn#messageArea a:link, #messageArea a:visited {\sn color: #c90;\sn}\sn\sn#messageArea a:hover {\sn color: #963;\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn#messageArea a:active {\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Popup /%=================================================%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.popup {\sn background: #eea;\sn border: 1px solid #930;\sn}\sn\sn.popup hr {\sn color: #963;\sn background: #963;\sn border-bottom: 1px;\sn}\sn\sn.popup li.disabled {\sn color: #ba9;\sn}\sn\sn.popup li a, .popup li a:visited {\sn color: #300;\sn}\sn\sn.popup li a:hover {\sn background: #930;\sn color: #eea;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Tiddler Display /%=================================================%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.tiddler .button {\sn color: #930;\sn}\sn\sn.tiddler .button:hover {\sn color: #cf6;\sn background: #930;\sn}\sn\sn.tiddler .button:active {\sn color: #fff;\sn background: #c90;\sn}\sn\sn.shadow .title {\sn color: #888;\sn}\sn\sn.title {\sn color: #422;\sn}\sn\sn.subtitle {\sn color: #866;\sn}\sn\sn.toolbar {\sn color: #aaa;\sn}\sn\sn.toolbar a,\sn.toolbar a:hover{\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn.tagging, .tagged {\sn border: 1px solid #fff;\sn background-color: #ffc;\sn}\sn\sn.selected .tagging, .selected .tagged {\sn border: 1px solid #aa6;\sn background-color: #ffc;\sn}\sn\sn.tagging .listTitle, .tagged .listTitle {\sncolor: #999999;\sn}\sn\sn.footer {\sn color: #ddd;\sn}\sn\sn.selected .footer {\sn color: #888;\sn}\sn\sn.sparkline {\sn background: #eea;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn.sparktick {\sn background: #930;\sn}\sn\sn.errorButton {\sn color: #ff0;\sn background: #f00;\sn}\sn\sn.zoomer {\sn color: #963;\sn border: 1px solid #963;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn''The viewer is where the tiddler content is displayed'' /%------------------------------------------------%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.viewer .button {\sn background: #c90;\sn color: #300;\sn border-right: 1px solid #300;\sn border-bottom: 1px solid #300;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer .button:hover {\sn background: #eea;\sn color: #c90;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer .imageLink{\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer blockquote {\sn border-left: 3px solid #666;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer table {\sn border: 2px solid #303030;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer th, thead td {\sn background: #996;\sn border: 1px solid #606060;\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer td, .viewer tr {\sn border: 1px solid #606060;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer pre {\sn border: 1px solid #963;\sn background: #eea;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer code {\sn color: #630;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer hr {\sn border: 0;\sn border-top: dashed 1px #606060;\sn color: #666;\sn}\sn\sn.highlight, .marked {\sn background: #ff3;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn''The editor replaces the viewer in the tiddler'' /%------------------------------------------------%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.editor input {\sn border: 1px solid #000;\sn}\sn\sn.editor textarea {\sn border: 1px solid #000;\sn width: 100%;\sn}\sn\sn.editorFooter {\sn color: #aaa;\sn}\sn\sn.editorFooter a {\sn color: #930;\sn}\sn\sn.editorFooter a:hover {\sn color: #cf6;\sn background: #930;\sn}\sn\sn.editorFooter a:active {\sn color: #fff;\sn background: #c90;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/";\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.ClassicBrownPageTemplate = "<div class='header'>\sn<div class='titleLine'>\sn<span class='siteTitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteTitle'></span>&nbsp;\sn<span class='siteSubtitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteSubtitle'></span>\sn</div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='mainMenu' refresh='content' tiddler='MainMenu'></div>\sn<div id='sidebar'>\sn<div macro='gradient vert #ffffff #cc9900'>\sn<div id='sidebarOptions' refresh='content' tiddler='SideBarOptions'></div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='sidebarTabs' refresh='content' force='true' tiddler='SideBarTabs'></div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='displayArea'>\sn<div id='messageArea'></div>\sn<div id='tiddlerDisplay'></div>\sn</div>";\n\nconfig.themes.push("ClassicBrown");\n//}}}\n/***\n!~MonkeyPirateTiddlyWiki Themes\nCreated by Simon Baird from http://simonbaird.com/mptw/\n***/\n//{{{\n\n// couple of extra bits\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.HorizontalMainMenuStyles = "/***\snTo use, add {{{[[HorizontalMainMenuStyles]]}}} to your StyleSheet tiddler, or you can just paste the CSS in directly. See also HorizontalMainMenu and PageTemplate.\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn\sn#topMenu br {display:none; }\sn#topMenu { background: #39a; }\sn#topMenu { padding:2px; }\sn#topMenu .button, #topMenu .tiddlyLink {\sn margin-left:0.5em; margin-right:0.5em;\sn padding-left:3px; padding-right:3px;\sn color:white; font-size:115%;\sn}\sn#topMenu .button:hover, #topMenu .tiddlyLink:hover { background:#178;}\sn\sn#displayArea { margin: 1em 15.7em 0em 1em; } /* so we use the freed up space */\sn\sn/* just in case want some QuickOpenTags in your topMenu */\sn#topMenu .quickopentag { padding:0px; margin:0px; border:0px; }\sn#topMenu .quickopentag .tiddlyLink { padding-right:1px; margin-right:0px; }\sn#topMenu .quickopentag .button { padding-left:1px; margin-left:0px; border:0px; }\sn\sn\sn/*}}}*/";\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.SideBarWhiteAndGrey = "/***\snThis CSS by DaveBirss.\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn\sn.tabSelected {\sn background: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn.tabUnselected {\sn background: #eee;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebar {\sn color: #000;\sn background: transparent; \sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions {\sn background: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .button {\sn color: #999;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .button:hover {\sn color: #000;\sn background: #fff;\sn border-color:white;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .button:active {\sn color: #000;\sn background: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel {\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel A {\sn color: #999;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel A:hover {\sn color: #000;\sn background: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel A:active {\sn color: #000;\sn background: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn.sidebarSubHeading {\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs {`\sn background: #fff\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabSelected {\sn color: #000;\sn background: #fff;\sn border-top: solid 1px #ccc;\sn border-left: solid 1px #ccc;\sn border-right: solid 1px #ccc;\sn border-bottom: none;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabUnselected {\sn color: #999;\sn background: #eee;\sn border-top: solid 1px #ccc;\sn border-left: solid 1px #ccc;\sn border-right: solid 1px #ccc;\sn border-bottom: none;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents {\sn background: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabSelected {\sn background: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabUnselected {\sn background: #eee;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .txtMoreTab .tabContents {\sn background: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents .tiddlyLink {\sn color: #999;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents .tiddlyLink:hover {\sn background: #fff;\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents {\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .button {\sn color: #666;\sn}\sn\sn#sidebarTabs .tabContents .button:hover {\sn color: #000;\sn background: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn\sn/*}}}*/";\n\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.MPTWStyleSheet = "/***\snCosmetic fixes that probably should be included in a future TW...\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.viewer .listTitle { list-style-type:none; margin-left:-2em; }\sn.editorFooter .button { padding-top: 0px; padding-bottom:0px; }\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\snImportant stuff. See TagglyTaggingStyles and HorizontalMainMenuStyles\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn[[TagglyTaggingStyles]]\sn[[HorizontalMainMenuStyles]]\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\snClint's fix for weird IE behaviours\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\snbody {position:static;}\sn.tagClear{margin-top:1em;clear:both;}\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\snJust colours, fonts, tweaks etc. See SideBarWhiteAndGrey\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\snbody {background:#eee; /* font-size:103%; */}\sna{ color: #069; }\sna:hover{ background: #069; color: #fff; }\sn.popup { background: #178; border: 1px solid #069; }\sn.headerForeground a { color: #6fc;}\sn.headerShadow { left: 2px; top: 2px; }\sn.title { padding:0px; margin:0px; }\sn.siteSubtitle { padding:0px; margin:0px; padding-left:1.5em; }\sn.subtitle { font-size:90%; color:#ccc; padding-left:0.25em; }\snh1,h2,h3,h4,h5 { color: #000; background: transparent; }\sn.title {color:black; font-size:2em;}\sn.shadow .title {color:#999; }\sn.viewer pre { background-color:#f8f8ff; border-color:#ddf; }\sn.viewer { padding-top:0px; }\sn.editor textarea { font-family:monospace; }\sn#sidebarOptions { border:1px #ccc solid; }\sn.tiddler {\sn border-bottom:1px solid #ccc; border-right:1px solid #ccc; padding-bottom:1em; margin-bottom:1em; \sn background:#fff; padding-right:1.5em; }\sn#messageArea { background-color:#bde; border-color:#8ab; border-width:4px; border-style:dotted; font-size:90%; }\sn#messageArea .button { text-decoration:none; font-weight:bold; background:transparent; border:0px; }\sn#messageArea .button:hover {background: #acd; }\sn[[SideBarWhiteAndGrey]]\sn\sn.viewer td {vertical-align:top;}\sn\sn.viewer table.noBorder {border-style:none;}\sn.viewer table.noBorder td {border-style:none;}\sn.viewer table.threeCol td {width:33%;}\sn\sn#adsense {\sn margin: 1em 15.7em 0em 1em; border:1px solid #ddd;\sn background:#f8f8f8; text-align:center;margin-bottom:1em;overflow:hidden;padding:0.5em;} \sn\sn.sliderPanel { margin-left: 2em; }\sn\sn.viewer th { background:#ddd; color:black; }\sn/*}}}*/\sn/*{{{*/\sn/* for testing clint's new formatter. eg {{red{asdfaf}}} */\sn.red { color:white; background:red; display:block; padding:1em; } \sn\sn/* FF doesn't need this. but IE seems to want to make first one white */\sn.txtMainTab .tabset { background:#eee; }\sn.txtMoreTab .tabset { background:transparent; }\sn\sn.faq ol li { padding-top:1em; font-size:120%; }\sn.faq ol ul li { padding-top:0px; font-size:100%; }\sn\sn/*}}}*/\sn";\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.MPTWPageTemplate = "<!---\snI've just tweaked my gradient colours and the topMenu bit. See HorizontalMainMenu.\sn--->\sn<!--{{{-->\sn<div class='header' macro='gradient vert #000 #069'>\sn<div class='headerShadow'>\sn<span class='siteTitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteTitle'></span>&nbsp;\sn<span class='siteSubtitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteSubtitle'></span>\sn</div>\sn<div class='headerForeground'>\sn<span class='siteTitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteTitle'></span>&nbsp;\sn<span class='siteSubtitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteSubtitle'></span>\sn</div>\sn<div id='topMenu' refresh='content' tiddler='MainMenu'></div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='sidebar'>\sn<div id='sidebarOptions' refresh='content' tiddler='SideBarOptions'></div>\sn<div id='sidebarTabs' refresh='content' force='true' tiddler='SideBarTabs'></div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='displayArea'>\sn<div id='messageArea'></div>\sn<div id='tiddlerDisplay'></div>\sn</div>\sn<!--}}}-->\sn";\n\nconfig.themes.push("MPTW");\n\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.MPTWCurvesStyleSheet = "/*{{{*/\sn[[MPTWStyleSheet]]\sn.tiddler { -moz-border-radius: 2em;}\sn.button { -moz-border-radius: 1em;}\sn#sidebarOptions { -moz-border-radius: 0 0 1em 1em;}\sn.tab { -moz-border-radius: 1em 1em 0 0;}\sn.tabContents { -moz-border-radius: 1em 1em 0 0;}\sn/*}}}*/";\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.MPTWCurvesPageTemplate = config.shadowTiddlers.MPTWPageTemplate;\n\nconfig.themes.push("MPTWCurves");\n\n//}}}\n/***\n!~GTDd3\nCreated by Tomo (Tom Otvos) from http://www.dcubed.ca\n(Based on the original GTD theme by Nathan Bowers at http://snapgrid.com)\n***/\n//{{{\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.GTDd3PageTemplate = "<div class='header'>\sn<div class='headerShadow'>\sn<span class='siteTitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteTitle'></span>&nbsp;\sn<span class='siteSubtitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteSubtitle'></span>\sn</div>\sn<div class='headerForeground'>\sn<span class='siteTitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteTitle'></span>&nbsp;\sn<span class='siteSubtitle' refresh='content' tiddler='SiteSubtitle'></span>\sn</div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='mainMenu' refresh='content' tiddler='MainMenu' force='true'></div>\sn<div id='sidebar'>\sn<div id='sidebarOptions' refresh='content' tiddler='SideBarOptions'></div>\sn<div id='sidebarTabs' refresh='content' force='true' tiddler='SideBarTabs'></div>\sn</div>\sn<div id='displayArea'>\sn<div id='messageArea'></div>\sn<div id='tiddlerDisplay'></div>\sn</div>";\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers.GTDd3StyleSheet = "/***\sn!GTD specific styles\sn***/\sn\sn/*{{{*/\sn\sn/* the tagging popup really gets in the way so push it off to the side */\sn.tagging { float: right; }\sn\sn/* this unbullets actions in the actionList macro */\snul.gtdActionList { list-style-type: none; }\snli.gtdActionListProject, li.gtdActionListContext { margin-top: 1.0em; }\sn\sn.gtdCompletedActionItem { text-decoration: line-through; }\sn.gtdNextActionItem { border-bottom: 1px solid red; }\sn\sn/*}}}*/\sn\sn/***\sn!Imported 3x5 printing styles\sn//adapted from the work of Clint Checketts, http://www.checkettsweb.com/tw/gtd_tiddlywiki.htm //\sn***/\sn\sn/*{{{*/\sn\sn@media print {\sn#mainMenu, #sidebar, #messageArea {display: none !important;}\sn#displayArea {margin: 1em 1em 0em 1em;}\sn\sn\sn/* LAYOUT ELEMENTS ========================================================== */\sn*\sn{\sn margin: 0;\sn padding: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#contentWrapper\sn{\sn margin: 0;\sn width: 100%;\sn position: static;\sn}\sn\snbody {\sn background: #fff;\sn color: #000;\sn font-size: 6.2pt;\sn font-family: \s"Lucida Grande\s", \s"Bitstream Vera Sans\s", Helvetica, Verdana, Arial, sans-serif;\sn}\sn\snimg {\sn max-width: 2.2in;\sn max-height: 4.3in;\sn}\sn\sn#header, #side_container, #storeArea, #copyright, #floater, #messageArea, .save_accesskey, .site_description, #saveTest, .toolbar, .header, .footer, .tagging, .tagged\sn{\sn display: none;\sn}\sn\sn#tiddlerDisplay, #displayArea\sn{\sn display: inline;\sn}\sn\sn.tiddler {\sn margin: 0 0 2em 0;\sn border-top: 1px solid #000;\sn page-break-before: always;\sn}\sn\sn.tiddler:first-child {\sn page-break-before: ;\sn}\sn\sn.title {\sn font-size: 1.6em;\sn font-weight: bold;\sn margin-bottom: .3em;\sn padding: .2em 0;\sn border-bottom: 1px dotted #000;\sn}\sn\snp, blockquote, ul, li, ol, dt, dd, dl, table\sn{\sn margin: 0 0 .3em 0;\sn}\sn\snh1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6\sn{\sn margin: .2em 0;\sn} \sn\snh1\sn{\sn font-size: 1.5em;\sn}\sn\snh2\sn{\sn font-size: 1.3em;\sn}\sn\snh3\sn{\sn font-size: 1.25em;\sn}\sn\snh4\sn{\sn font-size: 1.15em;\sn}\sn\snh5\sn{\sn font-size: 1.1em;\sn}\sn\snblockquote\sn{\sn margin: .6em;\sn padding-left: .6em;\sn border-left: 1px solid #ccc;\sn}\sn\snul\sn{\sn list-style-type: circle;\sn}\sn\snli\sn{\sn margin: .1em 0 .1em 2em;\sn line-height: 1.4em; \sn}\sn\sntable\sn{\sn border-collapse: collapse;\sn font-size: 1em;\sn}\sn\sntd, th\sn{\sn border: 1px solid #999;\sn padding: .2em;\sn}\sn\snhr {\sn border: none;\sn border-top: dotted 1px #777;\sn height: 1px;\sn color: #777;\sn margin: .6em 0;\sn}\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn\sn/***\sn!Imported styles for calendar plugin\sn***/\sn\sn/*{{{*/\sn.calendar{\sn border-bottom: 1px solid #550000;\sn}\sn\sn.viewer .calendar{\sn width: 220px;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendar{\sn font-size: 8px;\sn cursor: pointer;\sn width: 100%;\sn border: 0;\sn border-collapse: collapse;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendar .button{\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendar td{\sn font-size: 8pt;\sn padding: 0;\sn background: #fff;\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendar a{\sn margin: 0;\sn color: #000;\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendar a:hover{\sn color: #000;\sn background: transparent;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendarMonthname,\sn#mainMenu .calendar .calendarMonthTitle td a{\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu .calendarDaysOfWeek td{\sn background: #500;\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn/*}}}*/\sn\sn\sn/***\sn!Layout Rules /%==============================================%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn\snbody { position: static; }\sn\sn.headerForeground, .headerShadow {\sn padding-top: 1em;\sn}\sn\sn.tiddler {\sn margin: 0 0 0.9em 0;\sn padding-bottom: 1em;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu {\sn width: 16em;\sn font-size: 1em;\sn text-align: left;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu * {\sn font-size: 1em;\sn font-weight: normal;\sn padding: 0; margin: 0; border: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu ul {\sn list-style: none;\sn margin-bottom: 10px;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu li {\sn text-indent: 1em;\sn}\sn\sn#mainMenu a.button, #mainMenu a.tiddlyLink, #mainMenu a.externalLink {\sn display: block; margin: 0;\sn}\sn\sn#displayArea {\sn margin-left: 19em;\sn}\sn\sn/*}}}*/\sn\sn/***\sn!Colors Used\sn*@@bgcolor(#8cf): #8cf - Background blue@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#18f): #18f - Top blue@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#04b): #04b - Mid blue@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#014):color(#fff): #014 - Bottom blue@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#ffc): #ffc - Bright yellow@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#fe8): #fe8 - Highlight yellow@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#db4): #db4 - Background yellow@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#841): #841 - Border yellow@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#703):color(#fff): #703 - Title red@@\sn*@@bgcolor(#866): #866 - Subtitle grey@@\sn!Generic Rules /%==============================================%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\snbody {\sn background: #464646;\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sna{\sn color: #04b;\sn}\sn\sna:hover{\sn background: #04b;\sn color: #fff;\sn}\sn\sna img{\sn border: 0;\sn}\sn\snh1,h2,h3,h4,h5 {\sn color: #000;\sn background: #eee;\sn}\sn\sn.button {\sn color: #014;\sn border: 1px solid #fff;\sn}\sn\sn.button:hover {\sn color: #014;\sn background: #fe8;\sn border-color: #db4;\sn}\sn\sn.button:active {\sn color: #fff;\sn background: #db4;\sn border: 1px solid #841;\sn}\sn\sn/*}}}*/\sn/***\sn!Header /%==================================================%/\sn***/\sn/*{{{*/\sn.header {\sn background: #000;\sn}\sn\sn.headerShadow {\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sn.headerShadow a {\sn font-weight: normal;\sn color: #000;\sn}\sn\sn.headerForeground {\sn color: #cf6;\sn}\sn\sn.headerForeground a {\sn font-weight: normal;\sn color: #cf6;\sn}\sn\sn/* ??? what is up when you specify a site title colour in IE ??? */\sn/* .siteTitle { color: red; 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<html><table bgcolor="#ccecff" width=100% border="1"><tr valign="top"><td><b>Box 1.1 The "Hockey Stick" Debate.</b><p>Much discussion has focused on whether the current trend in rising global temperatures is unprecedented or within the range expected from natural variations. This is commonly referred to as the "Hockey Stick" debate as it discusses the validity of figures that show sustained temperatures for around 1000 years and then a sharp increase since around 1800 (for example, Mann et al. 1999, shown as a purple line in the figure below).\n<p>\nSome have interpreted the "Hockey Stick" as definitive proof of the human influence on climate. However, others have suggested that the data and methodologies used to produce this type of figure are questionable (e.g. von Storch et al. 2004), because widespread, accurate temperature records are only available for the past 150 years. Much of the temperature record is recreated from a range of 'proxy' sources such as tree rings, historical records, ice cores, lake sediments and corals.\n<p>\nClimate change arguments do not rest on "proving" that the warming trend is unprecedented over the past Millennium. Whether or not this debate is now settled, this is only one in a number of lines of evidence for human induced climate change. The key conclusion, that the build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will lead to several degrees of warming, rests on the laws of physics and chemistry and a broad range of evidence beyond one particular graph.\n<p>\n<blockquote><i>Reconstruction of annual temperature changes in the Northern Hemisphere for the past millennium using a range of proxy indicators by several authors. The figure suggests that the sharp increase in global temperatures since around 1850 has been unprecedented over the past millennium. Source: IDAG (2005)</i></blockquote>\n<p>\n<center><img src="box-1-1.jpg">></center>\n<p>\nRecent research, for example from the Ad hoc detection and attribution group (IDAG), uses a wider range of proxy data to support the broad conclusion that the rate and scale of 20th century warming is greater than in the past 1000 years (at least for the Northern Hemisphere). Based on this kind of analysis, the US National Research Council (2006)11 concluded that there is a high level of confidence that the global mean surface temperature during the past few decades is higher than at any time over the preceding four centuries. But there is less confidence beyond this. However, they state that in some regions the warming is unambiguously shown to be unprecedented over the past millennium.\n</td></tr></table></html>

<html><table bgcolor="#ccecff" width=100% border="1"><tr valign="top"><td><b>Box 1.2 Recent advances in estimating climate sensitivity</b><p>Climate sensitivity remains an area of active research. Recently, new approaches have used climate models and observations to develop a better understanding of climate sensitivity.\n<p>\n<ul><li>Several studies have estimated climate sensitivity by benchmarking climate models against the observed warming trend of the 20th century, e.g. Forest et al. (2006) and Knutti et al. (2002).\n<p>\n<li>Building on this work, modellers have systematically varied a range of uncertain parameters in more complex climate models (such as those controlling cloud behaviour) and run ensembles of these models, e.g. Murphy et al. (2004) and Stainforth et al. (2005). The outputs are then checked against observational data, and the more plausible outcomes (judged by their representation of current climate) are weighted more highly in the probability distributions produced.\n<p>\n<li>Some studies, e.g. Annan & Hargreaves (2006), have used statistical techniques to estimate climate sensitivity through combining several observational datasets (such as the 20th century warming, cooling following volcanic eruptions, warming after last glacial maximum).</ul>\n<p>\nThese studies provide an important first attempt to apply a probabilistic framework to climate projections. Their outcome is a series of probability distribution functions (PDFs) that aim to capture some of the uncertainty in current estimates. Meinhausen (2006) brings together the results of eleven recent studies (below). The red and blue lines are probability distributions based on the IPCC TAR (Wigley and Raper (2001)) and recent Hadley Centre ensemble work (Murphy et al. (2004)), respectively. These two distributions lie close to the centre of the results from the eleven studies.\n<p>\n<center><img src="box-1-2.jpg">></center>\n<p>\n<i>Source: Reproduced from Meinhausen (2006)</i>\n<p>\nThe distributions share the characteristic of a long tail that stretches up to high temperatures. This is primarily because of uncertainty over clouds20 and the cooling effect of aerosols. For example, if cloud properties are sensitive to climate change, they could create an important addition feedback. Similarly, if the cooling effect of aerosols is large it will have offset a substantial part of past warming due to greenhouse gases, making high climate sensitivity compatible with the observed warming.\n</td></tr></table></html>

<html><table bgcolor="#ccecff" width=100% border="1"><tr valign="top"><td><b>Box 1.3 Changes in the earth system that could amplify global warming</b><p><b>Weakening of Natural Land-Carbon Sinks</b>: Initially, higher levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will act as a fertiliser for plants, increasing forest growth and the amount of carbon absorbed by the land. A warmer climate will increasingly offset this effect through an increase in plant and soil respiration (increasing release of carbon from the land). Recent modelling suggests that net absorption may initially increase because of the carbon fertilisation effects (chapter 3). But, by the end of this century it will reduce significantly as a result of increased respiration and limits to plant growth (nutrient and water availability).28\n<p>\n<b>Weakening of Natural Ocean-Carbon Sinks</b>: The amount of carbon dioxide absorbed by the oceans is likely to weaken in the future through a number of chemical, biological and physical changes. For example, chemical uptake processes may be exhausted, warming surface waters will reduce the rate of absorption and CO₂ absorbing organisms are likely to be damaged by ocean acidification29. Most carbon cycle models agree that climate change will weaken the ocean sink, but suggest that this would be a smaller effect than the weakening of the land sink30.\n<p>\n<b>Release of Methane from Peat Deposits, Wetlands and Thawing Permafrost</b>: Thawing permafrost and the warming and drying of wetland areas could release methane (and carbon dioxide) to the atmosphere in the future. Models suggest that up to 90% of the upper layer of permafrost will thaw by 2100.31 These regions contain a substantial store of carbon. One set of estimates suggests that wetlands store equivalent to around 1600 GtCO₂e (where Gt is one billion tonnes) and permafrost soils store a further 1500 GtCO₂e32. Together these stores comprise more than double the total cumulative emissions from fossil fuel burning so far. Recent measurements show a 10 - 15% increase in the area of thaw lakes in northern and western Siberia. In northern Siberia, methane emissions from thaw lakes are estimated to have increased by 60% since the mid 1970's33. It remains unclear at what rate methane would be released in the future. Preliminary estimates indicate that, in total, methane emissions each year from thawing permafrost and wetlands could increase by around 4 - 10 GtCO₂e, more than 50% of current methane emissions and equivalent to 10 - 25% of current man-made emissions.34\n<p>\n<b>Release of Methane from Hydrate Stores</b>: An immense quantity of methane (equivalent to tens of thousands of GtCO₂, twice as much as in coal, oil and gas reserves) may also be trapped under the oceans in the form of gas hydrates. These exist in regions sufficiently cold and under enough high pressures to keep them stable. There is considerable uncertainty whether these deposits will be affected by climate change at all. However, if ocean warming penetrated deeply enough to destabilise even a small amount of this methane and release it to the atmosphere, it would lead to a rapid increase in warming.35 Estimates of the size of potential releases are scarce, but are of a similar scale to those from wetlands and permafrost.\n</td></tr></table></html>

<html><table bgcolor="#ccecff" width=100% border="1"><tr valign="top"><td><b>Box 1.4 Ice sheets and sea level rise</b><p>Melting ice sheets are already contributing a small amount to sea level rise. Most of recent and current global sea level rise results from the thermal expansion of the ocean with a contribution from glacier melt. As global temperatures rise, the likelihood of substantial contributions from melting ice sheets increases, but the scale and timing remain highly uncertain. While some models project that the net contribution from ice sheets will remain close to zero or negative over the coming century, recent observations suggest that the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets may be more vulnerable to rising temperatures than is projected by current climate models:\n<p>\n<ul><li><b>Greenland Ice Sheet</b>. Measurements of the Greenland ice sheet have shown a slight inland growth,58 but significant melting and an acceleration of ice flows near the coast,59 greater than predicted by models. Melt water is seeping down through the crevices of the melting ice, lubricating glaciers and accelerating their movement to the ocean. Some models suggest that as local temperatures exceed 3 - 4.5°C (equivalent to a global increase of around 2 - 3°C) above pre-industrial,60 the surface temperature of the ice sheet will become too warm to allow recovery from summertime melting and the ice sheet will begin to melt irreversibly. During the last interglacial period, around 125,000 years ago when Greenland temperatures reached around 4 - 5°C above the present61, melting of ice in the Arctic contributed several metres to sea level rise.\n<p>\n<li><b>Collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet</b>:62 In 2002, instabilities in the Larsen Ice Shelf led to the collapse of a section of the shelf the size of Rhode Island (Larsen B - over 3200 km2 - and 200 m thick) from the Antarctic Peninsula. The collapse has been associated with a sustained warming and resulting rapid thinning of Larsen B at a rate of just under 20 cm per year63. A similar rapid rate of thinning has now been observed on other parts of the WAIS around Amundsen Bay (this area alone contains enough water to raise sea levels by 1.5 m)64. Rivers of ice on the ice-sheet have been accelerating towards the ocean. It is possible that ocean warming and the acceleration of ice flows will destabilise the ice sheet and cause a runaway discharge into the oceans. Uncertainties over the dynamics of the ice sheet are so great that there are few estimates of critical thresholds for collapse. One study gives temperatures between 2°C and 5°C, but these remain disputed.</ul>\n</td></tr></table></html>

!!!Resolution on Information and Communications\nadopted by the\n''20th General Assembly''\nof the\n''Conference Of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with ECOSOC (CONGO)''\nGeneva, Switzerland, 3-5 November, 1997\n!!!Information and Communications\n<<<\nThe //20th General Assembly of the Conference of NGOs//, meeting in Geneva from 3 to 5 November, 1997,\n\n//Recognizing// the continuing dramatic advances in information and communications technology, and the ways in which these advances are:\n* transforming access to, and participation in, the United Nations system;\n* creating a forum for non-governmental organizations that transcends national boundaries; and\n* enabling structural changes in the relationships between non-governmental organizations and national and local governments; \n//Recognizing also// that there exist very substantial disparities between countries, and within countries, in the extent to which there is effective access to the global information infrastructure;\n\n//Resolves// to consider how the Conference of NGOs and its member organizations can make use of modern information and communications technology to increase their effectiveness and to strengthen the participation of non-governmental organizations in the work of the United Nations system in order to promote the goals of the United Nations. \n<<<\n\n----\n\nResolution proposed by:\n: [[Information Habitat: Where Information Lives]]\n: International Council of Jewish Women

!The science of climate change: scale of the environment challenge\n!!Key Messages\n* An overwhelming body of scientific evidence now clearly indicates that climate change is a serious and urgent issue. The Earth's climate is rapidly changing, mainly as a result of increases in greenhouse gases caused by human activities.\n* Most climate models show that a doubling of pre-industrial levels of greenhouse gases is very likely to commit the Earth to a rise of between 2-5°C in global mean temperatures. This level of greenhouse gases will probably be reached between 2030 and 2060. A warming of 5°C on a global scale would be far outside the experience of human civilisation and comparable to the difference between temperatures during the last ice age and today. Several new studies suggest up to a 20% chance that warming could be greater than 5°C.\n* If annual greenhouse gas emissions remained at the current level, concentrations would be more than treble pre-industrial levels by 2100, committing the world to 3-10°C warming, based on the latest climate projections.\n* Some impacts of climate change itself may amplify warming further by triggering the release of additional greenhouse gases. This creates a real risk of even higher temperature changes.\n** Higher temperatures cause plants and soils to soak up less carbon from the atmosphere and cause permafrost to thaw, potentially releasing large quantities of methane.\n** Analysis of warming events in the distant past indicates that such feedbacks could amplify warming by an additional 1-2°C by the end of the century.\n* Warming is very likely to intensify the water cycle, reinforcing existing patterns of water scarcity and abundance and increasing the risk of droughts and floods.\n* Rainfall is likely to increase at high latitudes, while regions with Mediterranean-like climates in both hemispheres will experience significant reductions in rainfall. Preliminary estimates suggest that the fraction of land area in extreme drought at any one time will increase from 1% to 30% by the end of this century. In other regions, warmer air and warmer oceans are likely to drive more intense storms, particularly hurricanes and typhoons.\n* As the world warms, the risk of abrupt and large-scale changes in the climate system will rise.\n** Changes in the distribution of heat around the world are likely to disrupt ocean and atmospheric circulations, leading to large and possibly abrupt shifts in regional weather patterns.\n** If the Greenland or West Antarctic Ice Sheets began to melt irreversibly, the rate of sea level rise could more than double, committing the world to an eventual sea level rise of 5-12 m over several centuries.\n* The body of evidence and the growing quantitative assessment of risks are now sufficient to give clear and strong guidance to economists and policy-makers in shaping a response.\n''Contents of Chapter 1\n<<<\n''[[1.1 Introduction]]''\n''[[1.2 The Earth's climate is changing]]''\n''[[1.3 Linking Greenhouse Gases and Temperature]]''\n''[[1.4 Current Projections]]''\n''[[1.5 Large Scale Changes and Regional Impacts]]''\n''[[1.6 Conclusions]]''\n''[[1.7 References]]''\n''[[1.8 Notes]]''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 1\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-01.pdf 21pp. (585 Kb)

!Macroeconomic models of costs\n!!Key Messages\n* Broader behavioural modelling exercises suggest a wide range of costs of climate-change mitigation and abatement, mostly lying in the range -2 to +5% of annual GDP by 2050 for a variety of stabilisation paths. These capture a range of factors, including the shift away from carbon-intensive goods and services throughout economies as carbon prices rise, but differ widely in their assumptions about technologies and costs.\n* Overall, the expected annual cost of achieving emissions reductions, consistent with an emissions trajectory leading to stabilisation at around 500-550ppm CO~~2~~e, is likely to be around 1% of GDP by 2050, with a range of +/- 3%, reflecting uncertainties over the scale of mitigation required, the pace of technological innovation and the degree of policy flexibility.\n* Costs are likely to rise significantly as mitigation efforts become more ambitious or sudden, suggesting that efforts to reduce emissions rapidly are likely to be very costly.\n* The models arriving at the higher cost estimates for a given stabilisation path make assumptions about technological progress that are pessimistic by historical standards and improbable given the cost reductions in low-emissions technologies likely to take place as their use is scaled up.\n* Flexibility over the sector, technology, location, timing and type of emissions reductions is important in keeping costs down. By focusing mainly on energy and mainly on CO~~2~~, many of the model exercises overlook some low-cost abatement opportunities and are likely to over-estimate costs. Spreading the mitigation effort widely across sectors and countries will help to ensure that emissions are reduced where is it cheapest to do so, making policy cost-effective.\n* While cost estimates in these ranges are not trivial, they are also not high enough seriously to compromise the world's future standard of living - unlike climate change itself, which, if left unchecked, could pose much greater threats to growth (see Chapter 6). An annual cost rising to 1% of GDP by 2050 poses little threat to standards of living, given that economic output in the OECD countries is likely to rise in real terms by over 200% by then, and in developing regions as a whole by 400% or more.\n* How far costs are kept down will depend on the design and application of policy regimes in allowing for 'what', 'where' and 'when' flexibility in seeking lowcost approaches. Action will be required to bring forward low-GHG technologies, while giving the private sector a clear signal of the long-term policy environment (see Part IV).\n* Well-formulated policies with global reach and flexibility across sectors will allow strong economic growth to be sustained in both developed and developing countries, while making deep cuts in emissions.\n''Contents of Chapter 10\n<<<\n''10.1 Introduction''\n''10.2 Costs of emissions-saving measures: results from other models''\n''10.3 Key assumptions affecting cost estimates''\n''10.4 Understanding the scale of total global costs''\n''10.5 Conclusion''\n''10.6 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 10\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-10.pdf 14pp. (339 Kb)

!Structural change and competitiveness\n!!Key Messages\n* The costs of mitigation will not be felt uniformly across countries and sectors.\n* Greenhouse-gas-intensive sectors, and countries, will require the most structural adjustment, and the timing of action by different countries will affect the balance of costs and benefits.\n* If some countries move more quickly than others in implementing carbon reduction policies, there are concerns that carbon-intensive industries will locate in countries without such policies in place. A relatively small number of carbon-intensive industries could suffer significant impacts as an inevitable consequence of properly pricing the cost of greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions.\n* The empirical evidence on trade and location decisions, however, suggests that only a small number of the worst affected sectors have internationally mobile plant and processes. Moreover, to the extent that these firms are open to competition this tends to come predominately from countries within regional trading blocs. This suggests that action at this regional level will contain the competitiveness impact.\n* Trade diversion and relocation are less likely, the stronger the expectation of eventual global action as firms take long-term decisions when investing in plant and equipment that will produce for decades.\n* International sectoral agreements for ~GHG-intensive industries could play an important role in promoting international action for keeping down competitiveness impacts for individual countries.\n* Even where industries are internationally mobile, environmental policies are only one determinant of plant and production location decisions. Other factors such as the quality of the capital stock and workforce, access to technologies, infrastructure and proximity to markets are usually more important determinants of industrial location and trade than pollution restrictions.\n''Contents of Chapter 11\n<<<\n''11.1 Introduction''\n''11.2 Distribution of costs and implications for competitiveness''\n''11.3 Carbon mitigation policies and industrial location''\n''11.4 Conclusion''\n''11.5 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 11\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-11.pdf 16pp. (386 Kb)

!Opportunities and wider benefits from climate policies\n!!Key Messages\n* The transition to a low-emissions global economy will open many new opportunities across a wide range of industries and services. Markets for low-carbon energy products are likely to be worth at least $500bn per year by 2050, and perhaps much more. Individual companies and countries should position themselves to take advantage of these opportunities.\n* Financial markets also face big opportunities to develop new trading and financial instruments across a broad range including carbon trading, financing clean energy, greater energy efficiency, and insurance.\n* Climate change policy can help to root out existing inefficiencies. At the company level, implementing climate policies can draw attention to money-saving opportunities. At the economy-wide level, climate change policy can be a lever for reforming inefficient energy systems and removing distorting energy subsidies on which governments spend around $250bn a year.\n* Policies on climate change can also help to achieve other objectives, including enhanced energy security and environmental protection. These co-benefits can significantly reduce the overall cost to the economy of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. There may be tensions between climate change mitigation and other objectives, which need to be handled carefully, but as long as policies are well designed, the co-benefits will be more significant than the conflicts.\n''Contents of Chapter 12\n<<<\n''12.1 Introduction''\n''12.2 Opportunities from growing markets''\n''12.3 Climate change policy as a spur to efficiency and productivity''\n''12.4 The links between climate change policy and other energy policy goals''\n''12.5 The role of pricing and regulatory reforms in the energy markets''\n''12.6 Climate change mitigation and environmental protection''\n''12.7 Conclusion''\n''12.8 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 12\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-12.pdf 15pp. (353 Kb)

!Towards a goal for climate-change policy\n!!Key Messages\n* Reducing the expected adverse impacts of climate change is both highly desirable and feasible. The need for strong action can be demonstrated in three ways:\n** by comparing disaggregated estimates of the damages from climate change with the costs of specific mitigation strategies,\n** by using models that take some account of interactions in the climate system and the global economy, and\n** by comparing the marginal costs of abatement with the social cost of carbon.\n* The science and economics both suggest that a shared international understanding of the desired goals of climate-change policy would be a valuable foundation for action. Among these goals, aiming for a particular target range for the ultimate concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere would provide an understandable and useful guide to policy-makers. It would also help policy-makers and interested parties at all levels to monitor the effectiveness of action and, crucially, anchor a global price for carbon. Any long-term goal would need to be kept under review and adjusted as scientific and economic understanding developed.\n* However, the first key decision, to be taken as soon as possible, is that strong action is indeed necessary and urgent. This does not require immediate agreement on a precise stabilisation goal. But it does require agreement on the importance of starting to take steps in the right direction while the shared understanding is being developed.\n* Measuring and comparing the expected benefits and costs over time of different potential policy goals can provide guidance to help decide how much to do and how quickly. Given the nature of current uncertainties explored in this Review, and the ethical issues involved, analysis can only suggest a range for action.\n* The current evidence suggests aiming for stabilisation somewhere within the range 450 - 550ppm CO~~2~~e. Anything higher would substantially increase risks of very harmful impacts but would only reduce the expected costs of mitigation by comparatively little. Anything lower would impose very high adjustment costs in the near term for relatively small gains and might not even be feasible, not least because of past delays in taking strong action.\n* For similar reasons, weak action over the next 20 to 30 years, by which time GHG concentrations could already be around 500ppm CO~~2~~e, would make it very costly or even impossible to stabilise at 550ppm CO~~2~~e. There is a high price to delay. Delay in taking action on climate change would lead both to more climate change and, ultimately, higher mitigation costs.\n* Uncertainty is an argument for a more, not less, demanding goal, because of the size of the adverse climate-change impacts in the worse-case scenarios.\n* Policy should be more ambitious, the more societies dislike bearing risks, the more they are concerned about climate-change impacts hitting poorer people harder, the more optimistic they are about technology opportunities, and the less they discount future generations' welfare purely because they live later. The choice of objective will also depend on judgements about political feasibility. These are decisions with such globally significant implications that they will rightly be the subject of a broad public debate at a national and international level.\n* The ultimate concentration of greenhouse gases anchors the trajectory for the social cost of carbon. The social cost of carbon is likely to increase steadily over time, in line with the expected rising costs of climate-change-induced damage. Policy should therefore ensure that abatement efforts at the margin also intensify over time. But policy-makers should also spur on the development of technology that can drive down the average costs of abatement.\n* The social cost of carbon will be lower at any given time with sensible climate-change policies and efficient low-carbon technologies than under 'business as usual'.\n* Even if all emissions stopped tomorrow, the accumulated momentum behind climate change would ensure that global mean temperatures would still continue to rise over the next 30 to 50 years.\n* Thus adaptation is the only means to reduce the now-unavoidable costs of climate change over the next few decades. But adaptation also entails costs, and cannot cancel out all the effects of climate change. Adaptation must go hand in hand with mitigation because, otherwise, the pace and scale of climate change will pose insurmountable barriers to the effectiveness of adaptation.\n''Contents of Chapter 13\n<<<\n''13.1 Introduction''\n''13.2 The need for strong and urgent action''\n''13.3 Setting objectives for action''\n''13.4 The economics of choosing a goal for global action''\n''13.5 Climate-change impacts and the stabilisation level''\n''13.6 The costs of mitigation and the stabilisation level''\n''13.7 A range for the stabilisation objective''\n''13.8 Implications for emissions reductions and atmospheric concentrations''\n''13.9 The social cost of carbon''\n''13.10 The role of adaptation''\n''13.11 Conclusions''\n''13.12 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 13\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-13.pdf 24pp. (384 Kb)

!Harnessing markets for mitigation - the role of taxation and trading\n!!Key Messages\n* Agreeing a quantitative global stabilisation target range for the stock of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere is an important and useful foundation for overall policy. It is an efficient way to control the risk of catastrophic climate change in the long term. Short term policies to achieve emissions reductions will need to be consistent with this long-term stabilisation goal.\n* In the short term, using price-driven instruments (through tax or trading) will allow flexibility in how, where and when emission reductions are made, providing opportunities and incentives to keep down the cost of mitigation. The price signal should reflect the marginal damage caused by emissions, and rise over time to reflect the increasing damages as the stock of GHGs grows. For efficiency, it should be common across sectors and countries.\n* In theory, taxes or tradable quotas could establish this common price signal across countries and sectors. There can also be a role for regulation in setting an implicit price where market-based mechanisms alone prove ineffective. In practice, tradable quota systems - such as the EU's emissions-trading scheme - may be the most straightforward way of establishing a common price signal across countries. To promote cost-effectiveness, they also need flexibility in the timing of emissions reductions.\n* Both taxes and tradable quotas have the potential to raise public revenues. In the case of tradable quotas, this will occur only if some firms pay for allowances (through an auction or sale). Over time, there are good economic reasons for moving towards greater use of auctioning, though the transition must be carefully managed to ensure a robust revenue base.\n* The global distributional impact of climate-change policy is also critical. Issues of equity are likely to be central to securing agreement on the way forward. Under the existing Kyoto protocol, participating developed countries have agreed binding commitments to reduce emissions. Within such a system, company-level trading schemes such as the EU ETS, which allow emission reductions to be made in the most cost-effective location - either within the EU, or elsewhere - can then drive financial flows between countries and promote, in an equitable way, accelerated mitigation in developing countries.\n* At the national - or regional - level, governments will want to choose a policy framework that is suited to their specific circumstances. Tax policy, tradable quotas and regulation can all play a role. In practice, some administrations are likely to place greater emphasis on trading, others on taxation and possibly some on regulation.\n''Contents of Chapter 14\n<<<\n''14.1 Introduction''\n''14.2 Designing policy to reduce the impact of the greenhouse-gas externality''\n''14.3 Delivering carbon reductions efficiently''\n''14.4 Efficiency under uncertainty - the implications for climate-change policy''\n''14.5 Setting short term policies to meet the long term goal''\n''14.6 The interaction between carbon pricing and fossil fuel''\n''14.7 Public finance issues''\n''14.8 Co-ordinating action across countries''\n''14.9 The performance of taxation and trading against principles of efficiency, equity and public finance considerations''\n''14.10 Conclusion - building policies for the future''\n''14.11 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 14\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-14.pdf 15pp. (857 Kb)

!Carbon pricing and emissions markets in practice\n!!Key Messages\n* Both tax and trading can be used to create an explicit price for carbon; and regulation can create an implicit price.\n* For all these instruments, credibility, flexibility and predictability are vital to effective policy design.\n* A lack of credible policy may undermine the effectiveness of carbon pricing, as well as creating uncertainties for firms considering large, long-term investments.\n* To establish the credibility of carbon pricing globally will take time. During the transition period, governments should consider how to deal with investments in long-lived assets which risk locking economies into a high-carbon trajectory.\n* To reap the benefits of emissions trading, deep and liquid markets and well designed rules are important. Broadening the scope of schemes will tend to lower costs and reduce volatility. Increasing the use of auctioning is likely to have benefits for efficiency, distribution and potentially the public finances.\n* Decisions made now on the third phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme pose an opportunity for the scheme to influence, and be the nucleus of, future global carbon markets.\n* The establishment of common incentives across different sectors is important for efficiency. The overall structure of incentives, however, will reflect other market failures and complexities within the sectors concerned, as well as the climate change externality.\n* The characteristics of different sectors will influence the design and choice of policy tool. Transaction costs of a trading scheme, for instance, will tend to be higher in sectors where there are many emission sources. The existing framework of national policies in these sectors will be an important influence on policy choice.\n''Contents of Chapter 15\n<<<\n''15.1 Introduction''\n''15.2 Carbon pricing and investment decisions''\n''15.3 Experience in emissions trading''\n''15.4 Designing efficient and well-functioning emissions trading schemes''\n''15.5 Carbon pricing across sectors of the economy''\n''15.6 Conclusions''\n''15.7 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 15\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-15.pdf 23pp. (536 Kb)

!Accelerating technological innovation\n!!Key Messages\n* Effective action on the scale required to tackle climate change requires a widespread shift to new or improved technology in key sectors such as power generation, transport and energy use. Technological progress can also help reduce emissions from agriculture and other sources and improve adaptation capacity.\n* The private sector plays the major role in R&D and technology diffusion. But closer collaboration between government and industry will further stimulate the development of a broad portfolio of low carbon technologies and reduce costs. Co-operation can also help overcome longer-term problems, such as the need for energy storage systems, for both stationary applications and transport, to enable the market shares of low-carbon supply technologies to be increased substantially.\n* Carbon pricing alone will not be sufficient to reduce emissions on the scale and pace required as:\n** Future pricing policies of governments and international agreements should be made as credible as possible but cannot be 100% credible.\n** The uncertainties and risks both of climate change, and the development and deployment of the technologies to address it, are of such scale and urgency that the economics of risk points to policies to support the development and use of a portfolio of low-carbon technology options.\n** The positive externalities of efforts to develop them will be appreciable, and the time periods and uncertainties are such that there can be major difficulties in financing through capital markets.\n* Governments can help foster change in industry and the research community through a range of instruments:\n** Carbon pricing, through carbon taxes, tradable carbon permits, carbon contracts and/or implicitly through regulation will itself directly support the research for new ways to reduce emissions;\n** Raising the level of support for R&D and demonstration projects, both in public research institutions and the private sector;\n** Support for early stage commercialisation investments in some sectors.\n* Such policies should be complemented by tackling institutional and other non-market barriers to the deployment of new technologies.\n* These issues will vary across sectors with some, such as electricity generation and transport, requiring more attention than others.\n* Governments are already using a combination of market-based incentives, regulations and standards to develop new technologies. These efforts should increase in the coming decades.\n* Our modelling suggests that, in addition to a carbon price, deployment incentives for lowemission technologies should increase two to five times globally from current levels of around $34 billion.\n* Global public energy R&D funding should double, to around $20 billion, for the development of a diverse portfolio of technologies.\n''Contents of Chapter 16\n<<<\n''16.1 Introduction''\n''16.2 The innovation process''\n''16.3 Innovation for low-emission technologies''\n''16.4 Policy implications for climate change technologies''\n''16.5 Research, development and demonstration policies''\n''16.6 Deployment policy''\n''16.7 Other supporting policies''\n''16.8 The scale of action required''\n''16.9 Conclusions''\n''16.10 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 16\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-16.pdf 30pp. (317 Kb)

!Beyond carbon markets and technology\n!!Key Messages\n* Policies to price greenhouse gases, and support technology development, are fundamental to tackling climate change. However, even if these measures are taken, barriers and market imperfections may still inhibit action, particularly on energy efficiency.\n* These barriers and failures include hidden and transaction costs such as the cost of the time needed to plan new investments; lack of information about available options; capital constraints; misaligned incentives; as well as behavioural and organisational factors affecting economic rationality in decision-making.\n* These market imperfections result in significant obstacles to the uptake of cost-effective mitigation, and weakened drivers for innovation, particularly in markets for energy efficiency measures.\n* Policy responses which can help to overcome these barriers in markets affecting demand for energy include:\n** Regulation: Regulation has an important role, for example in product and building markets by: communicating policy intentions to global audiences; reducing uncertainty, complexity and transaction costs; inducing technological innovation; and avoiding technology lock-in, for example where the credibility of carbon markets is still being established.\n** Information: Policies to promote: performance labels, certificates and endorsements; more informative energy bills; wider adoption of energy use displays and meters; the dissemination of best practice; or wider carbon disclosure help consumers and firms make sounder decisions and stimulate more competitive markets for more energy efficient goods and services.\n** Financing: Private investment is key to raising energy efficiency. Generally, policy should seek to tax negative externalities rather than subsidise preferable outcomes, and address the source of market failures and barriers. Investment in public sector energy conservation can reduce emissions, improve public services, fostering innovation and change across the supply chain and set an example to wider society.\n* Careful appraisal, design, implementation and management helps minimise the cost and increase the effectiveness of regulatory, information and financing measures. Energy contracting can reduce the costs of raising efficiency through economies of scale and specialisation.\n* Fostering a shared understanding of the nature and consequences of climate change and its solutions is critical both in shaping behaviour and preferences, particularly in relation to their housing, transport and food consumption decisions, and in underpinning national and international political action and commitment.\n* Governments cannot force this understanding, but can be a catalyst for dialogue through evidence, education, persuasion and discussion. And governments, businesses and individuals can all help to promote action through demonstrating leadership.\n''Contents of Chapter 17\n<<<\n''17.1 Introduction''\n''17.2 Market Failures and Responses to Incentives''\n''17.3 Policy responses: Regulation and Standards, Direct Controls''\n''17.4 Policy Responses: Information policy''\n''17.5 Policy responses: Financing Mitigation''\n''17.6 Policy Delivery''\n''17.7 Building a shared concept of responsible behaviour''\n''17.8 Conclusion''\n''17.9 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 17\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-17.pdf 26pp. (317 Kb)

!Understanding the economics of adaptation\n!!Key Messages\n* Adaptation is crucial to deal with the unavoidable impacts of climate change to which the world is already committed. It will be especially important in developing countries that will be hit hardest and soonest by climate change.\n* Adaptation can mute the impacts, but cannot by itself solve the problem of climate change.\n* Adaptation will be important to limit the negative impacts of climate change. However, even with adaptation there will be residual costs. For example, if farmers switch to more climate resistant but lower yielding crops.\n* There are limits to what adaptation can achieve. As the magnitude and speed of unabated climate change increase, the relative effectiveness of adaptation will diminish. In natural systems, there are clear limits to the speed with which species and ecosystems can migrate or adjust. For human societies, there are also limits - for example, if sea level rise leaves some nation states uninhabitable.\n* Without strong and early mitigation, the physical limits to - and costs of - adaptation will grow rapidly. This will be especially so in developing countries, and underlines the need to press ahead with mitigation.\n* Adaptation will in most cases provide local benefits, realised without long lag times, in contrast to mitigation. Therefore some adaptation will occur autonomously, as individuals respond to market or environmental changes. Much will take place at the local level. Autonomous adaptation may also prove very costly for the poorest in society.\n* But adaptation is complex and many constraints have to be overcome. Governments have a role to play in making adaptation happen, starting now, providing both policy guidelines and economic and institutional support to the private sector and civil society. Other aspects of adaptation, such as major infrastructure decisions, will require greater foresight and planning, while some, such as knowledge and technology, will be of global benefit.\n* Studies in climate-sensitive sectors point to many adaptation options that will provide benefits in excess of cost. But quantitative information on the costs and benefits of economy-wide adaptation is currently limited.\n''Contents of Chapter 18\n<<<\n''18.1 Role of adaptation''\n''18.2 Adaptation perspectives''\n''18.3 Barriers and limits to adaptation''\n''18.4 Conclusions''\n''18.5 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 18\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-18.pdf 12pp. (186 Kb)

!Adaptation in the developed world\n!!Key Messages\n* In developed countries, adaptation will be required to reduce the costs and disruption caused by climate change, particularly from extreme weather events like storms, floods and heatwaves.\n* Adaptation will also help take advantage of any opportunities, such as development of new crops or increased tourism potential. But at higher temperatures, the costs of adaptation will rise sharply and the residual damages remain large. The additional costs of making new infrastructure and buildings more resilient to climate change in OECD countries could range from $15-150 billion each year (0.05-0.5% of GDP), with higher costs possible with the prospect of higher temperatures in the future.\n* Markets that respond to climate information will stimulate adaptation amongst individuals and firms. Risk-based insurance schemes, for example, provide strong signals about the size of climate risks and encourage better risk management.\n* In developed countries, progress on adaptation is still at an early stage, even though market structures are well developed and the capacity to adapt is relatively high. Market forces alone are unlikely to deliver the full response necessary to deal with the serious risks from climate change.\n* Government has a role in providing a clear policy framework to guide effective adaptation by individuals and firms in the medium and longer term. There are four key areas:\n** High-quality climate information will help drive efficient markets. Improved regional climate predictions will be critical, particularly for rainfall and storm patterns.\n** Land-use planning and performance standards should encourage both private and public investment in buildings, long-lived capital and infrastructure to take account of climate change.\n** Government can contribute through long-term polices for climate-sensitive public goods, such as natural resources protection, coastal protection, and emergency preparedness.\n** A financial safety net may be required to help the poorest in society who are most vulnerable and least able to afford protection (including insurance).\n''Contents of Chapter 19\n<<<\n''19.1 Introduction''\n''19.2 Adaptation costs and prospects in the developed world''\n''19.3 Providing information and tools''\n''19.4 Is there a role for regulation in overcoming market barriers to adaptation?''\n''19.5 Incorporating climate change into long-term policies for public and publicly provided goods''\n''19.6 Spreading risk and protecting the vulnerable''\n''19.7 Conclusion''\n''19.8 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 19\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-19.pdf 14pp. (210 Kb)

!Economics, ethics and climate change\n!!Key Messages\n* Climate change is a result of the externality associated with greenhouse-gas emissions - it entails costs that are not paid for by those who create the emissions.\n* It has a number of features that together distinguish it from other externalities:\n** It is global in its causes and consequences;\n** The impacts of climate change are long-term and persistent;\n** Uncertainties and risks in the economic impacts are pervasive.\n** There is a serious risk of major, irreversible change with non-marginal economic effects.\n* These features shape the economic analysis: it must be global, deal with long time horizons, have the economics of risk and uncertainty at its core, and examine the possibility of major, non-marginal changes.\n* The impacts of climate change are very broad ranging and interact with other market failures and economic dynamics, giving rise to many complex policy problems. Ideas and techniques from most of the important areas of economics have to be deployed to analyse them, including many recent advances.\n* The breadth, magnitude and nature of impacts imply that several ethical perspectives, such as those focusing on welfare, equity and justice, freedoms and rights, are relevant. Most of these perspectives imply that the outcomes of climate-change policy are to be understood in terms of impacts on consumption, health, education and the environment over time but different ethical perspectives may point to different policy recommendations.\n* Questions of intra- and inter-generational equity are central. Climate change will have serious impacts within the lifetime of most of those alive today. Future generations will be even more strongly affected, yet they lack representation in present-day decisions.\n* Standard externality and cost-benefit approaches have their usefulness for analysing climate change, but, as they are methods focused on evaluating marginal changes, and generally abstract from dynamics and risk, they can only be starting points for further work.\n* Standard treatments of discounting are valuable for analysing marginal projects but are inappropriate for non-marginal comparisons of paths; the approach to discounting must meet the challenge of assessing and comparing paths that have very different trajectories and involve very long-term and large inter-generational impacts. We must go back to the first principles from which the standard marginal results are derived.\n* The severity of the likely consequences and the application of the above analytical approaches form the basis of powerful arguments, developed in the Review, in favour of strong and urgent global action to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, and of major action to adapt to the consequences that now cannot be avoided.\n''Contents of Chapter 2\n<<<\n''2.1 Introduction''\n''2.2 Understanding the market failures that lead to climate change''\n''2.3 Ethics, welfare and economic policy''\n''2.4 The long-run impacts of climate change: evaluation over time and discounting''\n''2.5 Risk and Uncertainty''\n''2.6 Non-marginal policy decisions''\n''2.7 The public policy of promoting mitigation''\n''2.8 International action for mitigation and adaptation''\n''2.9 Conclusions''\n''2.10 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 2\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-02.pdf 18pp. (386 Kb)\nChapter 2: Annex A: Ethical frameworks and intertemporal equity 14pp. (371 Kb)\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/annex-2a.pdf

!Adaptation in the developing world\n!!Key Messages\n* Adaptation to mute the impact of climate change will be essential in the poorer parts of the world. The poorest countries will be especially hard hit by climate change, with millions potentially pushed deeper into poverty.\n* Development itself is key to adaptation. Much adaptation should be an extension of good development practice and reduce vulnerability by:\n** Promoting growth and diversification of economic activity;\n** Investing in health and education;\n** Enhancing resilience to disasters and improving disaster management;\n** Promoting risk-pooling, including social safety nets for the poorest.\n* Putting the right policy frameworks in place will encourage and facilitate effective adaptation by households, communities and firms. Poverty and development constraints will present obstacles to adaptation but focused development policies can reduce these obstacles.\n* Adaptation actions should be integrated into development policy and planning at every level. This will incur incremental adaptation costs relative to plans that ignore climate change.\n* But ignoring climate change is not a viable option - inaction will be far more costly than adaptation.\n* Adaptation costs are hard to estimate, because of uncertainty about the precise impacts of climate change and its multiple effects. But they are likely to run into tens of billions of dollars. This makes is still more important for developed countries to honour both their existing commitments to increase aid sharply and help the world's poorest countries adapt to climate change. More work is needed to determine the costs of adaptation.\n* Without global action to mitigate climate change, both the impacts and adaptation costs will be much larger, and so will be the need for richer countries to help the poorer and most exposed countries. The costs of climate change can be reduced through both adaptation and mitigation, but adaptation is the only way to cope with impacts of climate change over the next few decades.\n''Contents of Chapter 20\n<<<\n''20.1 Introduction''\n''20.2 Adaptation prospects in the developing world''\n''20.3 The foundations of the policy response: building on good development practice''\n''20.4 New policies focused on climate change''\n''20.5 Adaptation costs in the developing world''\n''20.6 International assistance for adaptation''\n''20.7 Conclusion''\n''20.8 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 20\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-20.pdf 19pp. (453 Kb)

!Framework for understanding international collective action for climate change\n!!Key Messages\n* Climate change mitigation raises the classic problem of the provision of a global public good. It shares some key characteristics with other environmental challenges that require the international management of common resources to avoid free riding.\n* International collective action is already taking place in a wide variety of forms, including multilateral, coordinated and parallel approaches.\n** Multilateral frameworks such as the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol provide an essential foundation to build further co-operation.\n** Partnerships, networks and organisations such as the International Energy Agency facilitate coordinated international action.\n** Mutual understanding of domestic policy goals supports further action: the EU, China, and California are amongst those that have adopted strong mandatory initiatives that will reduce the growth of greenhouse gas emissions.\n* Stronger, more coordinated action is required to stabilise concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Successful efforts in many areas, including the protection of the ozone layer, have demonstrated that international co-operation can overcome issues of free riding. Insights from game theory help to inform the design of frameworks for international action.\n* Countries usually honour international commitments where they conform to shared notions of responsible behaviour, even through international law provides weak tools to enforce co-operation. Existing multilateral frameworks can be enhanced by creating a shared understanding of long-term goals and responsible behaviour.\n* The transparency and comparability of national action across a range of dimensions of effort are key to mutual understanding and recognition of what others are doing, as well as ensuring public accountability. Enhancing them will require a strong response from existing multilateral institutions, including those with expertise in monitoring economic policy.\n* Widespread public understanding of the climate change problem and support for action is growing rapidly. Public awareness and support is crucial for encouraging and sustaining co-operation.\n''Contents of Chapter 21\n<<<\n''21.1 Introduction''\n''21.2 Understanding international collective action''\n''21.3 Existing international arrangements for co-operation on climate change''\n''21.4 Building and sustaining coordinated global action on climate change''\n''21.5 Conclusions''\n''21.6 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 21\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-21.pdf 18pp. (214 Kb)

!Creating a global price for carbon\n!!Key Messages\n* A shared understanding of long-term goals must be at the centre of international frameworks to support large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions reductions around the world.\n* A broadly similar price of carbon is necessary to keep down the overall costs of making these reductions, and can be created through tax, trading or regulation. Creating a transparent and comparable carbon price signal around the world is an urgent challenge for international collective action.\n* Securing broad-based and sustained co-operation requires an equitable distribution of effort across both developed and developing countries. There is no single formula that captures all dimensions of equity, but calculations based on income, per capita emissions and historic responsibility all point to developed countries taking responsibility for emissions reductions of at least 60% from 1990 levels by 2050.\n* The Kyoto Protocol has established valuable institutions to underpin international emissions trading. There are strong reasons to build on and learn from this approach. There are also opportunities to use the UNFCCC dialogue and the review of the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol to explore ways to improve.\n* Private sector trading schemes are now at the heart of international flows of carbon finance. Linking and expanding regional and sectoral emissions trading schemes, including subnational and voluntary schemes, requires greater international co-operation and the development of appropriate new institutional arrangements.\n* Common but differentiated responsibilities should be reflected in future international frameworks, including through a greater range of commitments and multi-stage approaches.\n* Carbon pricing and other measures should be extended to international aviation and shipping.\n''Contents of Chapter 22\n<<<\n''22.1 Introduction''\n''22.2 Reducing the costs of mitigation through an efficient international framework''\n''22.3 Sharing the costs of mitigation''\n''22.4 Putting efficiency and equity together: The experience of Kyoto''\n''22.5 Building on national, regional and sectoral carbon markets''\n''22.6 Building on common but differentiated responsibilities''\n''22.7 Challenges of extending international co-operation to aviation and shipping''\n''22.8 Interactions with the international trade regime''\n''22.9 Conclusions''\n''22.10 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 22\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-22.pdf 23pp. (497 Kb)

!Supporting the transition to a low-carbon global economy\n!!Key Messages\n* Demand for energy and transportation is growing rapidly in many developing countries.\n* The investment that takes place in the next 10-20 years could lock in very high emissions for the next half-century, or present an opportunity to move the world onto a more sustainable path.\n* Investment in energy efficiency can reduce demand growth, and low-carbon technologies can further reduce the impact on climate change.\n* The transfer of technologies to developing countries by the private sector can be accelerated through national action and international co-operation.\n* Energy price and taxation reform will play an important role in improving the conditions for investment in more efficient and low-carbon technologies, as they can support other development priorities and encourage co-benefits from mitigation policies, including energy security and improved air quality.\n* Carbon pricing is essential to influence investment decisions in low-carbon technologies, including renewable energy and carbon capture and storage. The Clean Development Mechanism is currently the main formal channel for supporting low-carbon investment in developing countries, but in its existing form it has significant limitations.\n* The incremental costs of low-carbon investments in developing countries are likely to be at least $20-30 billion per year.\n* A transformation in the scale of and incentives for international carbon finance flows is required to support cost-effective reductions. This will require mechanisms that link carbon finance to policies and programmes rather than to individual projects, working within a context of national, regional or sectoral objectives for emissions reductions.\n* Long-term goals and early signals to provide continuity of carbon finance after 2012 are essential to deliver emissions reductions in developing countries.\n* There are opportunities now to build trust and to pilot new approaches to creating largescale flows for investment in low-carbon development paths. The International Financial Institutions have an important role to play in accelerating this process, including through the creation of the Clean Energy Investment Framework.\n* The reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers for low-carbon goods and services, including within the Doha Development Round of international trade negotiations, could provide further opportunities to accelerate the diffusion of key technologies.\n''Contents of Chapter 23\n<<<\n''23.1 Introduction''\n''23.2 Understanding the context for energy sector investment''\n''23.3 Improving the enabling environment for investment''\n''23.4 Accelerating technology transfer to developing countries''\n''23.5 International financial flows for energy efficient and low-carbon investment''\n''23.6 Developing an integrated approach to enhance investment in developing countries''\n''23.7 Enhancing trade in low-carbon goods and services''\n''23.8 Conclusions''\n''23.9 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 23\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-23.pdf 23pp. (262 Kb)

!Promoting effective international technology co-operation\n!!Key Messages\n* The private sector is the major driver of innovation and the diffusion of technologies around the world. But governments can help to promote international collaboration to overcome barriers to technology development. Technology co-operation enables the sharing of risks, rewards and progress of technology development and enables co-ordination of priorities.\n* Mutual recognition of the value contributed by country's investments in new technologies and innovation could usefully be built into international commitments.\n* International R&D co-operation can take many forms. Coherent, urgent and broadly based action requires international understanding and co-operation, embodied in a range of formal multilateral agreements and informal arrangements. Co-operation can focus on:\n** Sharing knowledge and information, including between developed and developing countries\n** Co-ordinating R&D priorities in different national programmes\n** Pooling risk and reward for major investments in R&D, including demonstration projects A global portfolio that emerges from individual national R&D priorities and deployment support may not be sufficiently diverse, and is likely to place too little weight on some technologies with global potential, such as biomass. International discussion and coordination of priorities for investment in R&D and early stage deployment could play an important role in developing a broadly-based portfolio of cost-effective abatement options.\n* A small number of technologies, including solar PV, CCS, bio-energy and hydrogen have been identified in international assessments as having significant global potential. Dedicated international programmes could play a role in accelerating R&D in these areas.\n* Both informal and formal co-ordination of deployment support can boost cost reductions by increasing the scale of new markets across borders. Transparency and information sharing have supported informal co-operation on renewable energy. Tradable deployment instruments could increase the effectiveness of support and allow greater coordination across borders. There is a strong case for greater international co-ordination of programmes to demonstrate carbon capture and storage technologies, and for international agreement on deployment.\n* International co-ordination of regulations and product standards can be a powerful way to encourage greater energy efficiency. It can raise their cost effectiveness, strengthen the incentives to innovate, improve transparency, and promote international trade.\n''Contents of Chapter 24\n<<<\n''24.1 Introduction''\n''24.2 The role of international technology co-operation''\n''24.3 Models for R&D co-operation''\n''24.4 Co-ordinating deployment support''\n''24.5 The use of international public-private co-operation to support''\n''24.6 International co-ordination of performance standards, labels and endorsements''\n''24.7 Conclusions''\n''24.8 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 24\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-24.pdf 21pp. (227 Kb)

!Reversing emissions from land use change\n!!Key Messages\n* Curbing deforestation is a highly cost-effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and has the potential to offer significant reductions fairly quickly. It also helps preserve biodiversity and protect soil and water quality. Encouraging new forests, and enhancing the potential of soils to store carbon, offer further opportunities to reverse emissions from land use change.\n* Policies on deforestation should be shaped and led by the nation where the forests stand but there should be strong help from the international community, which benefits from their actions.\n* At a national level, establishing and enforcing clear property rights to forestland, and determining the rights and responsibilities of landowners, communities and loggers, is key to effective forest management. This should involve local communities, and take account of their interests and social structures, work with development goals and reinforce the process of protecting the forests.\n* Compensation from the international community should be provided and take account of the opportunity costs of alternative uses of the land, the costs of administering and enforcing protection, and managing the transition. Research carried out for this report indicates that the opportunity cost of forest protection in 8 countries responsible for 70 per cent of emissions from land use could be around $5 billion annually, initially, although over time marginal costs would rise.\n* Carbon markets could play an important role in providing such incentives in the longer term. But there are short-term risks of de-stabilising the crucial process of building strong carbon markets if deforestation is integrated without agreements that increase demand for emissions reductions, and an understanding of the scale of transfers likely to be involved.\n* Action to preserve the remaining areas of natural forest is urgent. Large-scale pilot schemes are required to explore effective approaches to combining national action and international support.\n''Contents of Chapter 25\n<<<\n''25.1 Introduction''\n''25.2 Understanding deforestation''\n''25.3 Changing economic incentives to reduce deforestation''\n''25.4 Project-based approaches to increasing carbon storage in land use''\n''25.5 International support for avoided deforestation''\n''25.6 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 25\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-25.pdf 17pp. (562 Kb)

!International support for adaptation\n!!Key Messages\n* Adaptation efforts in developing countries must be accelerated. Adaptation is essential to manage the impacts of climate change that have already been locked into the climate system.\n* The poorest developing countries will be hit earliest and hardest by climate change, even though they have contributed little to causing the problem. The international community should support them in adapting to climate change. Without such support there are serious risks that development progress will be undermined.\n* Transfers to developing-country governments and civil society will be necessary to support adaptation. Additional costs to developing countries of adapting to climate change could run into tens of billions of dollars. Donors and multilateral development institutions should mainstream and support adaptation across their assistance to developing countries.\n* Public-private partnerships for climate-related insurance can help to support adaptation. At the household level, remittances are likely to have an important role in supporting autonomous adaptation.\n* The international community should also support adaptation through investment in global public goods, including:\n** Improved monitoring and prediction of climate change;\n** The development and deployment of drought- and flood-resistant crops;\n** Methods to combat land degradation;\n** Better modelling of impacts.\n* In addition, efforts should be increased to improve mechanisms for improving risk management and preparedness, disaster response and refugee resettlement.\n* The scale of the challenge makes it more urgent than ever for developed countries to honour their existing commitments - made in Monterrey 2002, and strengthened at the EU in June 2005 and at the G8 Gleneagles meeting in July 2005 - to double aid flows by 2010. Strong growth and development will enhance countries' ability to adapt.\n* Strong and early mitigation has a key role to play in limiting the long-run costs of adaptation. Without this, the costs of adaptation will rise dramatically.\n''Contents of Chapter 26\n<<<\n''26.1 Introduction''\n''26.2 International assistance for adaptation''\n''26.3 The role of international private financing for adaptation''\n''26.4 Global public goods''\n''26.5 Risk management and risk preparedness: responding to disasters and resettling''\n''26.6 Conclusion''\n''26.7 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 26\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-26.pdf 18pp. (330 Kb)

!Conclusions: building and sustaining international co-operation on climate change\n!!Key Messages\n* Very strong reductions in carbon emissions are required to reduce the risks of climate change. They are likely to provide benefits well in excess of the costs.\n* Indeed the costs of not acting strongly are likely to be very high.\n* Action is urgent since stocks of GHGs are rapidly approaching dangerous levels, there will be heavy investment in energy infrastructure that could lock in future emissions, and it will take time to develop technologies that deliver zero emissions at low cost.\n* Without a clear perspective on the long-term goals for stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, it is unlikely that action will be sufficient to meet the objective.\n* Action must include mitigation, innovation and adaptation, and there are many opportunities to start now, including where there are immediate benefits and where large-scale pilot programmes will generate valuable experience\n* Countries should agree a broad set of mutual responsibilities to contribute to the overall goal of reducing the risks of climate change. These responsibilities should take account of costs and the ability to bear them, as well as starting points, prospects for growth and past histories.\n* The challenge now is to broaden and deepen participation across all the relevant dimensions of action - including co-operation to create carbon prices and markets, to accelerate innovation and deployment of low-carbon technologies, to reverse emissions from land-use change and to help poor countries adapt to the worst impacts of climate change.\n''Contents of Chapter 27\n<<<\n''27.1 Introduction''\n''27.2 Developing a shared understanding of the long-term goals for climate policy''\n''27.3 Building the institutions for effective co-operation''\n''27.4 Creating the conditions for collective action''\n''27.5 Conclusions''\n''27.6 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 27\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-27.pdf 4pp. (90 Kb)

!Ethical frameworks and intertemporal equity\n\n''Contents of Chapter 2: Annex A\n<<<\n''2.1 Ethical frameworks for climate change''\n''2.2 Intertemporal appraisals and discounting''\n''2.3 Conclusions''\n''2.4 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 2: Annex A\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/annex-2a.pdf 14pp. (371 Kb)

!How climate change will affect people around the world\n!!Key Messages\n* Climate change threatens the basic elements of life for people around the world - access to water, food, health, and use of land and the environment. On current trends, average global temperatures could rise by 2-3°C within the next fifty years or so, leading to many severe impacts, often mediated by water, including more frequent droughts and floods.\n** Melting glaciers will increase flood risk during the wet season and strongly reduce dry-season water supplies to one-sixth of the world's population, predominantly in the Indian sub-continent, parts of China, and the Andes in South America.\n** Declining crop yields, especially in Africa, are likely to leave hundreds of millions without the ability to produce or purchase sufficient food - particularly if the carbon fertilisation effect is weaker than previously thought, as some recent studies suggest. At mid to high latitudes, crop yields may increase for moderate temperature rises (2-3°C), but then decline with greater amounts of warming.\n** Ocean acidification, a direct result of rising carbon dioxide levels, will have major effects on marine ecosystems, with possible adverse consequences on fish stocks.\n** Rising sea levels will result in tens to hundreds of millions more people flooded each year with a warming of 3 or 4°C. There will be serious risks and increasing pressures for coastal protection in South East Asia (Bangladesh and Vietnam), small islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and large coastal cities, such as Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Mumbai, Calcutta, Karachi, Buenos Aires, St Petersburg, New York, Miami and London.\n** Climate change will increase worldwide deaths from malnutrition and heat stress. Vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever could become more widespread if effective control measures are not in place. In higher latitudes, cold-related deaths will decrease.\n** By the middle of the century, 200 million more people may become permanently displaced due to rising sea levels, heavier floods, and more intense droughts, according to one estimate.\n** Ecosystems will be particularly vulnerable to climate change, with one study estimating that around 15-40% of species face extinction with 2°C of warming. Strong drying over the Amazon, as predicted by some climate models, would result in dieback of the forest with the highest biodiversity on the planet.\n* The consequences of climate change will become disproportionately more damaging with increased warming. Higher temperatures will increase the chance of triggering abrupt and large-scale changes that lead to regional disruption, migration and conflict.\n** Warming may induce sudden shifts in regional weather patterns like the monsoons or the El Ni�o. Such changes would have severe consequences for water availability and flooding in tropical regions and threaten the livelihoods of billions.\n** Melting or collapse of ice sheets would raise sea levels and eventually threaten at least 4 million Km^^2^^ of land, which today is home to 5% of the world's population.\n''Contents of Chapter 3\n<<<\n''3.1 Introduction''\n''3.2 Water''\n''3.3 Food''\n''3.4 Health''\n''3.5 Land''\n''3.6 Infrastructure''\n''3.7 Environment''\n''3.8 Non-linear changes and threshold effects''\n''3.9 Conclusion''\n''3.10 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 3\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-03.pdf 36pp. (1 Mb)

!Implications of climate change for development\n!!Key Messages\n* Climate change poses a real threat to the developing world. Unchecked it will become a major obstacle to continued poverty reduction.\n* Developing countries are especially vulnerable to climate change because of their geographic exposure, low incomes, and greater reliance on climate sensitive sectors such as agriculture. Ethiopia, for example, already has far greater hydrological variability than North America but less than 1% of the artificial water storage capacity per capita.\n* Together these mean that impacts are proportionally greater and the ability to adapt smaller.\n* Many developing countries are already struggling to cope with their current climate.\n* For low-income countries, major natural disasters today can cost an average of 5% of GDP.\n* Health and agricultural incomes will be under particular threat from climate change. For example:\n** Falling farm incomes will increase poverty and reduce the ability of households to invest in a better future and force them to use up meagre savings just to survive.\n** Millions of people will potentially be at risk of climate-driven heat stress, flooding, malnutrition, water related disease and vector borne diseases. For example, dengue transmission in South America may increase by 2 to 5 fold by the 2050s.\n** The cost of climate change in India and South East Asia could be as high as a 9-13% loss in GDP by 2100 compared with what could have been achieved in a world without climate change. Up to an additional 145-220 million people could be living on less than $2 a day and there could be an additional 165,000 to 250,000 child deaths per year in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa by 2100 (due to income losses alone).\n* Severe deterioration in the local climate could lead, in some parts of the developing world, to mass migration and conflict, especially as another 2-3 billion people are added to the developing world's population in the next few decades:\n** Rising sea levels, advancing desertification and other climate-driven changes could drive millions of people to migrate: more than a fifth of Bangladesh could be under water with a 1m rise in sea levels - a possibility by the end of the century.\n** Drought and other climate-related shocks risk sparking conflict and violence, with West Africa and the Nile Basin particularly vulnerable given their high water interdependence.\n* These risks place an even greater premium on fostering growth and development to reduce the vulnerability of developing countries to climate change.\n* However, little can now be done to change the likely adverse effects that some developing countries will face in the next few decades, and so some adaptation will be essential. Strong and early mitigation is the only way to avoid some of the more severe impacts that could occur in the second half of this century.\n''Contents of Chapter 4\n<<<\n''4.1 Introduction''\n''4.2 The vulnerability of developing countries to a changing climate''\n''4.3 Direct implications of climate change for health, livelihoods and growth: what can be learnt from natural disasters?''\n''4.4 What do global climate change models predict for developing countries?''\n''4.5 Impact of climate change on economic growth prospects and implications for incomes and health''\n''4.6 Population movement and risk of conflict''\n''4.7 Implications of Climate Change on other Aspects of Development''\n''4.8 Conclusion''\n''4.9 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 4\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-04.pdf 30pp. (832 Kb)

!Costs of climate change in developed countries\n!!Key Messages\n* Climate change will have some positive effects for a few developed countries for moderate amounts of warming, but will become very damaging at the higher temperatures that threaten the world in the second half of this century.\n** In higher latitude regions, such as Canada, Russia and Scandinavia, climate change could bring net benefits up to 2 or 3°C through higher agricultural yields, lower winter mortality, lower heating requirements, and a potential boost to tourism. But these regions will also experience the most rapid rates of warming with serious consequences for biodiversity and local livelihoods.\n** Developed countries in lower latitudes will be more vulnerable. Regions where water is already scarce will face serious difficulties and rising costs. Recent studies suggest a 2°C rise in global temperatures may lead to a 20% reduction in water availability and crop yields in southern Europe and a more erratic water supply in California, as the mountain snowpack melts by 25 - 40%.\n** In the USA, one study predicts a mix of costs and benefits initially (� 1% GDP), but then declines in GDP even in the most optimistic scenarios once global temperatures exceed 3°C.\n** The poorest will be the most vulnerable. People on lower incomes are more likely to live in poorquality housing in higher-risk areas and have fewer financial resources to cope with climate change, including lack of comprehensive insurance cover.\n* The costs of extreme weather events, such as storms, floods, droughts, and heatwaves, will increase rapidly at higher temperatures, potentially counteracting some of the early benefits of climate change. Costs of extreme weather alone could reach 0.5 - 1% of world GDP by the middle of the century, and will keep rising as the world warms.\n** Damage from hurricanes and typhoons will increase substantially from even small increases in storm severity, because they scale as the cube of windspeed or more. A 5 - 10% increase in hurricane windspeed is predicted to approximately double annual damages, resulting in total losses of 0.13% of GDP each year on average in the USA alone.\n** The costs of flooding in Europe are likely to increase, unless flood management is strengthened in line with the rising risk. In the UK, annual flood losses could increase from around 0.1% of GDP today to 0.2 - 0.4% of GDP once global temperature increases reach 3 to 4°C.\n** Heatwaves like 2003 in Europe, when 35,000 people died and agricultural losses reached $15 billion, will be commonplace by the middle of the century.\n* At higher temperatures, developed economies face a growing risk of large-scale shocks.\n** Extreme weather events could affect trade and global financial markets through disruptions to communications and more volatile costs of insurance and capital.\n** Major areas of the world could be devastated by the social and economic consequences of very high temperatures. As history shows, this could lead to large-scale and disruptive population movement and trigger regional conflict.\n''Contents of Chapter 5\n<<<\n''5.1 Introduction''\n''5.2 Impacts on wealth and output''\n''5.3 Key vulnerabilities''\n''5.4 Impacts of extreme events''\n''5.5 Large-scale impacts and systemic shocks''\n''5.6 Conclusion''\n''5.7 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 5\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-05.pdf 21pp. (469 Kb)

!Economic modelling of climate-change impacts\n!!Key Messages\n* The monetary cost of climate change is now expected to be higher than many earlier studies suggested, because these studies tended not to include some of the most uncertain but potentially most damaging impacts.\n* Modelling the overall impact of climate change is a formidable challenge, involving forecasting over a century or more as the effects appear with long lags and are very long-lived. The limitations to our ability to model over such a time scale demand caution in interpreting results, but projections can illustrate the risks involved - and policy here is about the economics of risk and uncertainty.\n* Most formal modelling has used as a starting point 2-3°C warming. In this temperature range, the cost of climate change could be equivalent to around a 0-3% loss in global GDP from what could have been achieved in a world without climate change. Poor countries will suffer higher costs.\n* However, 'business as usual' (BAU) temperature increases may exceed 2-3°C by the end of this century. This increases the likelihood of a wider range of impacts than previously considered, more difficult to quantify, such as abrupt and large-scale climate change. With 5-6°C warming, models that include the risk of abrupt and large-scale climate change estimate a 5-10% loss in global GDP, with poor countries suffering costs in excess of 10%. The risks, however, cover a very broad range and involve the possibility of much higher losses. This underlines the importance of revisiting past estimates.\n* Modelling over many decades, regions and possible outcomes demands that we make distributional and ethical judgements systematically and explicitly. Attaching little weight to the future, simply because it is in the future ('pure time discounting'), would produce low estimates of cost - but if you care little for the future you will not wish to take action on climate change.\n* Using an Integrated Assessment Model, and with due caution about the ability to model, we estimate the total cost of BAU climate change over the next two centuries to equate to an average reduction in global per-capita consumption of 5%, at a minimum, now and forever.\n* The cost of BAU would increase still further, were the model to take account of three important factors:\n** First, including direct impacts on the environment and human health ('non-market' impacts) increases the total cost of BAU climate change from 5% to 11%, although valuations here raise difficult ethical and measurement issues. But this does not fully include 'socially contingent' impacts such as social and political instability, which are very difficult to measure in monetary terms;\n** Second, some recent scientific evidence indicates that the climate system may be more responsive to greenhouse-gas emissions than previously thought, because of the existence of amplifying feedbacks in the climate system. Our estimates indicate that the potential scale of the climate response could increase the cost of BAU climate change from 5% to 7%, or from 11% to 14% if non-market impacts are included. In fact, these may be only modest estimates of the bigger risks - the science here is still developing and broader risks are plausible;\n** Third, a disproportionate burden of climate change impacts fall on poor regions of the world.\n* Based on existing studies, giving this burden stronger relative weight could increase the cost of BAU by more than one quarter.\n* Putting these three additional factors together would increase the total cost of BAU climate change to the equivalent of around a 20% reduction in current per-capita consumption, now and forever.\n* Distributional judgements, a concern with living standards beyond those elements reflected in GDP, and modern approaches to uncertainty all suggest that the appropriate estimate of damages may well lie in the upper part of the range 5-20%. Much, but not all, of that loss could be avoided through a strong mitigation policy. We argue in Part III that this can be achieved at a far lower cost.\n''Contents of Chapter 6\n<<<\n''6.1 Introduction''\n''6.2 What existing models calculate and include''\n''6.3 Do the existing models fully capture the likely cost of climate change?''\n''6.4 Calculating the global cost of climate change: an 'expected-utility' analysis''\n''6.5 Conclusion''\n''6.6 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 6\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-06.pdf 25pp. (329 Kb)

!Projecting the growth of greenhouse-gas emissions\n!!Key Messages\n* Greenhouse-gas concentrations in the atmosphere now stand at around 430ppm CO~~2~~ equivalent, compared with only 280ppm before the Industrial Revolution. The stock is rising, driven by increasing emissions from human activities, including energy generation and land-use change.\n* Emissions have been driven by economic development. CO~~2~~ emissions per head have been strongly correlated with GDP per head across time and countries. North America and Europe have produced around 70% of CO~~2~~ emissions from energy production since 1850, while developing countries - non-Annex 1 parties under the Kyoto Protocol - account for less than one quarter of cumulative emissions.\n* Annual emissions are still rising. Emissions of carbon dioxide, which accounts for the largest share of greenhouse gases, grew at an average annual rate of around 2½% between 1950 and 2000. In 2000, emissions of all greenhouse gases were around 42Gt CO~~2~~e, increasing concentrations at a rate of about 2.7ppm CO~~2~~e per year.\n* Without action to combat climate change, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases will continue to rise. In a plausible 'business as usual' scenario, they will reach 550ppm CO~~2~~e by 2035, then increasing at 4½ppm per year and still accelerating.\n* Most future emissions growth will come from today's developing countries, because of more rapid population and GDP growth than developed countries, and an increasing share of energy-intensive industries. The non-Annex 1 parties are likely to account for over three quarters of the increase in energy-related CO~~2~~ emissions between 2004 and 2030, according to the International Energy Agency, with China alone accounting for over one third of the increase.\n* Total emissions are likely to increase more rapidly than emissions per head, as global population growth is likely to remain positive at least to 2050.\n* The relationship between economic growth and development and CO~~2~~ emissions growth is not immutable. There are examples where changes in energy technologies, the structure of economies and the pattern of demand have reduced the responsiveness of emissions to income growth, particularly in the richest countries. Strong, deliberate policy choices will be needed, however, to decarbonise both developed and developing countries on the scale required for climate stabilisation.\n* Increasing scarcity of fossil fuels alone will not stop emissions growth in time. The stocks of hydrocarbons that are profitable to extract (under current policies) are more than enough to take the world to levels of CO~~2~~ concentrations well beyond 750ppm, with very dangerous consequences for climate-change impacts. Indeed, with business as usual, energy users are likely to switch towards more carbon-intensive coal, oil shales and synfuels, tending to increase rates of emissions growth. It is important to redirect energy-sector research, development and investment away from these sources towards low-carbon technologies.\n* Extensive carbon capture and storage would allow some continued use of fossil fuels, and help guard against the risk of fossil fuel prices falling in response to global climate-change policy, undermining its effectiveness.\n''Contents of Chapter 7\n<<<\n''7.1 Introduction''\n''7.2 Past greenhouse-gas emissions and current trends''\n''7.3 The determinants of energy-related CO2 emissions''\n''7.4 The role of growth in incomes and population in driving emissions''\n''7.5 The role of technology and efficiency in breaking the link between growth and emissions''\n''7.6 The impact of fossil-fuel scarcity on emissions growth''\n''7.7 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 7\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-07.pdf 22pp. (680 Kb)\nChapter 7: Annex A: Climate change and the environmental Kuznets curve 2pp. (54 Kb)\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/annex-07a.pdf\nChapter 7: Annex B: Emissions from the power sector 3pp. (36 Kb)\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/annex-07b.pdf\nChapter 7: Annex C: Emissions from the transport sector 4pp. (139 Kb)\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/annex-07c.pdf\nChapter 7: Annex D: Emissions from the industry sector 4pp. (39 Kb)\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/annex-07d.pdf\nChapter 7: Annex F: Emissions from the land-use change and forestry sector pp. ()\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/annex-7f.pdf

!Climate change and the environmental Kuznets curve\n\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 7: Annex A\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/annex-07a.pdf 2pp. (54 Kb)

!Emissions from the power sector\n\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 7: Annex B\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/annex-07b.pdf 3pp. (36 Kb)

!Emissions from the transport sector\n\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 7: Annex C\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/annex-07c.pdf 4pp. (139 Kb)

!Emissions from the industry sector\n\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 7: Annex D\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/annex-07d.pdf 4pp. (39 Kb)

!Emissions from the land-use change and forestry sector\n\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 7: Annex F\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/annex-7f.pdf 0pp. ()

!The challenge of stabilisation\n!!Key Messages\n* The world is already irrevocably committed to further climate changes, which will lead to adverse impacts in many areas. Global temperatures, and therefore the severity of impacts, will continue to rise unless the stock of greenhouse gases is stabilised.\n* Urgent action is now required to prevent temperatures rising to even higher levels, lowering the risks of impacts that could otherwise seriously threaten lives and livelihoods worldwide.\n* Stabilisation - at whatever level - requires that annual emissions be brought down to the level that balances the Earth's natural capacity to remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. In the long term, global emissions will need to be reduced to less than 5Gt CO~~2~~e, over 80% below current annual emissions, to maintain stabilisation. The longer emissions remain above the level of natural absorption, the higher the final stabilisation level will be.\n* Stabilisation cannot be achieved without global action to reduce emissions. Early action to stabilise this stock at a relatively low level will avoid the risk and cost of bigger cuts later. The longer action is delayed, the harder it will become.\n* Stabilising at or below 550 ppm CO~~2~~e (around 440-500 ppm CO~~2~~ only) would require global emissions to peak in the next 10 - 20 years, and then fall at a rate of at least 1-3% per year. By 2050, global emissions would need to be around 25% below current levels. These cuts will have to be made in the context of a world economy in 2050 that may be three to four times larger than today - so emissions per unit of GDP would need to be just one quarter of current levels by 2050.\n* Delaying the peak in global emissions from 2020 to 2030 would almost double the rate of reduction needed to stabilise at 550 ppm CO~~2~~e. A further ten-year delay could make stabilisation at 550 ppm CO~~2~~e impractical, unless early actions were taken to dramatically slow the growth in emissions prior to the peak.\n* To stabilise at 450 ppm CO~~2~~e, without overshooting, global emissions would need to peak in the next 10 years and then fall at more than 5% per year, reaching 70% below current levels by 2050. This is likely to be unachievable with current and foreseeable technologies.\n* If carbon absorption were to weaken, future emissions would need to be cut even more rapidly to hit any given stabilisation target for atmospheric concentration.\n* Overshooting paths involve greater risks to the climate than if the stabilisation level were approached from below, as the world would experience at least a century of temperatures, and therefore impacts, close to those expected for the peak level of emissions.\n* Some of these impacts might be irreversible. In addition, overshooting paths require that emissions be reduced to extremely low levels, below the level of natural absorption, which may not be feasible.\n* Energy systems are subject to very significant inertia. It is important to avoid getting 'locked into' long-lived high carbon technologies, and to invest early in low carbon alternatives.\n''Contents of Chapter 8\n<<<\n''8.1 Introduction''\n''8.2 Stabilising the stock of greenhouse gases''\n''8.3 Stabilising carbon dioxide concentrations''\n''8.4 Stabilising concentrations of non-CO2 gases''\n''8.5 Pathways to stabilisation''\n''8.6 Timing of Emissions Reductions''\n''8.7 The Scale of the Challenge''\n''8.8 Conclusions''\n''8.9 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 8\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-08.pdf 18pp. (660 Kb)

!Identifying the costs of mitigation\n!!Key Messages\n* Slowly reducing emissions of greenhouse gasses that cause climate change is likely to entail some costs. Costs include the expense of developing and deploying low-emission and high-efficiency technologies and the cost to consumers of switching spending from emissions-intensive to low-emission goods and services.\n* Fossil fuel emissions can be cut in several ways: reducing demand for carbon-intensive products, increasing energy efficiency, and switching to low-carbon technologies. Non-fossil fuel emissions are also an important source of emission savings. Costs will differ considerably depending on which methods and techniques are used where.\n** Reducing demand for emissions-intensive goods and services is part of the solution. If prices start to reflect the full costs of production, including the greenhouse gas externality, consumers and firms will react by shifting to relatively cheaper low-carbon products. Increasing awareness of climate change is also likely to influence demand. But demand-side factors alone are unlikely to achieve all the emissions reductions required.\n** Efficiency gains offer opportunities both to save money and to reduce emissions, but require the removal of barriers to the uptake of more efficient technologies and methods.\n** A range of low-carbon technologies is already available, although many are currently more expensive than fossil-fuel equivalents. Cleaner and more efficient power, heat and transport technologies are needed to make radical emission cuts in the medium to long term. Their future costs are uncertain, but experience with other technologies has helped to develop an understanding of the key risks. The evidence indicates that efficiency is likely to increase and average costs to fall with scale and experience.\n** Reducing non-fossil fuel emissions will also yield important emission savings. The cost of reducing emissions from deforestation, in particular, may be relatively low, if appropriate institutional and incentive structures are put in place and the countries facing this challenge receive adequate assistance. Emissions cuts will be more challenging to achieve in agriculture, the other main non-energy source.\n* A portfolio of technologies will be needed. Greenhouse gases are produced by a wide range of activities in many sectors, so it is highly unlikely that any single technology will deliver all the necessary emission savings. It is also uncertain which technologies will turn out to be cheapest, so a portfolio will be required for low-cost abatement.\n* An estimate of resource costs suggests that the annual cost of cutting total GHG to about three quarters of current levels by 2050, consistent with a 550ppm CO~~2~~e stabilisation level, will be in the range - 1.0 to +3.5% of GDP, with an average estimate of approximately 1%. This depends on steady reductions in the cost of low-carbon technologies, relative to the cost of the technologies currently deployed, and improvements in energy efficiency. The range is wide because of the uncertainties as to future rates of innovation and fossil-fuel extraction costs. The better the policy, the lower the cost.\n* Mitigation costs will vary according to how and when emissions are cut. Without early, well-planned action, the costs of mitigating emissions will be greater.\n''Contents of Chapter 9\n<<<\n''9.1 Introduction''\n''9.2 Calculating the costs of cutting GHG emissions''\n''9.3 The range of abatement opportunities''\n''9.4 Cutting non-fossil-fuel related emissions''\n''9.5 Reducing the demand for carbon-intensive goods and services''\n''9.6 Improving energy efficiency''\n''9.7 Low-carbon technologies''\n''9.8 A technology-based approach to costing mitigation of fossil fuel emissions''\n''9.9 Other technology-based studies on cost''\n''9.10 Conclusion''\n''9.11 References''\n<<<\n----\nDownload pdf version of Chapter 9\nhttp://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/chapter-09.pdf 28pp. (363 Kb)

<<<\n"No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it."\n//Albert Einstein// (1879 - 1955) Physicist & Nobel Laureate \n<<<\n''Climate Change 2.0'' is being developed from a vision of a collaborative application of [[Web 2.0]] methodologies to the global [[climate change crisis|Climate change crisis]] and incorporating a transition to an [[Open Source]], [[Creative Commons]] climate. ''Climate Change 2.0'' is based on the recognition of the vital contribution that the combination of the [[economics of information|Economics of information]] and information and communications technologies (ICT) can contribute - and already are contributing - to addressing what is increasingly recognized as the greatest challenges to a sustainable common future, both through the power of the technologies and through the progressive discovery and realization of the fundamental properties and nature of a digital knowledge-based universe and the accompanying profound freedoms and transformation of human consciousness and the emergence of digitally-connected global civil society that has been growing rapidly since the early stages of preparations for the 1992 Earth Summit - of which the [[United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change]] was a key component.\n\n\nWhile Climate Change 2.0 \n<<<\n"''The Interlocking Crises''\nUntil recently, the planet was a large world in which human activities and their effects were neatly compartmentalized within nations, within sectors (energy, agriculture, trade), and within broad areas of concern (environment, economics, social). These compartments have begun to dissolve. This applies in particular to the various global 'crises' that have seized public concern, particularly over the past decade. These are not separate crises: an environmental crisis, a development crisis, an energy crisis. They are all one."\n//[[Our Common Future, From One Earth to One World|http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-ov.htm]]//\n<<<\n''Climate Change 2.0'' is being jointly launched by the [[NGO Networking Commitee]]\n\nDespite the fact that ICT has made indispensable contributions to the understanding of climate change. the lack of recognition of the current and potential role of ICT - and of the [[economics of information|Economics of information]], in addressing the climate change crisis is striking. Among the many contributions of ICT are the:\n* collection and analysis of the evidence demonstrating the nature and dynamics of climate change would not be possible;\n* use of earth observation satellite imagery\n* extensive and timely collaboration among thousands of research scientists, advocates and activists concerned with climate change;\n* use of the Internet as a key medium in the publication and dissemination of information and publications relating to climate change trends\nHowever, while there is a massive amount of information freely available online in relation to climate change,\n* there is no systematic strategy to optimize the organization of climate change information for a digital environment\n* almost all of the major documents are published as pdf files - a format optimized for printing - and that offers fairly primitive and cumbersome navigational features compared to the combination of HTML, scripting languages and database-driven methodologies\n* the pdf files are generally created without even the incorporation of internal pdf navigational tools, i.e. bookmarks, or with systematic inclusion of hyperlinks to references\nIn addition. although there are some excellent examples of the value of process-oriented ICT, little attention is given to the actual and potential use of ICT in such areas as:\n* monitoring and analyzing industrial energy & resource use, often within the conceptual framework of ''industrial ecology'' - see <<wikipedia "Industrial ecology">> at <<wikipedia Wikipedia>>.\n* monitoring and management of residential & office energy use\n* monitoring and management of traffic congestion & traffic flows\n* energy-saving through substituting the movement of information for the movement of people\n!!![[Background / Context]]\n!!![[Draft Plan of Action]]\n!!![[Current Status]]\n!!![[Related Initiatives]]

To date a number of elements of Climate 2.0 have been under development, with a short-term focus on the development of an online platform for the September 2007 ''60th Annual DPI/NGO Conference'' - on the theme of Climate Change in , and in the broader context of the [[NGO Committee on Education]]'s focus on the [[United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development]], 2005-2014, and related international decades.\n\nThe DPI/NGO Climate Change Conference offers a unique opportunity for a demonstration project of [[Climate Change 2.0]] as it will be the last to be held at the United Nations Headquarters before major renovations begin, and there is strong interest in developing a prototype interactive online framework that would provide for real-time participation in the Conference, for this Conference, and as a model to be used for future Annual DPI/NGO Conferences.\n\nAmong the elements that are under development are the following:\n* [[Climate Change 2.0 - The Manhattan Connection]]<br>[[www.climate-change-two.net/|http://www.climate-change-two.net/]]\n** [[Rescuing a Planet Under Stress and a Civilization in Trouble: Plan B 3.0 (beta)]]<br>[[www.climate-change-two.net/rescuing/|http://www.climate-change-two.net/rescuing/]]\n** [[The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom]]<br>[[www.climate-change-two.net/wealth-of-networks/|http://www.climate-change-two.net/wealth-of-networks/]]\n** [[Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review]]<br>[[www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/|http://www.climate-change-two.net/stern-review/]]\n** [[Education, Youth & Technology for Sustainable Development]]<br>[[www.ngo-education.net/workshop/|http://www.ngo-education.net/workshop/]]\n** [[UN Documents Cooperation Circles: Gathering a Body of Global Agreements]]<br>[[www.un-documents.net/|http://www.un-documents.net/]]\n** [[TiddlyPerfect: An emerging hybrid information species]]<br>[[www.tiddlyperfect.net/|http://www.tiddlyperfect.net/]]

<<<\n"No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it."\n//Albert Einstein// (1879 - 1955) Physicist & Nobel Laureate \n<<<\n''Climate Change 2.0: Information Ecology of Climate Change'' is intended to harness the power of the Internet, ''Web 2.0'' tools, the increasingly powerful, converging development of hand-held communications devices andthe accompanying transformative change in global consciousness that are taking place in a millennial transition to a knowledge-based universe to the challenge of global climate change / global warming. \n\nIn adopting this approach, Climate Change 2.0 seeks to engage in appreciattive inquiry into the . including attention to a parallel change in climate - the cascading global transition to a free and open climate of knowledge - a climate of cooperation, sharing and collaboration that is increasingly accessible and yielding fruit in the realms of a knowledge-based universe. A central element of ''Climate Change 2.0'' is the use of Free and Open Source software and support for systematic expansion and development of a global [[Creative Commons]]. \n\n''Climate Change 2.0'' is also a response to a new, second phase of the global dialogue on [[dangerous anthropogenic climate change]]: As the February 2007 report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change made clear, the debate is over. to the ''Inconvenient Truth'' of dangerous global warming, confirmed by the initial report of the [[IPCC]]'s [[Fourth Assessment Report]], the first section of which was released on February 5, 2007. The global consensus is almost unanimous: the debate is over! In phase 2, the challenge is how to respond to this [[Inconvenient Truth]] Now we must take responsible action in light of that truth. \n\n''Climate Change 2.0'' is based on the emerging science of [[information ecology|Information Ecology]] - a science that is based on an understanding of the nature and dynamics of information ecosystems: of an appreciation of the architecture of the information habitats where information lives within these ecosystems, and of the nature and properties of the myriad information species that absorb, digest, organize, exchange, redistribute and transform other information species. In the light of a global commitment to the value of knowledge, a key determining basis for the evolution of these species would truth, Those information species that can so that the value of the information they contain becomes more fully accessible.\n\n''Information ecology'' is also based an an appreciation of the nature, dynamics and fundamental properties of information, information systems and networks; to the interaction between information species - food chains, patterns of competition for access and/or dominance; and to the remarkable new forms of complex, intelligent, information habitats that are becoming possible - of which TiddlyPerfect would appear to be a prime example. [[read more|Climate Change 2.0]]

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''CONGO'' - the ''C''onference ''O''f ''N''on-''G''overnmental ''O''rganizations in Consultative Relationship with the United Nations - is an independent, international, not-for-profit membership association of nongovernmental organizations that facilitates the participation of NGOs in United Nations debates and decisions. CONGO is most active in the major UN centers of New York, Geneva, and Vienna, but extends its work to all regions of the world. In 2000. CONGO became an NGO in General Consultative Status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council.\n* http://www.ngocongo.org

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/***\n|Name|HoverMenuPlugin|\n|Created by|SaqImtiaz|\n|Location|http://tw.lewcid.org/#HoverMenuPlugin|\n|Version|1.11|\n|Requires|~TW2.x|\n!Description:\nProvides a hovering menu on the edge of the screen for commonly used commands, that scrolls with the page.\n\n!Demo:\nObserve the hovering menu on the right edge of the screen.\n\n!Installation:\nCopy the contents of this tiddler to your TW, tag with systemConfig, save and reload your TW.\nTo customize your HoverMenu, edit the HoverMenu shadow tiddler.\n\nTo customize whether the menu sticks to the right or left edge of the screen, and its start position, edit the HoverMenu configuration settings part of the code below. It's well documented, so don't be scared!\n\nThe menu has an id of hoverMenu, in case you want to style the buttons in it using css.\n\n!Notes:\nSince the default HoverMenu contains buttons for toggling the side bar and jumping to the top of the screen and to open tiddlers, the ToggleSideBarMacro, JumpMacro and the JumpToTopMacro are included in this tiddler, so you dont need to install them separately. Having them installed separately as well could lead to complications.\n\nIf you dont intend to use these three macros at all, feel free to remove those sections of code in this tiddler.\n\n!To Do:\n* rework code to allow multiple hovering menus in different positions, horizontal etc.\n* incorporate code for keyboard shortcuts that correspond to the buttons in the hovermenu\n\n!History:\n*03-08-06, ver 1.1.2: compatibility fix with SelectThemePlugin\n*03-08-06, ver 1.11: fixed error with button tooltips\n*27-07-06, ver 1.1 : added JumpMacro to hoverMenu\n*23-07-06\n\n!Code\n***/\n\n/***\nstart HoverMenu plugin code\n***/\n//{{{\nconfig.hoverMenu={};\n//}}}\n\n/***\nHoverMenu configuration settings\n***/\n//{{{\nconfig.hoverMenu.settings={\n align: 'right', //align menu to right or left side of screen, possible values are 'right' and 'left' \n x: 18, // horizontal distance of menu from side of screen, increase to your liking.\n y: 200 //vertical distance of menu from top of screen at start, increase or decrease to your liking\n };\n//}}}\n\n//{{{\n//continue HoverMenu plugin code\nconfig.hoverMenu.handler=function()\n{ \n if (!document.getElementById("hoverMenu"))\n {\n var theMenu = createTiddlyElement(document.getElementById("contentWrapper"), "div","hoverMenu");\n theMenu.setAttribute("refresh","content");\n theMenu.setAttribute("tiddler","HoverMenu");\n var menuContent = store.getTiddlerText("HoverMenu");\n wikify(menuContent,theMenu);\n }\n\n var Xloc = this.settings.x;\n Yloc =this.settings.y;\n var ns = (navigator.appName.indexOf("Netscape") != -1);\n function SetMenu(id)\n {\n var GetElements=document.getElementById?document.getElementById(id):document.all?document.all[id]:document.layers[id];\n if(document.layers)GetElements.style=GetElements;\n GetElements.sP=function(x,y){this.style[config.hoverMenu.settings.align]=x +"px";this.style.top=y +"px";};\n GetElements.x = Xloc;\n GetElements.y = findScrollY();\n GetElements.y += Yloc;\n return GetElements;\n }\n window.LoCate_XY=function()\n {\n var pY = findScrollY();\n ftlObj.y += (pY + Yloc - ftlObj.y)/15;\n ftlObj.sP(ftlObj.x, ftlObj.y);\n setTimeout("LoCate_XY()", 10);\n }\n ftlObj = SetMenu("hoverMenu");\n LoCate_XY();\n};\n\nwindow.old_lewcid_hovermenu_restart = restart;\nrestart = function()\n{\n window.old_lewcid_hovermenu_restart();\n config.hoverMenu.handler();\n};\n\nsetStylesheet(\n"#hoverMenu .imgLink, #hoverMenu .imgLink:hover {border:none; padding:0px; float:right; margin-bottom:2px; margin-top:0px;}\sn"+\n"#hoverMenu .button, #hoverMenu .tiddlyLink {border:none; font-weight:bold; background:#18f; color:#FFF; padding:0 5px; float:right; margin-bottom:4px;}\sn"+\n"#hoverMenu .button:hover, #hoverMenu .tiddlyLink:hover {font-weight:bold; border:none; color:#fff; background:#000; padding:0 5px; float:right; margin-bottom:4px;}\sn"+\n"#hoverMenu .button {width:100%; text-align:center}"+\n"#hoverMenu { position:absolute; width:7px;}\sn"+\n"\sn","hoverMenuStyles");\n\n\nconfig.macros.renameButton={};\nconfig.macros.renameButton.handler = function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler)\n{\n\n if (place.lastChild.tagName!="BR")\n {\n place.lastChild.firstChild.data = params[0];\n if (params[1]) {place.lastChild.title = params[1];}\n }\n};\n\nconfig.shadowTiddlers["HoverMenu"]="<<top>>\sn<<toggleSideBar>><<renameButton '>' >>\sn<<jump j '' top>>\sn<<saveChanges>><<renameButton s 'Save TiddlyWiki'>>\sn<<newTiddler>><<renameButton n>>\sn";\n//}}}\n//end HoverMenu plugin code\n\n//Start ToggleSideBarMacro code\n//{{{\nconfig.macros.toggleSideBar={};\n\nconfig.macros.toggleSideBar.settings={\n styleHide : "#sidebar { display: none;}\sn"+"#contentWrapper #displayArea { margin-right: 1em;}\sn"+"",\n styleShow : " ",\n arrow1: "«",\n arrow2: "»"\n};\n\nconfig.macros.toggleSideBar.handler=function (place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler)\n{\n var tooltip= params[1]||'toggle sidebar';\n var mode = (params[2] && params[2]=="hide")? "hide":"show";\n var arrow = (mode == "hide")? this.settings.arrow1:this.settings.arrow2;\n var label= (params[0]&&params[0]!='.')?params[0]+" "+arrow:arrow;\n var theBtn = createTiddlyButton(place,label,tooltip,this.onToggleSideBar,"button HideSideBarButton");\n if (mode == "hide")\n { \n (document.getElementById("sidebar")).setAttribute("toggle","hide");\n setStylesheet(this.settings.styleHide,"ToggleSideBarStyles");\n }\n};\n\nconfig.macros.toggleSideBar.onToggleSideBar = function(){\n var sidebar = document.getElementById("sidebar");\n var settings = config.macros.toggleSideBar.settings;\n if (sidebar.getAttribute("toggle")=='hide')\n {\n setStylesheet(settings.styleShow,"ToggleSideBarStyles");\n sidebar.setAttribute("toggle","show");\n this.firstChild.data= (this.firstChild.data).replace(settings.arrow1,settings.arrow2);\n }\n else\n { \n setStylesheet(settings.styleHide,"ToggleSideBarStyles");\n sidebar.setAttribute("toggle","hide");\n this.firstChild.data= (this.firstChild.data).replace(settings.arrow2,settings.arrow1);\n }\n\n return false;\n}\n\nsetStylesheet(".HideSideBarButton .button {font-weight:bold; padding: 0 5px;}\sn","ToggleSideBarButtonStyles");\n//}}}\n//end ToggleSideBarMacro code\n\n//start JumpToTopMacro code\n//{{{\nconfig.macros.top={};\nconfig.macros.top.handler=function(place,macroName)\n{\n createTiddlyButton(place,"^","jump to top",this.onclick);\n}\nconfig.macros.top.onclick=function()\n{\n window.scrollTo(0,0);\n};\n\nconfig.commands.top =\n{\n text:" ^ ",\n tooltip:"jump to top"\n};\n\nconfig.commands.top.handler = function(event,src,title)\n{\n window.scrollTo(0,0);\n}\n//}}}\n//end JumpToStartMacro code\n\n//start JumpMacro code\n//{{{\nconfig.macros.jump= {};\nconfig.macros.jump.handler = function (place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler)\n{\n var label = (params[0] && params[0]!=".")? params[0]: 'jump';\n var tooltip = (params[1] && params[1]!=".")? params[1]: 'jump to an open tiddler';\n var top = (params[2] && params[2]=='top') ? true: false; \n\n var btn =createTiddlyButton(place,label,tooltip,this.onclick);\n if (top==true)\n btn.setAttribute("top","true")\n}\n\nconfig.macros.jump.onclick = function(e)\n{\n if (!e) var e = window.event;\n var theTarget = resolveTarget(e);\n var top = theTarget.getAttribute("top");\n var popup = Popup.create(this);\n if(popup)\n {\n if(top=="true")\n {createTiddlyButton(createTiddlyElement(popup,"li"),'Top ↑','Top of TW',config.macros.jump.top);\n createTiddlyElement(popup,"hr");}\n \n story.forEachTiddler(function(title,element) {\n createTiddlyLink(createTiddlyElement(popup,"li"),title,true);\n });\n }\n Popup.show(popup,false);\n e.cancelBubble = true;\n if (e.stopPropagation) e.stopPropagation();\n return false;\n}\n\nconfig.macros.jump.top = function()\n{\n window.scrollTo(0,0);\n}\n//}}}\n//end JumpMacro code\n\n//utility functions\n//{{{\nPopup.show = function(unused,slowly)\n{\n var curr = Popup.stack[Popup.stack.length-1];\n var rootLeft = findPosX(curr.root);\n var rootTop = findPosY(curr.root);\n var rootHeight = curr.root.offsetHeight;\n var popupLeft = rootLeft;\n var popupTop = rootTop + rootHeight;\n var popupWidth = curr.popup.offsetWidth;\n var winWidth = findWindowWidth();\n if (isChild(curr.root,'hoverMenu'))\n var x = config.hoverMenu.settings.x;\n else\n var x = 0;\n if(popupLeft + popupWidth+x > winWidth)\n popupLeft = winWidth - popupWidth -x;\n if (isChild(curr.root,'hoverMenu'))\n {curr.popup.style.right = x + "px";}\n else\n curr.popup.style.left = popupLeft + "px";\n curr.popup.style.top = popupTop + "px";\n curr.popup.style.display = "block";\n addClass(curr.root,"highlight");\n if(config.options.chkAnimate)\n anim.startAnimating(new Scroller(curr.popup,slowly));\n else\n window.scrollTo(0,ensureVisible(curr.popup));\n}\n\nwindow.isChild = function(e,parentId) {\n while (e != null) {\n var parent = document.getElementById(parentId);\n if (parent == e) return true;\n e = e.parentNode;\n }\n return false;\n};\n//}}}\n\n\n

The DPI/NGO Conference Planning Committee:\n\n

The contents of this TiddlyWiki web page were generated from a ''~DataPerfect'' database. ~DataPerfect is a little-known, brilliant relational database compantion of the legendary ''~WordPerfect for DOS'', which was used to prepare the text from the pdf files of The Stern Review for input into the ~DataPerfect database. The design of ~DataPerfect makes it an exceptional vehicle for generating content for TiddlyWiki web pages. \n\n~DataPerfect was written, and is still maintained by, ''Lew Bastian'' - older brother of ~WordPerfect's author; before joinging the ''~WordPerfect Corporation'', Lew had worked for ''IBM'', where he had written some of the early disk-caching patents. The development of ~DataPerfect was discontinued by the ''~WordPerfect Corporation'' after the introduction of Windows, and subsequently, Novell made the program freely available; an active ''~DataPerfect Users Group'' - [[http://www.dataperfect.nl|www.dataperfect.nl]] - of which Lew Bastian is a leading member - provides exceptional support.

[[Welcome]]\n[[Executive Summary]]

/***\n|''Name:''|DisableWikiLinksPlugin|\n|''Source:''|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#DisableWikiLinksPlugin|\n|''Author:''|Eric Shulman - ELS Design Studios|\n|''License:''|[[Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License|http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/]]|\n|''~CoreVersion:''|2.0.10|\n\nThis plugin allows you to disable TiddlyWiki's automatic WikiWord linking behavior, so that WikiWords embedded in tiddler content will be rendered as regular text, instead of being automatically converted to tiddler links. To create a tiddler link when automatic linking is disabled, you must enclose the link text within {{{[[...]]}}}.\n\nYou can also block automatic WikiWord linking behavior only for non-existing tiddler titles, while still automatically linking WikiWords that correspond to existing tiddlers titles or shadow tiddler titles.\n\nYou can also block specific selected WikiWords from being automatically linked by listing them in [[DisableWikiLinksList]], separated by whitespace. This tiddler is optional and, when present, causes the listed words to always be excluded, even if automatic linking of other WikiWords is being permitted. \n\nNote: WikiWords contained in default ''shadow'' tiddlers will be automatically linked unless you select an additional checkbox option lets you disable these automatic links as well, though this is not recommended, since it can make it more difficult to access some TiddlyWiki standard default content (such as AdvancedOptions or SideBarTabs)\n\n!!!!!Configuration\n<<<\nSelf-contained control panel:\n<<option chkDisableNonExistingWikiLinks>> Disable automatic WikiWord links for non-existing tiddlers\n<<option chkDisableWikiLinks>> Disable ALL automatic WikiWord tiddler links\n<<option chkAllowLinksFromShadowTiddlers>> ... except for WikiWords contained in shadow tiddlers\n<<<\n!!!!!Installation\n<<<\nimport (or copy/paste) the following tiddlers into your document:\n''DisableWikiLinksPlugin'' (tagged with <<tag systemConfig>>)\n<<<\n!!!!!Revision History\n<<<\n''2006.12.31 [1.4.0]'' in format